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ABSTRACT 
 Between the Spanish-American War and World War II, the United States Marine 
Corps institutionalized the use of public relations and publicity to craft an elite military 
identity and to endear the Corps to the American public. The Marine Corps adapted this 
approach in the wake of threats to its existence and as the service benefited from the 
power of a sensationalist press in the early twentieth century. Fundamental to the Corps’ 
public relations strategy from 1898 to 1945 was the employment of community-level 
public relations through the use of “human interest” stories, a practice that brought the 
stories of Marines to their hometowns. That the Marine Corps focused much of its 
publicity on the experiences of individual Marines from the turn of the twentieth century 
through World War II is often overlooked.  
 During the interwar period, Major General Commandant John A. Lejeune served 
to legitimize the Marine Corps’ position in the military establishment and in front of the 
American public. Lejeune applied progressive principles of education, 
professionalization, and public relations in order to assure that the Marine Corps survived 
the post-World War I downturn in funding. Lejeune also helped to establish Marine 
Corps alumni groups like the Marine Corps Association and created lasting traditions 
such as the birthday celebration, which helped to ensure that even when Marines left the 
service, they still had an important role in supporting the Corps. Lejeune’s eight-year 
tenure as commandant established lasting policies and the interwar commandants who 
succeeded Lejeune secured his legacy through reinforcing and even expanding his 
reforms. 
 iii 
 Many historians argue that the Marine Corps’ survival and public endearment in 
the twentieth century was rooted in its military actions in World War I and World War II. 
However, it was the early institutionalization of the Corps’ public relations efforts that 
provided consistent community-level support for the Corps during and between these 
wars. From the “follow-up” book in Chicago in 1907 to “Joe Blow” stories in World War 
II, the Marine Corps demonstrated a clear understanding of the need to bring the stories 
of Marines to their hometowns in order to effectively establish a lasting public image. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 1898 through the Second World War, the U.S. Marine Corps actively 
developed a public image that helped to sustain its existence. Through the creation of that 
public image, the Corps also defined what it meant to be a Marine to both potential 
recruits and the American public. The creation of the Marine Corps image was 
unprecedented in its effectiveness in defining the Corps as an elite military service and 
establishing its importance to Americans through the dedicated effort at educating the 
public about its history and mission. While the Marine Corps image is often viewed 
within the vacuum of its tremendous public exposure during the Second World War, the 
Corps’ groundbreaking public relations activities throughout the entire first half of the 
twentieth century paved the way for the strategies it employed during the Second World 
War, which eventually gained the Corps its mythic status. 
The expressed purpose and audience of the Corps’ public image changed 
throughout the period covered by this dissertation. Prior to the First World War, the 
Corps sought to teach the American public about the Marine Corps through publishing its 
history. This was both an attempt to prove its worthiness in the military establishment, as 
well as to fight against the narrative from naval officials that argued Marines were 
worthless aboard the ships of the fleet. In the First World War, the Marine Corps crafted 
its public image specifically to highlight the “eliteness” of the service, first to make sure 
Marines went to Europe, and during the war the elite image helped the Marines gain 
recruits and helped the perception of the Marines to outperform their impact on the 
ground. During the interwar period, General John A. Lejeune specifically aimed the 
crafting of the Corps’ public image toward legitimization and professionalization through 
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education and doctrinal reform. Since the Corps was severely drawn down at the time, 
there was not as much of a need for recruit-focused publicity. During the Second World 
War, the Corps again turned toward recruits, but also employed public relations tactics 
that endeared the public to the Corps’ activities and Marines. 
This dissertation begins with the Corps’ experience in the Spanish-American War, 
both on the ground and in the newspapers back in the U.S. In response to the public 
attention the U.S. Marine Corps received while participating in police actions and 
interventions in the Caribbean, as well as the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps 
began to develop a public image or brand identity. This process started with individual 
recruiters and recruiting stations in the first decade of the twentieth century and was 
institutionalized with the creation of the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau in 1911. At that 
time, the Marine Corps as an institution took an active role in the creation of its public 
image, and the American public’s reception to the Corps’ outreach aides in an analysis of 
the changing nature of American culture as well as the civil-military relationship in the 
United States. While developments such as the adoption of amphibious assault doctrine 
in the interwar period helped to focus the Corps’ combat mission, its public image was 
created by and flourished through the Corps’ attention to its relationship with the public 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The Marine Corps enlisted a different 
approach to its public relations than the other services, thus setting itself apart. While the 
navy and war departments generally utilized publicity only for recruitment during 
wartime, the Marine Corps institutionalized its relationship with the public to sustain its 
existence during war and peace. Between and during the two World Wars, the Corps 
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developed relationships with local and hometown newspapers across America through 
the creation and distribution of hometown human-interest pieces.  
The Marine Corps consistently employed this “hometown” approach for nearly 
half a century, as they transitioned from broad-based human-interest news to “Joe Blow” 
stories during the Second World War. This approach connected the Marine Corps to the 
American public in a different and more substantial way than the other services. By 1945, 
the “Joe Blow” stories found a dedicated audience in individual Marines’ hometowns, 
thus helping the Marine Corps’ part in the war become synonymous with the enlisted 
soldier’s experience in war. 
The current historiography of USMC public relations gives little attention to the 
importance of the Corps’ strategic creation of a public image and its ongoing relationship 
with the public. This dissertation will place the Marine Corps in the broader history of 
public relations, analyzing the importance of previous public relations precedents upon 
the development of the modern Marine Corps.1 The hayday of the American advertising 
movement took place during the Progressive Era in the United States. Historian D.L. 
LeMahieu argues that by the end of World War I, the advertising and publicity industry 
had “rung up over a billion dollars in annual sales,” and “permeate[d] the fabric of 
American culture.”2 Among the most significant developments in the public relations and 
advertising field during this period was the rise and success of the “agency.” Modern 
                                                 
1 For histories of Public Relations as well as the relationship between PR and the government, see Scott M. 
Cutlip, Public Relations History: From the 17th to the 20th Century (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Publishers, 1995); Stuart Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996); 
Stephen Ponder, Managing the Press: The Origins of the Media Presidency, 1897-1933 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999); and Leonard Ray Teel, The Public Press, 1900-1945: The History of American 
Journalism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006). 
2 D.L. LeMahieu, “The Origins of the Advertising Business,” review of The Making of Modern 
Advertising, by Daniel Pope. Reviews in American History (December 1983):571. 
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advertising agencies provided expertise, such as copywriting for advertisements, as well 
as visuals and even local relationships with newspapers and editors. In many ways, the 
Marine Corps also developed “mini-advertising agencies” within its recruiting centers as 
early as 1907, far before the other services recognized the power of public image 
management. The Corps also utilized and prized what is most commonly known as the 
“hometowner” in the world of journalism. Whether it took the form of a “follow-up 
book” of Joe Blow stories, the Corps’ consistent connection to the hometowns of Marines 
represented an important public relations strategy. 
Analyzing the American people’s perception of the Marine Corps brings a war 
and society perspective to a subject dominated by studies of military doctrine. Military 
historians most often concentrate on the Marine Corps’ tactical separation from the other 
services, including the development of amphibious warfare and other distinctly Marine 
Corps roles and missions. This dissertation argues that the development of effective 
public relations ensured the Marine Corps’ success more than military doctrine alone and 
even predated the Corps’ major doctrinal developments. Prior research on the 
development of Marine Corps public relations among historians is limited. The recent 
historiographical debates regarding the development of a “modern” Marine Corps, 
however, make this research both timely and revisionist. While there are numerous 
converging arguments regarding the creation of a “modern” Marine Corps, this 
dissertation connects many of the periodizations and incorporates a social analysis of 
Marine Corps’ public relations efforts into the Corps’ broader development.3 
                                                 
3 These historiographical perspectives on the making of the modern Marine Corps include, Alan A. 
Axelrod, Miracle at Belleau Wood: The Birth of the Modern U.S. Marine Corps (New York: Global Pequot 
Books, 2007); Aaron O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps (Cambridge: 
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Initial scholarship on the Marine Corps’ public relations program during this 
period is limited. This first study was Robert A. Lindsay’s This High Name, which, 
written in 1956, represents a valuable research tool, yet lacks an effective analysis of the 
significance of public relations.4 Examination of the Corps’ public image has seen a 
resurgence since Robert Lindsay’s original study. This historiography includes Craig 
Cameron’s American Samurai, Robert S. Burrell’s The Ghosts of Iwo Jima, Aaron 
O’Connell’s Underdogs, David Ulbrich’s Preparing for Victory, and Heather Marshall’s 
“It Means Something to be a Marine These Days: Image, Identity, and Mission in the 
Marine Corps, 1861-1918.”5 While Robert Lindsay established the basic narrative of the 
Corps’ public relations program, the other studies begin to place the Marine Corps in a 
broader context, providing examinations of gender, culture, and policy.  
In her dissertation, historian Heather Marshall argues that the Corps’ development 
of a public image occurred from the Civil War and was finally achieved at the outset of 
World War I. Marshall also focused on how the American public, and particularly future 
recruits of the Marine Corps received and interpreted the message the Corps delivered. 
While this dissertation and Dr. Marshall’s dissertation agree on the importance of the 
early twentieth century, particularly the development of the Marine Corps Publicity 
                                                 
Harvard University Press, 2012), Jack Shulimson, The Marine Corps’ Search for an Mission, 1880- 1898 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993); David J. Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb 
and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011); and 
Heather Pace Marshall, “It Means Something to be a Marine These Days: Image, Identity, and Mission in 
the Marine Corps, 1861-1918,” (PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 2010). 
4 Robert Lindsay, This High Name: Public Relations and the U.S. Marine Corps (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1956). 
5 Craig Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine 
Division, 1941-1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Robert S. Burrell, The Ghosts of Iwo 
Jima (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006); Aaron O’Connell, Underdogs: The Making of 
the Modern Marine Corps (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
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Bureau, this dissertation will seek to lay out the strategies and approaches the Corps took 
in order to craft and develop the public image and how that fit into both military and 
public relations history. This dissertation also includes both the interwar period as well as 
World War II. The periodization is important to the thesis because while the public image 
of the Corps that emerged from the First World War was indeed full of legend and lore 
still embraced today, the interwar period could easily have broken the Corps’ momentum 
without the leadership of Major General John A. Lejeune and his successors. The 
importance of the Corps’ activities in the Second World War also cannot be understated, 
particularly in light of the consistencies between the public image management strategies 
of both wars. 
This dissertation closely examines how the program defined the Corps’ 
relationship with the American public: most importantly, how the Corps’ public relations 
strategies were institutionalized, legitimized, and optimized. Placing the Marine Corps’ 
relationship with society into context allows historians to better understand the public’s 
fierce support of the Marine Corps, especially when the Corps’ existence was threatened 
during the “unification crisis” at the outset of the Second World War. 
Many of the Marines who participated in the public relations programs and 
actions also play a major role in the historiography.6 Benis Frank’s Denig’s Demons and 
How They Grew is the most informative history of the development of the Combat 
Correspondents system. Frank, a former Marine and close friend of General Denig, wrote 
                                                 
6 See Samuel Stavisky, Marine Combat Correspondent: World War II in the Pacific (New York: Ivy 
Books, 1999); Thayer Soule, Shooting the Pacific War: Marine Corps Combat Photography in WWII 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1999); Jim Lucas, Combat Correspondent (New York: Reynal 
and Hitchcock, 1944); Ted Thomey, Immortal Images: A Personal History of Two Photographers and the 
Flag Raising on Iwo Jima (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996). 
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his book after World War II during which time the Corps’ publicity activities were under 
extreme outside scrutiny. Frank also wrote for a specific audience, the Combat 
Correspondents and Photographers Association. Thus, his book, while informative, 
defends and praises the activities of the Division of Public Relations during World War 
II. While these books do not represent poor scholarship, they do reflect the realities of the 
time in which they were written.7 Books, manuscripts, and memoirs about Marine Corps 
history in general are often criticized because of their hagiographic tendencies. While this 
forces the historian to look critically at these portions of the historiography, perhaps it 
also reflects the Corps’ historic ability to create a cult-like following, both from the 
public and its Marines. 
The Corps’ rise in the media throughout the first decade of the twentieth century 
created suspicion and resentment in some military and political circles. Historian Allan 
Millett argues that President Theodore Roosevelt “felt that the Corps had inordinate 
influence on policy-making,” an influence heightened by increased political patronage in 
the Marine officer corps since 1898.8 In 1908, based on suggestions from naval officials, 
President Roosevelt decided that, due to its seemingly redundant role, the Marine Corps 
better served the navy as an independent landing force.9 On November 12 of that year, 
President Roosevelt removed Marines from the ships of the U.S. fleet. Congress launched 
                                                 
7 Robert Lindsay, This High Name and Benis M. Frank, Denig’s Demons and How They Grew: The Story 
of Marine Combat Correspondents, Photographers, and Artists (Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps Combat 
Correspondents and Photographers Association, 1967) 
8 Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis (New York: Free Press, 1991), 139. 
9 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 139. 
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an investigation into the question and eventually crushed Roosevelt’s Naval 
Appropriations Bill, keeping the Marine Corps on land and at sea.10  
While the Marine Corps faced extinction on average about once every eleven 
years throughout its history, the unification crisis of 1908-9 played a key role in the 
Corps’ increased public relations activity throughout its future.11 Amidst an environment 
of threats to unify or disband the Marine Corps, the service stepped up its activities to 
increase public support. Just as the “muckrakers” of the era used the news to educate the 
public about corporate greed, the Marine Corps used institutional publicity to educate the 
public of its vital role in the military.12 With a record of battles, campaigns, and police 
actions, the Marine Corps sought to saturate the public imagination with tales of its 
exploits. This seemingly simplistic goal, the idea of connecting with the public at the 
hometown level, gained the Corps recognition throughout America. As early as 1911, the 
U.S. Marine Corps established a Publicity Bureau in order to craft its public image and 
manage the news through a close relationship with the press and public. 
The inauguration of President Woodrow Wilson in 1913 also marked a significant 
change to the role the Marine Corps played in enforcing America’s foreign policy.13 The 
previous decade of U.S. policies was isolationist compared to the Wilson years. As 
Wilson’s presidency progressed, the Marine Corps continued to take part in interventions 
                                                 
10 Millett, Semper Fidelis, 143. 
11 Robert D. Heinl, “The Cat with More than Nine Lives,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, No. 6 (June 
1954), 659. 
12 Ewen, PR!: A Social History of Spin, 76. 
13 The relationship between the Wilson Administration and the U.S. Marine Corps is in need of serious 
scholarly study. During Wilson’s presidency, with the help of Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and 
Congressman Thomas Butler (father of Smedley Butler), the Marine Corps gained serious lobbying power 
with both Congress and the President. There is a clear surge in the political power of the Marine Corps 
during this period. A comprehensive study of the origins and outcomes of that political power is beyond the 
scope of this research, yet still remains of serious importance to the Marine Corps’ rise in political spheres.  
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and police actions, the majority of which brought the Corps to the headlines of 
newspapers. The rise of Wilson and the progressives created a dialogue and language that 
cast the Marines’ activities as a necessary fight to preserve democracy. Along with 
America’s historical patronage of the Caribbean, Wilson’s rise further defined the U.S.’s 
role in the Caribbean as one of protection and policing. While historians debate the 
myriad factors of American involvement in the Caribbean, from economic desires to 
Manifest Destiny, the Marine Corps nevertheless played a significant role.14 Between the 
years 1898 and 1917, the Marines landed twenty separate times in the region, and the 
press continued to laud the actions of Marines throughout.15 
In the U.S., the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau continued to craft the Marines’ 
image in the press. In 1914, the Marine Corps created a new recruiting pamphlet called 
The Recruiters’ Bulletin, which was aimed at providing tools for Marine recruiters across 
the country to publicize the Marine Corps through a focus on Marines’ hometowns.16 
Robert Lindsay found that “the Recruiting Publicity Bureau were then not only interested 
in attracting enlistees but also in that prime aim of every public relations practitioner: 
getting the name of your institution before the public in a favorable light.”17 
For the Marine Corps, taking advantage of their nationwide network of recruiting 
stations proved key to building a public image. Marines such as Captain Thomas Sterrett, 
the editor of the Recruiters’ Bulletin knew that building a connection to the public was 
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key. In one of his earliest non-fiction articles, titled “Working the Newspapers,” Sterrett 
provided a thorough account of how a recruiter should establish himself in the 
community, create relationships with prominent local individuals, and approach the 
newspaper editors in that town.18 He discussed ideas of morality, reason, and even 
economics in order to help recruiters understand their role in acquiring new recruits.19  
Sterrett believed recruiting was not just about fulfilling quotas. The point of 
recruiting was to build relationships and instill ideas within the public. It was not a one-
sided concept, but instead an ongoing conversation between the military the public. For 
this reason, the development of the Publicity Bureau, an organization that according to its 
own publication was “in the interests of the recruiting of the U.S. Marine Corps,” was 
pivotal in the creation of the social contract between the U.S. military and their audience, 
the American public.20 
The importance of the Marine Corps publicity campaign also lies in its relevance 
as a lens through which historians can study the broader history of public relations. 
During the First World War, the United States Marine Corps built a public relations 
program that proved far more effective than those of other the military services and very 
closely mirrored the newest innovations in corporate public relations strategies. The 
Corps created a public relations system that proved effective during America’s 
participation in the First World War. With only a few precedents on which to base its 
own publicity model, the Marine Corps employed the talent of former newspapermen and 
journalists in order to create an effective system of information distribution. 
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The First World War was a defining event in the Marine Corps’ development of 
an elite image because it was the Corps’ first chance to prove itself in full-scale battle. In 
preparation for the First World War, the Marine Corps created a land contingent to fight 
on European battlefields. With the help and political activism of Commandant George 
Barnett, the Corps managed to secure a spot to fight in Europe alongside their army 
brethren. 
 Driven by the Corps’ Publicity Bureau and the ideas disseminated through the 
Recruiters’ Bulletin, the Marine Corps operated a tremendously opportunistic publicity 
campaign throughout the war. The former newspaper personnel who directed the Corps’ 
publicity activities made sure that no chance to put the Corps in front of the public was 
missed. From placing the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor in shop windows to the education of 
postmasters around the country to aid in the Corps’ recruiting activities, the Marines, 
more than the other services, knew that the primary goal of its campaigns had to be 
focused on educating the public about the Corps and its mission. 
 One example of the Marines’ public relations accomplishments was that their 
most important recruiting slogan of the war, “First to Fight,” thoroughly permeated the 
public consciousness to the point that it is still used in reference to the Marines a century 
later. Editors of several newspapers and magazines across the country marveled at the 
Corps’ ability to gain recruits with the “First to Fight” slogan. Ultimately, “First to Fight” 
defined not only the public image the Corps saw in itself but also it helped to attract the 
type of recruits to the Marine Corps that would help to reinforce their elite identity. The 
Corps was able to lean on its history of interventions and police actions around the world 
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to fulfill its claims to be the “first to fight.” Without Commandant Barnett’s ability to get 
the Corps into Europe, it might never have taken off with such success.  
Throughout the war, the Marine Corps represented a small fraction of the troops 
on the both the European front and the home front, yet the Marines crafted an effective 
public image of their successes on the battlefield along with the multiplication of the 
stories by the Publicity Bureau at home. With the expertise of civilian journalists, 
newspapermen, and ad men, the Marine Corps focused on small details on the home 
front, assuring that the public knew the difference between the Marines and the other 
services, further pushing the Corps’ name into the limelight. On top of those factors, the 
bending of the censorship rules in theater so that the Marines could be called out by name 
also helped the public the Corps’ wartime saga. 21 With stories such as those of Chicago 
Tribune reporter Floyd Gibbons at Belleau Wood reaching the major newspapers in the 
U.S., the Corps also managed to achieve a level of combat legitimacy that it had not 
previously attained, thus perhaps securing its position in American wars for the indefinite 
future. Nicknames such as “Devil Dogs,” became tremendously popular for Marine 
publicity, despite the debate surrounding the validity that it was a name actually used by 
the Germans.  
 Even though the Marines represented a small fraction of the vast armed forces 
engaged in Europe, back in the U.S., the name of the Marines began to become familiar 
to Americans, not just as a group of soldiers fighting in small islands and exotic 
locations, but also as a battle-tested combat unit fighting alongside the other services. 
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Numerous factors at play in Europe, including the fighting ability of the Marines, the 
ability for journalists to single out Marines in the press at home without breaking 
censorship rules, and favorable news from correspondents in the field all helped to 
legitimize the Corps as a combat institution. Back in the U.S., the Corps’ Publicity 
Bureau, hosted events like “National U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting Week,” which helped 
to familiarize the Corps’ public image at a hometown level. The Corps’ ability to create 
and disseminate a discussion around the successes and failures of recruiting across the 
country through the Recruiters’ Bulletin truly set it apart from the other services. 
 The First World War had done much for the publicity of the Marines and it was 
then the duty of the Corps’ leadership to legitimize the Corps’ position within the U.S. 
military. When John Archer Lejeune succeeded Major General George Barnett as 
commandant in 1920, he immediately began to reorganize the Marine Corps from 
headquarters down. Lejeune introduced sweeping reforms, including a new system of 
promotion and the establishment of the Marine Corps Schools, a predecessor of the 
Marine Corps Command and General Staff College. His reforms continued to focus on 
how the Corps was represented in the American public through history and legend. These 
actions, including the establishment of a Marine Corps Historical Center, helped to 
solidify the Corps’ focus on the preservation and publication of its history. Lejeune 
continued the legacies of the Recruiters’ Bulletin by maintaining an open mind and a 
drive for public relations. Even small reforms, such as the establishment of a mandatory 
Marine Corps Birthday celebration every year, helped to mythologize the Corps’ 
traditions.  
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Lejeune also made sure Marines participated in charity and volunteer projects, 
which, like Major Tom Sterrett’s press clipping service in World War I, cost little, but 
proved particularly effective. In a memo the Officer in Charge of Marine Corps 
Recruitment in 1922, David D. Porter noted that an activity such as “Orphan Outings,” in 
which Marines escort orphans around town and to nearby battlefields, “helps to mold 
public opinion in favor of our service” and find “widespread publicity in many 
newspaper far distant from that city.”22 Lejeune was an expert at getting the most out of 
the Marine Corps for the least amount of money through making cuts in areas where he 
could get advertising for free.23 
 Lejeune’s progressive focus on education helped Marines, both officers and 
enlisted, to improve themselves through the Corps’ schools and programs. With the 
introduction of the Marine Corps Institute in 1920, Lejeune created an enlisted education 
system for Marines around the world to better themselves, and at the same time, the 
public image of the Marine Corps. This was an example of Lejeune’s focus on averting 
problems with Marines being seen as drunken and disorderly sailor-types. With an 
education, a mission, and a network of veteran Marines that comprised a type of 
brotherhood, the Marine Corps could endure and create its own self-fulfilling legacy.  
 Even when faced with a public image crisis sparked by unrest and controversy 
from the Corps’ activities in Haiti in 1920, Lejeune helped to manage the Corps’ 
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response in order to soften the blow, especially during an election year. Lejeune leaned 
on the American public and press to alter the narrative around the situation in Haiti, 
where Marines were accused of excessive force and even murder. Lejeune’s visits to 
Haiti and rejections of the stories that emerged there, re-focused the public conversation. 
Instead, Lejeune spoke publicly about the facets of Haitian society that were different and 
uncanny to the American people, such as the practice of Voodoo and cannibalism as a 
way to solicit the public’s attention and favor.  
 Representation of the Corps in American popular culture also excelled under 
Lejeune’s leadership. Films such as What Price Glory? and Tell it to the Marines helped 
to further refine the Corps’ public image under the supervision and approval of Lejeune 
and Marine leadership. While the Corps was not involved in the creation of What Price 
Glory? its controversial opening on Broadway and Tell it to the Marines’ success at the 
box office helped to bring the Marine Corps further into the public imagination. With Tell 
it to the Marines, Lejeune sought out MGM in order to make a film that was completed 
with the express permission and help of the Marine Corps in order to create a sort of 
recruiting film through a Hollywood motion picture. These silent films still managed to 
include content and words that gave the Corps the edgy public image it needed to keep up 
its image as an elite service. 
The effectiveness of the Marine Corps public relations program was not only 
recognized by the government and the other military services, but also by the private 
sector. Whereas the Marine Corps at first took its public relations lessons from private 
corporations such as AT&T, numerous corporations sought out or commended the 
Marine Corps’ publicity methods during the interwar period. In 1927, Irving S. Bailey, 
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the director of the agency department at Aetna Life Insurance Company sent a letter to 
Headquarters, Marine Corps. In it, Bailey notes that the Corps’ methods and success was 
well known in the private sector. He wrote, “we are very much interested in the methods 
used by the United States Marine Corps in recruiting men because we believe this same 
practice could be used to attract men to the insurance business.” He went on to say that he 
would make sure every man would know the Marine Corps’ name in association with 
their methods.24  
The director of the du Pont Corporation’s advertising department also commented 
on the Corps’ attention and enthusiasm to advertising methods in 1923. After sending the 
company’s agent to the Marine Corps to get some facts about its history, the director of 
advertising expressed his “deep appreciation,” for the “cordial cooperation” the Corps 
showed in aiding the agent in his work.25 These examples show that Lejeune built upon 
the public relations successes gained since 1898. Without a fight for a purpose in the U.S. 
military and without the foresight of Marines in establishing publicity bureaus and setting 
recruiting precedents, Lejeune would not have excelled despite the massive budget and 
manpower cuts of the 1920s. The Marine Corps, therefore, underwent its most serious 
and dramatic changes during this period. 
 The periodization of this study purposely shifts the focus of common arguments 
surrounding the development of the modern Marine Corps. The institutional history of 
the Marine Corps before the development of the Fleet Marine Force in 1933 is often 
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presented as a forethought or simple precursor to the Corps’ experience in World War II. 
Many historians highlight the honored tradition of Marines who fought in the “Banana 
Wars” on the islands of Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, or on foreign duty in China, 
Siberia, or Mexico, and in the first truly World War in Europe, as the significant factors 
in allowing the Corps to reach mythic heights by the Second World War. Yet, these 
combat tours, interventions, and police actions did not alone separate the Marine Corps 
from the army and navy. Without the intentional use of publicity and the emerging 
science of public relations, the Marine Corps could not have enticed the American public 
to rally on the side of Marines or recognize the Corps as the tip of America’s fighting 
spear. Along with the brave exploits of many combat Marines, it was the publicity men, 
former newspapermen, writers, poets, journalists, and correspondents who truly created 
the Marine Corps that would eventually project itself into the future as America’s elite—
“the few, the proud.” 
As the Marine Corps entered World War II, the service built on years of 
institutionalized public relations strategy and again sought out media professionals to 
help bring the Marines’ wartime experiences to the public. That the Marine Corps 
participated almost singularly in the Pacific Theater helped the Corps to consolidate its 
new releases and streamline its tactics to overcome tight censorship. By February 1945, 
the Marine Corps achieved what is arguably the most recognizable image of the Corps, if 
not of the entire war, with the flag-raising at Iwo Jima. It was this moment in the war that 
Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal observed, “the raising of that flag on Suribachi 
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means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years.”26 It is important to understand, however, 
that the systematic exploitation of the image by the Corps’ entire wartime public relations 
system led to the effectiveness of that image. 
In 1941, then Commandant Thomas Holcomb selected World War I veteran 
Brigadier General Robert L. Denig to lead the Corps’ newly established Division of 
Public Relations. General Denig quickly established a system of recruiting civilians who 
had knowledge of public relations, news, photography, and other mediums to become 
Marines, so that they better understood the Corps and could have closer relationships 
with the Marines themselves in the field. The organization Denig created, known as 
Marine Corps Combat Correspondents (CC), set the Corps apart from the other services 
in how it dealt with news and publicity during the war. By turning media professionals 
into Marines, the Corps once again institutionalized its public image.  
In order to reach out to the public and continue to connect the Marine Corps to 
American communities, the Corps deployed CCs to the Pacific to collect stories from the 
enlisted men of the Corps. These stories received the nickname “Joe Blow” stories 
because of their distribution to the Marines’ local newspapers across the country. While 
many stories were popular enough to reach many newspapers, the idea of reporting on an 
individual service member for their hometowns was unique in the military establishment. 
Just as they had in World War I, the Marine Corps built on its network of national 
recruiting centers to extend its reach into middle American. Most stories during the war 
involved either news about local casualties or just big-picture updates about the war, Joe 
                                                 
26
 J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story (New York: Back Bay Books, 1977), 364. 
 19 
Blow stories offered the public positive news items to read about a local Marine that 
might also give them context of the war’s progress. By 1943, the CCs’ stories were so 
well-written and appreciated by local communities that “almost every local editor 
responded and soon the country was covered with Marine Corps Joe Blow stories.”27  
While other historians and writers have analyzed the Marine Corps CC system, 
the continuity of the Corps’ previous public relations efforts is often ignored. Since 1907, 
some members of the Marine Corps understood the importance of involving the families 
and hometowns of Marines. That the Corps’ “Joe Blow” stories permeated American 
society seems clear as by the outset of World War II, the Marine Corps managed to 
receive the title of “a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s” from President 
Truman.28  
 While the Marine Corps Combat Correspondents helped the Corps to convey its 
image through newsworthy “Joe Blow” stories to hometowns throughout the war, 
censorship, recruiting challenges, and internal debates over the nature of the Corps’ 
public image continued to play a role in the service’s public relations decision making. 
The Marine Corps’ invasion of Tarawa in November 1943 and a Marine motion picture 
photographer’s film from that battle was a crucial moment of decision for Marine 
leadership as it pertained to their image in the war. Chapter 5 examines the civil-military 
context of the public reaction to the Battle of Tarawa and the film created by the Corps 
itself, With the Marines at Tarawa. 
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 For the Marine Corps, a confluence of important events in 1943 created both 
opportunities and challenges to their recruiting and the continuation of their image as an 
elite fighting unit. In 1943, the Roosevelt Administration and the Office of War 
Information (OWI) sought to reduce the amount of censorship applied to news material 
coming from the fronts. This was especially applied to images of the war as Elmer Davis, 
the head of the OWI and President Roosevelt believed that the American public were not 
prepared for the true costs of war up to that point. It was because of these changes that 
the Marine Corps, with the personal blessing of President Roosevelt, was able to release a 
motion picture film in early 1944 that displayed the dead bodies of Marines who fell 
during the battle, all displayed in brilliant Technicolor. The film, With the Marines at 
Tarawa, was shot by a young enlisted Marine, Staff Sergeant Norman Hatch, who had 
experience filming short documentaries with the March of Time. Hatch’s knowledge and 
understanding of the importance of narrative in filmmaking helped to bring his footage to 
life in front of audiences across the country.  
 In 1943, President Roosevelt also forced the military services, including the 
Marine Corps to accept new recruits only through Selective Service system. This was a 
tremendous blow to the Marine Corps’ recruiting process because it relied so heavily, as 
it did in the First World War, on its claims to be an elite, volunteer driven service. 
Regardless of the validity of these claims during the war, the Corps’ inability to focus on 
volunteer enlistments forced it to change its approach to recruiting. In order to continue 
accepting volunteers, the Corps opened up enlistments to 17-year-olds, who could 
commit to serving in the Marine Corps, only with their parents’ permission.  
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 With the new lowered censorship rules and the Corps’ new recruiting process for 
younger recruits, the Battle of Tarawa and subsequent film stirred up a debate both in the 
public and within the Marine Corps at the same time. Marine recruiters across the country 
wrote into the Corps’ Division of Public Relations to voice their concerns about the film 
and to discuss the negative reaction of those who viewed it at theaters, especially women 
and children. While the parents of a potential recruit were always an important part of the 
Marines’ public interactions (as the Corps cited so much parental praise for the Joe Blow 
stories), the need for parental permission to sign up volunteers forced recruiters to work 
more closely with parents, and thus made the film’s impact significant for some recruiters 
who cried foul when their numbers dropped after the film’s release.  
 General Denig and the Division of Public Relations, however, did not take the 
same view of the recruiters who complained of the film’s release. When the DPR 
conducted a poll across the nation, it found that some recruiters did run into trouble with 
parents of recruits and might have seen a dip in recruiting numbers during that period. 
However, these recruiters also found that it was drawing more recruits than it seemed to 
deter. It was this interaction as well, that revealed much in the way of how Marines, 
especially the DPR, saw its public image. While certainly the “Joe Blow” stories of 
heroism, triumph, or just everyday occurrences brought the Corps into the hometowns of 
Americans in a personal way, the Corps still saw its image as that of an elite and battle-
hardened service, and if that meant that the public needed to see that its own Marines 
died for a cause, it was certainly appropriate and not to be hidden away. 
 The end of the Second World War brought with it many institutional changes to 
both the Marine Corps and the entire U.S. military. As U.S. forces entered into 
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occupations throughout Europe and Asia, their chain of command began to change. 
Congress’s actions to both draw down and streamline the American military for 
efficiency meant the Marine Corps faced another challenge to its existence. The postwar 
period brought with it an end to the flexibility afforded to the combat correspondents and 
public relations officers in World War II. With the creation of the Department of Defense 
in 1948, all public relations efforts were filtered through an even larger bureaucratic 
system. In no war after 1945 would the Marines achieve the same positive publicity with 
the American public as they had in World War II. As CC Alvin Josephy confidently 
noted, there were a “peculiar set of circumstances working in World War II that were just 
wonderful for this.”29 The new Post-World War II order, however, tested the success of 
the Marine Corps’ public relations efforts over the previous 50 years.  
For nearly a century of its existence, the Marine Corps has defined its members 
upon the basis that they are no longer average men, but something more; Marines. From 
1911, the Marine Corps built a publicity model using methodologies from both the 
private and public sectors. While the army and navy also employed public relations 
methods, the Marine Corps took advantage of its small size and esprit de corps to take its 
case directly to the public; a move that separated the Corps from the rest of the military 
and eventually gained it unsurpassed popularity. In 1947, the Marine Corps removed unit 
patches from their uniforms further signifying that Marines did not need specialized units 
to create esprit de corps. Since then, joining the Marine Corps itself meant becoming part 
of an elite fighting unit.30 This distinction has set the Marine Corps apart from its fellow 
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services throughout most of the twentieth century. To create this public image, the 
Marine Corps took advantage of media and publicity to instill the idea of an elite Corps 
into the public mind. With the establishment of a public relations model, the Marine 
Corps solidified its position as an integral and elite institution in the U.S. military. 
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CHAPTER I – THE PUBLIC RELATIONS RENAISSANCE OF THE MARINE 
CORPS, 1898-1916 
From the Spanish-American War through the First World War, the Marine Corps 
experienced a public relations renaissance. The Marines, once the little understood sister 
service of the much larger and more publicly present U.S. Navy, began to see service 
around the world as the United States expanded with its new territories and increased 
interventionism. In an eager and sensationalist turn-of-the-century press, the Marines 
found a direct line to the public with which it could help to educate and publicize the 
history and current actions of the Corps. By 1907, the Corps began to institutionalize this 
relationship with the press through the introduction of a regional publicity bureau at its 
largest recruiting center, Chicago, Illinois. Following the near removal of Marines from 
the ships of the navy in 1908 and 1909, the Corps again stepped up its public image 
management through the creation of an official Marine Corps Publicity Bureau in 1911. 
The Publicity Bureau served all the recruiting stations of the Marine Corps and in 1914 
began to distribute the Recruiters’ Bulletin, its own trade publication regarding the 
crafting of the Corps’ public image for recruiters. The Corps’ institutionalization of a 
public relations strategy from 1898-1916 represented some of the earliest of its kind in 
the military and ultimately defined a system and a strategy the proved successful for the 
Corps as it entered the First World War.  
When the USS Maine exploded in 1898, the tremendous public reaction became 
an unprecedented and unexpected moment for the Marine Corps and an introduction into 
the importance of publicity in the new century. The newspapers of the time all sought to 
cover the drama that unfolded in Havana Harbor that day. This brought Marines such as 
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Private William Anthony into the public eye. Private Anthony’s actions that day were one 
of the first “human interest” stories to appear in the news following the massive 
explosion. On February 17, 1898, the New York Evening World reported: 
It is told of Captain Sigsbee that he was writing a letter to his wife in the port cabin when the 
explosion occurred. All the lights were instantly extinguished. Sigsbee, running out, bumped into a 
perfectly disciplined marine orderly, who, amid shrieks, groans, flames and horror, and in the 
dark, saluted and said: “I have to inform you that the ship has been blown up and is sinking.” 
…The brave marine is named Anthony. He said to me to-day when I spoke of it: “Oh, that’s 
nothing; any Yankee marine would do that.”31  
A New York Times article in July 1898 compared Private Anthony’s handling of the 
situation with a British Royal Marine who nearly 150 years earlier advised a British 
admiral that the HMS Royal George was sinking by similarly stating “The ship is turning 
over, Sir, and will go down.”32 The story went on to state that “it is hoped that the 
military politicians of both countries [Great Britain and the United States] will allow to 
live the “ever faithful” corps that have done so much, have so much that is worthy in 
common, and have been so little understood by the civilian.”33 
 The Marine Corps’ participation in American police actions and “small wars” of 
the early twentieth century made the small service the darling of a distinctly 
sensationalist press. With American expansion throughout the world and the Corps’ early 
success in the Spanish-American War, a symbiotic relationship developed between the 
Marines and American newspaper publishers. As the Marines increasingly became the 
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first troops ashore during several different well-publicized expeditions both in the Pacific 
and in the Caribbean, the press was there to report on the dramatic actions that took place. 
As the Marines increasingly showed up in American newspaper headlines, the realization 
began to take place within some recruiting stations that the Corps could even help to 
supply and control the news about the service through internally crafted and well-written 
pieces delivered to the newspapers themselves.  
While the U.S. Marine Corps was informally established in 1775, it was not until 
the navy took a prominent role in American expansionism that the service managed to 
gain individual press attention and thus begin to develop an understanding of its own 
public image. In the first century of their existence, Marines largely served shipboard 
duties, such as policemen, sharpshooters, and small landing parties for the capital ships of 
the navy. 34 Due to their small size and largely integrated role within the navy, the Marine 
Corps, while a distinguished service, rarely competed with the navy for roles and 
missions. With the Spanish-American War, however, the Marine Corps was deployed in 
a manner far different than it had been in the past. Not only was the Corps assembled as 
an infantry unit in a major combat action but also it served with a perceived distinction, 
unlike some of its previous combat experience.  
The Marine Corps actions in the American Civil War represented perhaps the 
Corps’ most important previous land engagement prior to the Spanish-American War. 
There are few histories of the Corps’ activities in the Civil War and even fewer historians 
who speak highly of those actions. Marine Corps Historian Allan Millett argues that “the 
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Marine Corps began the Civil War on the defensive both tactically and institutionally, 
and it never recovered.”35 Battlefield performance for both Union and Confederate 
Marines gave the postwar Corps a reputation for cowardice and confusion. Union 
Marines panicked and ran as their combined army-navy brigade collapsed at the First 
Battle of Manassas (Bull Run) in 1861, and an attempted amphibious landing at Fort 
Fisher, North Carolina in 1865 was easily repelled. These incidents are an example of the 
few land engagements the Marines attempted during the war, however, their time aboard 
the ships of the Union in blockading duty was considered successful, if uneventful.36 The 
Confederate Marines, on the other hand, remained a small outfit, less than 1,000 strong 
for most of the war. Without the infrastructure of the former U.S. Navy, Confederate 
Marines did not retain much support for missions broader than guarding posts and 
stations in the South.37 Both the Corps and the navy as a whole emerged from the Civil 
War as relatively damaged institutions. Officers and sailors of the navy spent much of 
their time in blockade duty and the Corps’ inability to establish itself as an effective 
military arm in land engagements prevented both services from modernization and 
evolution.38 
In the decades after the Civil War, however, the navy and the Marine Corps both 
experienced a time of change and institutional modernization, albeit for different reasons. 
It was during this period that the U.S. Navy experienced a technological revolution with 
the development and refinement of steam-powered ships and advanced gun systems, both 
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requiring more educated and engineering-savvy sailors. As America began to expand 
overseas, the navy prepared to adapt to its new role as the front line of America’s frontier. 
Along with these developments, “naval reformers and professionals inaugurated an 
intellectual ferment within the navy that led to new thinking about naval warfare,” and 
since during this period all Marine officers came from the Naval Academy, the reformer 
sentiment worked its way into the Corps’ own development.39  
Naval reform in the 1880s and 1890s took on several forms. New technology 
allowed naval strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan to contemplate the ways in which 
faster ships with better defensive armor and more firepower should fit into American war 
planning. The importance of engineering knowledge and advanced education to take 
advantage of the new technologies also thrust forward a new class of officers anxious for 
promotion based on their merits and not the tradition of promotions based on time served. 
This movement had an important impact on the Marine Corps through officers who 
attended the Naval Academy, such as John A. Lejeune.  
This reformist mindset also translated into the Corps’ leadership beginning to 
seek out specific missions for the Marine Corps. As naval officers achieved 
professionalization through higher education due to the navy’s new technological needs, 
the Marines faced the prospect of falling behind due to their outdated duties aboard ships. 
The reform and modernization then undertaken by Colonel Commandant Heywood is 
important to the Corps’ later transformation because it put Marines in positions of power 
and rank sufficient enough to enact change and achieve the goal of establishing the Corps 
as a flexible multi-role service, able to serve on land and at sea.  
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Under Colonel Heywood, the Marine Corps continued to add officers from the 
Naval Academy and attracted better cadets because it offered quicker promotion among 
the ranks. With more motivated and politically connected officers, the Marine Corps 
accelerated its modernization. With the introduction of the Marine Corps School of 
Application and other educational opportunities for enlisted men, and with the Corps’ 
officers attending the Naval and Army War Colleges, the Marine Corps added to the 
quality and professionalization of its Marines.40 While the professionalization of the 
Corps’ officership occurred in small steps in the late nineteenth century, the results 
transformed the Corps of the twentieth century.  
While the professionalization of the Corps’ officers put Marines in positions to 
enact institutional change, it was the Spanish-American War that instigated the Corps to 
emerge from its nineteenth century “doldrums.”41 Even with the navy’s expansionist 
mission, it was not until the Spanish-American War that Marines served as an 
expeditionary land force. Ironically, the Corps later fought vigorously against their use as 
an independent amphibious landing force in the early 1900s, yet it was the Corps’ actions 
in Cuba which laid the groundwork for its future doctrine and public image. At the 
outbreak of the war “naval authorities immediately ordered the establishment of a Marine 
battalion with its own transport.”42 The Marine battalion concentrated a larger number of 
Marines and envisioned their use as ground combat troops, not just a landing party; an 
entirely new role for the Marine Corps.  
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The Spanish-American War was central to the early development of the Corps’ 
public image because of the conflict’s widely publicized nature from the eager news 
press of the day. It was the first major American conflict in this period and the Marines 
became the first object of what historian Clyde Metcalf considered an “impatient press 
always demanding actions.”43 In June of 1898, numerous press correspondents joined the 
Marines for the first American military mission of the war, the landing at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. Historian Charles Brown referred to the conflict as the “Correspondent’s 
War.”44 Journalists and correspondents wielded a type of power previously unknown to 
the press. Shortly after the war, journalist Murat Halstead wrote: 
The press of the United States largely took very extraordinary attitudes with respect to the war of 
our country with Spain. It was the belief of several great journals and journalists that they must be 
held accountable for the state of hostilities. They assumed airs of authority as to its management, 
its object…gave as much prominence to views as to news, and pursued the cultivation and 
vindication of theories with even greater warmth and energy than they gathered and displayed 
from day to day the incidents of intelligence that were of the nature of information about the 
conduct of hostilities.45 
By the Spanish-American War, the newspaper industry experienced a revolution in 
technology and economy, which meant that the press then had the ability to reach many 
more households across the U.S. According to historian Richard Kaplan, expansion of the 
printing industry was primarily the product of “innovations in printing technology, 
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increasing advertising revenues, lower paper costs, and the drive for greater profits.”46 As 
a result of those profits won during this democratization of the news, competition among 
the newspapers led to journalists seeking out dramatic headlines and news.47  
At the onset of the conflict, the American press eagerly reported on the actions of 
American forces with little regard for the veracity of the news that made it to newspapers 
back in the U.S. News of Admiral Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish fleet at the 
Philippines “electrified American public opinion” and the anxious wait for action in the 
Caribbean became palpable.48 On June 7, 1898, a small detachment of Marines landed at 
Guantanamo Bay for a reconnaissance. On June 10, the 650-strong Marine First Battalion 
landed on Cuba, the first substantial American unit to do so. The Corps’ ability to quickly 
deploy this oversized yet flexible battalion to Cuba made sure that the Marines dominated 
the headlines in the United States until the army landed at Santiago on June 22. By June 
9, even before the main Marine force landed, the Washington Post had already reported 
in a headline that “Our Flag is There.” The article remarked briefly on the hazy details of 
the Marines’ landing.49 In time, the stories became more elaborate. While the official 
reports described the landing of Marines as a march in the “blazing afternoon sun,” in 
which the “sweating Marines dragged their gear across the beach, climbed a hill, and 
pitched camp,” the media accounts were, as expected, more dramatic.50  
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On June 12, the New York Times reported that “the invasion of Cuba by American 
forces began today. Six hundred Marines have pitched their tents about the smoking ruins 
of the outer fortifications of Guantanamo, and the Stars and Stripes for the first-time float 
from a Spanish flagstaff in Cuba.”51 Even though the Marines waited in Key West for 
weeks prior, making trouble with the naval personnel attached to their transport and 
getting restless to the point of a potentially bad news story, the Corps’ participation as the 
first troops on the ground in Cuba led to a much better story as the conflict began. The 
language in the New York Times article connected the Corps with the patriotism of a flag 
being raised after a “battle.” It also conjured an image of the aftermath of a great invasion 
in which the Marines defeated the Spanish on Cuba, which was not in any way what 
occurred during those first days.52 On the day the New York Times released that article, 
however, the Spanish did come out to fight and engaged the Marines there in a battle that 
grabbed headlines and help define the Corps’ public image during the conflict. 
As the Spanish began to attack Marine lines, numerous American war 
correspondents joined the Corps to report on the early stages of battle. Among the 
correspondents and the Marines was novelist, poet, and writer, Stephen Crane. While 
published after the war, Crane’s collection of stories, Wounds in the Rain, provides the 
human side of the Corps’ experience against the Spanish, accounts that rarely appear in 
the official sources and histories. Crane spent time with four Marines on the beach at 
Camp McCalla who were tasked with signaling to the navy offshore:  
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It was my good fortune – at that time I considered it my bad fortune indeed – to be with them on 
two of the nights when a wild storm of fighting was pealing about the hill; and, of all the actions 
of the war, none were so hard on the nerves, none strained courage so near the panic point, as 
those swift nights in Camp McCalla. With a thousand rifles rattling; with the field guns booming 
in your ears; with the diabolic Colt automatic clacking; with the roar of the Marblehead coming 
from the bay, and at last, with Mauser bullets sneering always in the air a few inches over one’s 
head, and with this enduring from dusk to dawn, it is extremely doubtful if any one who was there 
will be able to forget it easily.53 
 Crane’s untimely death at age 28 in 1900 struck a blow to America’s war 
correspondents. His reporting was considered some of the most realistic of its time and is 
still provides some of the most detailed accounts of Marines in the Spanish-American 
War. 
The articles that appeared in American newspapers published only days after the 
events at Guantanamo began to include language that lifted the Corps’ public image and 
reputation. Concepts such as coolness under fire, fighting spirit, and bravery were often 
used to describe the Corps’ fighting there. A June 15 New York Times article titled “The 
Fighting at Guantanamo” stated, “thus far the Marines have had the best of the fighting, 
but the situation is grave, and they are exhausted with repelling almost incessant 
attacks.”54 In the same article, the correspondent with the Marines observed that “the 
Marines show spirit under the persistent fire of the Spanish bushwhackers, the officers 
particularly exhibiting the coolness and nerve of seasoned campaigners.”55  
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At the same time that the Marine Corps received praise in the press for their 
actions in Cuba, the lack of planning for the army’s deployment to Cuba also found its 
way to the front pages. On June 16, an article in the New York Times, titled “The Army of 
Invasion: Lack of Method in Moving it from Tampa the Talk of Washington,” focused on 
the “confusion, detention, lack of agreement on plan, absence of prior calculation, and 
arrangement” of the army forces meant to go to Cuba.56 The contrast between the navy 
and Marine Corps’ early successes in the Spanish-American War did little for the army’s 
own public image and helped the Corps to stand out as a successfully deployed ground 
force. 
The Marine Corps’ position as the first to land in Cuba and thus the first to open 
ground combat allowed the Corps to stand out in the public imagination due to the 
comprehensive coverage of the war’s early days. Clyde Metcalf noted that the Marines, 
“being the first to land on Cuban soil and the first to raise the American flag over the 
island, seemed to be particularly gratifying for the impatient press.” He also argued that 
“performance of the Marine battalion, while ashore around Guantanamo Bay, was for the 
first time being the focal point of war news . . .The publicity given and the reputation 
won aided materially in a rapid expansion of the Corps soon after the war and in a great 
enlargement of its fields of activity.”57 If “any publicity is good publicity,” then Marines 
continued to gain publicity through hundreds of articles for the next year in major 
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newspapers, most of which praised the Marines for their actions on board the Maine and 
at Cuba.  
The Marine Corps’ participation in the Spanish-American War, particularly as the 
first major combat unit to land ashore, gained the attention of the American press. Article 
headlines such as “Heroism of Americans,” “Thanks Proposed to the Marines,” “Routed 
the Enemy,” “Valor of the Marines,” “Our Gallant Marines,” “Praise for the Marines,” 
and “Record of the Marines,” all portrayed the Marines in the language of heroism and 
gallantry at Guantanamo.58 For a service that had yet to establish a firm mission prior to 
the war, their short but fiery experience in Cuba allowed both the press and the American 
public to understand the Corps’ abilities in battle. Recognition on the part of the Marines 
of the benefits offered by this type of press led to the Corps’ later strategies to help 
control and manage the stories that the public read in the newspapers. 
While the Spanish capitulation in August 1898 represented an end to the war, for 
the Marine Corps, the war opened up new frontiers. New American possessions, 
including Manila in the Philippines, led the Marines across the Pacific for occupation 
duty. Rather than postwar demobilization, the Marine Corps instead began to act as 
America’s “expansionist” police force. Fortunately for the Corps, their ability to deploy 
quickly to the Philippines allowed the Marines to participate in active operations to 
secure naval bases. It also meant that Marines were forward deployed in the Asia-Pacific 
region, ready to act as an American quick-reaction force.  
                                                 
58“Heroism of Americans,” Washington Post, June 5, 1898; “Thanks Proposed to the Marines,” Washington 
Post, July 8, 1898; “Routed the Enemy,” Washington Post, June 16, 1898; and “Valor of the Marines,” 
New York Times, June 27, 1898; “Our Gallant Marines,” New York Times, September 26, 1898; “Praise for 
the Marines,” New York Times, August 11, 1898; and “Record of the Marines,” New York Times, October 
23, 1898. 
 36 
In 1900, as the Philippine occupation gained a negative perception in the U.S., the 
Corps received an opportunity to improve their reputation with a deployment to China. In 
the north, some of the country’s poorest regions began to experience massive uprisings 
against Western interference in the country and especially foreign missionaries. These 
uprisings were led by a group called the “Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists,” 
later termed the “Boxers.” As these protests entered into large cities such as Peking, 
Western nations mobilized their military elements to defend their civilian missionaries.59 
Said to have numbered in the millions, the Boxers attacked numerous missions and 
legations. Missionaries, as well as civilian men, women, and children, were killed in the 
path of destruction created by the Boxers. Western powers, along with Japan, believed 
that the Chinese Dowager Empress Tzu His was too weak to suppress the uprising, which 
meant that thousands more European, Japanese, and Russian missionaries were in harm’s 
way.60 In response, the militaries of these nations, including Austria-Hungary, Germany, 
Great Britain, France, Japan, and Russia sent in their own troops to protect their interests 
and civilians.61 
As tensions rose in China, it was the Marines that were the first American combat 
force to arrive. On May 31, 1900, two ship’s detachments, numbering roughly 50 
Marines, landed at Peking. The American press took great interest in the conflict growing 
in China as it was well-suited to “David versus Goliath” narratives. Having learned the 
powerful attraction of war stories, newspapers across the country were eager to report the 
news from China, especially as it pertained to American forces there, which at first 
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included only the Marines. In the build-up to the American intervention, newspapers 
focused on the atrocities committed and the dire situation faced by American and other 
missionaries in China. The headlines read “Europeans Slain by the Boxers,” “More 
‘Boxer’ Atrocities: Three Christian Families Massacred,” and by June 6, they read 
“Americans may be fighting in China: More American Marines Landed.”62 As news of 
the Corps’ landing and participation reached back to the U.S., the Marines’ presence 
dominated the headlines, and sensationalism ruled the day, something that sold papers 
and benefitted the growing reputation of the Marine Corps. 
Newspapers like the New York Herald provided daily estimates of casualties and 
deaths as the conflict carried on. Throughout June, the Marines continued to add to their 
numbers, reaching their peak at nearly 500 Marines by the end of July.63 The Herald’s 
headline of June 13, 1900 continued to reinforce the theme of David versus Goliath as it 
announced “Little Band of Marines Encounter Great Boxer Horde.”64 While the Boxers 
certainly outnumbered the Marines, many of the Boxers believed themselves impervious 
to bullets, allowing the Marines and the other Western forces to fend off the Chinese as 
more reinforcements arrived. 
The Marines also represented only a tiny portion of the large international force 
that arrived in China to quell the Boxer rebellion. Yet, as the first Americans ashore, and 
with the casualties they sustained, the Marines were lauded, and those who were killed 
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were memorialized in papers across the country.65 As the Marines and allied soldiers 
eliminated threats from Chinese snipers in the walls around Tientsin at great cost, the 
relief forces headed to Peking in early August 1900. Just as the large group of Western 
militaries, now termed the International Relief Force, arrived in Peking, however, the 
Chinese Manchu government sided with the Boxers, further reinforcing the city against 
the Western powers.66 After over a week of quelling guerilla warfare around the city, the 
relief force finally broke through and liberated the Western legations on August 14, 
1900.67  
The Corps’ experience in China represents an example of the power of the press 
over the realities on the ground. As the Corps was the first to enter China, they were 
hailed as rescuers and liberators. Their success in combat, even against a relatively 
unorganized force, however, was subjective at best. The Corps suffered 39 casualties, 
including four Killed in Action. Thanks to the newspapers in America though, the drama 
of the intervention and the Corps’ participation gained the Marines not only headlines 
during the battle, but yet another credential toward their public image as a battle-
hardened and elite fighting force. The army and navy could only sit on the sidelines and 
watch as the Marines dominated the press and the national imagination. 
Even as Marines continued occupation duty in China, there was a clear 
recognition within the American press that the Corps’ participation was newsworthy and 
the Marine Corps sought, for the first time, to exploit that fact. In August 1900, an 
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unattributed story about the history of the Marine Corps, one that spanned an entire page, 
was published all around the country. It was titled differently in most papers, including 
“Soldier and Sailor, Too,” “On Land and Sea,” and even “Uncle Sam’s Marines Are True 
Heroes.”68 While the story is unattributed, it is reasonable to believe that the Marine 
Corps was behind it, marking an important milestone in which the Corps nationally 
distributed a story to its recruiting centers, who then got it in newspapers and in front of 
the public. In the New Orleans Picayune, the headline was “The Value of the Marine 
Corps.”69 The last line of the article best identified its purpose for the Marines. The 
author concluded, “Since the outbreak of trouble in China, the Marines have been much 
in the public eye, and all their exploits have served to increase the reputation and 
popularity of the Corps.”70 
Newspapers continued to publish articles throughout 1900 and into 1901 that 
recognized the bravery of Marines in China. Works such as “Bravery on the Firing Line,” 
“Captain Leonard, USMC, is here,” “Letters from Tientsin,” “Bravery of Marines,” “Our 
Soldiers in China,” “High Praise for the Marines,” “In Fire Zone All Day,” “Gallantry of 
Americans,” and an article on the exploits of Boxer Rebellion hero Captain Smedley 
Butler, titled, “Home from the Wars,” never let the Corps’ heritage and lore out of the 
public imagination.71 In the Corps’ participation in the Boxer Rebellion, the Marines 
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created heroes, legends, and lore, which all continue to contribute to the Corps’ public 
image today. Marines such as Dan Daly, John T. Myers, and Smedley Butler are still 
remembered today in Marine Corps training programs including both Recruit Training 
(boot camp) and Officer Candidates School (OCS).72 
The societal impact of the Marines’ deployment in China was a powerful 
testament to the weight of the press, and pushed the Marines to consider control over 
their own story. Even though the Marines’ role in China had been tiny, they burst into 
popular culture. Marines were melded into existing songs and poems of the early 
twentieth century. In 1901, the Washington Post reprinted a poem dedicated to the 
Marines, written by G.C. Reid in the Georgetown College Journal, entitled “’Billy Blue,’ 
U.S. Marine.” Its final verses demonstrated the change in the image of Marines since 
1898:  
Throw out your chest Billy Blue, 
For there’s medals on your chest Billy Blue, 
And tho’ you ain’t the man to brag 
You were never known to lag 
In following the flag, Billy Blue 
There were sixty of his comrades that went down with the Maine, 
But he raised the flag in Cuba first of all; 
He’s been at it in Manila, and he’s at it now again,  
Out in China, where he opened up the “ball.” 
So it’s: Strike up the band Billy Blue: 
You’re the finest in the land, Billy Blue,  
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For we all know where you’ve been,  
On the wall of old Pekin 
And in the trenches of Tientsin, Billy Blue.73 
Prior to this version, the poem referenced army and navy personnel on different topics. 
Clearly, the Marines gained a great deal of attention in the first two years of the twentieth 
century and would only continue to be instilled in American culture as the Marines 
participated in more interventions and police actions on behalf of American expansion.74  
In American music, the “President’s Own” United States Marine Corps Band also 
helped to keep the Corps in the press and to represent America itself. One of the most 
recognized bands in the American military, the “President’s Own’s” concerts regularly 
made the news wherever it played. In the late nineteenth century, former director John 
Philip Sousa made a name for the Corps with his enduring ragtime marches, and 
endeared the Corps’ band within the powerful Washington, D.C. circles.75 The 
“President’s Own” band even represented the United States at the Paris Exhibition in 
1900.76 Although dress uniforms and theatre-like discipline often brought ridicule from 
other military services, the band captured national and international attention.77 
With an increase in both recruits and national attention after the Spanish-
American War and the Boxer Rebellion, the Marine Corps appeared to be a service on the 
rise, certainly in the public’s estimation. However, the military establishment in general 
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remained skeptical about the small service’s roles. Having faced opponents to the Corps’ 
survival as a part of the navy in the past and learned first-hand the power of the press, the 
Corps sought to direct that power for its own good. By turning to the public, the Corps 
circumvented the existing hierarchies of the military establishment. While it would seem 
that the Corps’ small size might act as a deterrent to institutional change since it could not 
reach anywhere near the size of the other services, instead, its small size offered 
flexibility and exclusivity. There appeared to be a recognition amongst the Corps that if it 
could not petition the President, military, or Congress for funds to grow, it could craft its 
public image around its small size. By highlighting its history and combat record in 
newspapers and therefore going straight to the public, the Marine Corps crafted a public 
image that Marines were not merely regular soldiers, but instead a “corps d’elite:” a 
small, handpicked group of seagoing soldiers that saw action around the world while the 
army sat idle.  
As agents of their own change in public image, the Marines mirrored the work of 
public relations men in the civilian world. Much like the first public relations pioneers in 
the early twentieth century, the Corps found its early success by using the newspapers.78 
Public relations experts like Edward Bernays got their start in journalism and the 
newspapers. These men were considered “news engineers,” who could tap into the 
emotions of Americans and “get news through to the public.”79 With tactics like pushing 
articles about the history of the Marine Corps and touting its achievements, the Corps 
demonstrated an ability to control the information that reached the public, rather than 
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react to it, which mirrored the development of public relations in the civilian world. 
Bernays argued that facts that could become news were “any overt act which juts out of 
the routine of circumstance . . . interrupting the continuity of life in some way to bring 
about a response.”80 
In 1907, the first example of the institutionalization of Marine Corps publicity 
emerged with the development of a proactive publicity strategy at the Chicago Recruiting 
Station. This strategy involved a two-pronged approach in which the recruiters developed 
a “follow-up” system for all recruits and then press agents at the Chicago recruiting office 
wrote interesting and newsworthy articles in their respective hometown newspapers or in 
the Chicago Tribune.81 This system was put in place by the commanding officer of the 
Chicago Recruiting District at the time, Captain William C. Harllee. Captain Harllee was 
a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and had served in the U.S. Army 
during the Spanish-American War. In 1900, Harllee was appointed a second lieutenant in 
the Marine Corps and saw service in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Cuba.82 In 1907, 
Harllee was ordered to Chicago by Major General Commandant George Elliott to “take 
charge of the Marine Corps Recruiting Office there and run an experimental operation.”83 
Prior to Captain Harllee’s arrival in Chicago, the newspaper recruiting strategy for 
the Marine Corps was unassuming and unambitious at best. As was typical at the time, 
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the ads for Marine recruits appeared in the “Help Wanted” section of the newspaper. In 
the February 7, 1907 Chicago Tribune, the Corps’ ad for recruits was four lines long. It 
read: “Men—For the U.S. Marine Corps. Between ages 19 and 35; an opportunity to see 
the world.” While the ad was in the first column of the newspaper, it was nearly three 
quarters of the way down the page and squeezed to between an ad for “Men—100 TALL 
YOUNG MEN TO APPEAR ON STAGE AT MCVICKER’S THEATRE” and “MEN—
TO CUT ICE. JEFFERSON ICE CO.”84 These advertisements ran roughly every other 
day in the same help wanted section. This was not unusual as the navy ran ads in the 
same section for their own recruiting purposes. In their ads, however, the navy clearly 
targeted a different audience. In the March 21, 1907 “Help Wanted” section of the 
Chicago Tribune, the navy placed an ad for “BOYS—OF GOOD PHYSIQUE AND 
CHARACTER.”85  
Why the navy chose to use “boys” instead of “men” is undetermined. While on 
the surface this may seem to be a way in which the Marine Corps appropriated 
“manhood” in order to show the difference between it and the other services, most likely 
there are other more practical strategies at play. In the Chicago Tribune at the time, the 
“Help Wanted” ads were categorized alphabetically based on the call itself. The “Male 
Help” section included ads for everything from coachmen to porters, janitors, and “strong 
men.” By starting their ad with the word “Boys,” the navy actually featured their ad first 
among all the ads at the top of the first column in that section. The navy’s ad also called 
for recruits from “ages 17 to 25,” while the Marine Corps’ ads sought recruits of “ages 19 
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to 35.”86 As recruits under the age of 18 still needed parental permission at this time, 
perhaps the navy had to clarify its own call. Regardless, the ads prior to the Corps’ 
introduction of a “publicity bureau” in Chicago represented the generally lackluster and 
uninteresting type of “help wanted” theme that failed to stick out among the many other 
calls for work in the area. 
 Captain Harllee had an entirely different plan for the recruiting and publicity of 
Marines in Chicago. Lore has it that Harllee showed up at the Chicago recruiting office 
and “tossed at Gunnery Sergeant Clarence B. Proctor: ‘Sergeant, let’s get a story out to 
the press about a Marine running away with a beautiful blonde with exquisite curls.’ The 
Sergeant replied ‘I don’t know of any such, sir.’ Harllee retorted, ‘Let’s make one up. We 
can get a fake picture and call the Marine ‘old Chaw Brannon!’ Said Proctor, ‘What’s the 
point sir?’ Harllee, ‘Sergeant, you know perfectly well that nobody here has ever even 
heard of us. We’ve got to start to change that with this story. We can exploit the address 
of the office and draw attention to a picture of a hard-boiled old-timer in our eye-catching 
Marine Corps dress uniform. We can start the ball rolling to get some good recruits!.’”87 
In Harllee’s biography, this drastic change in recruiting strategy was not necessarily an 
idea born out of Chicago, but instead an institutional change brought about by the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. The author, Harllee’s son, Rear Admiral John Harllee, 
states, “General Elliott wanted to try something new—publicity…The general wanted to 
try out his plan in Chicago.”88 
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 Captain Harllee clearly did not mind blurring the lines between fact and fiction in 
Chicago, so long as he got the attention of potential recruits. His deep involvement with 
the publicity work in Chicago is clearly represented in the sheer amount of material he 
personally wrote in order to get the name of the Marine Corps out to the public. In a 
February, 1908 edition of the Chicago Examiner, under the headline “United States 
Marine Corps,” Harllee, a veteran of the army, wrote a response to an earlier editorial in 
which the author claimed the military service should be a school for men of questionable 
character. In his response, Captain Harllee artfully intertwined the lofty principles of the 
Marine Corps and the benefits it offered. Harllee even used language that is still used to 
this day in the Corps’ recruiting material, that becoming a Marine is something that is 
earned, not guaranteed. Harllee wrote, “In our service we have no such type as the 
“deleterious common soldier” nor do we view our men as common soldiers. On the 
contrary, we foster the idea that to be a United States Marine is something of which to be 
proud.”89  
 The new publicity material generated by the Chicago recruiting district under 
Harllee was drastically different. Not only did Captain Harllee and Sergeant Clarence 
Proctor deliver less than accurate stories to the press, such as “a Baptist preacher who 
joined the Marines because he gets a better salary, considering food, lodging, and 
clothing.”90 They also drew attention to the Marines with Harllee’s own combat 
experiences in the press. On August 12, 1907, the Rock Island Argus (Illinois) published 
an article about Harllee’s accomplishments. Titled “Comes Here From Cuba To Gather in 
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Recruits,” the article notes that Harllee “took a prominent part in the suppression of the 
insurrection which broke out in the island…about a year ago. It will be remembered that, 
as usual, the Marines were the first to be landed in the island when the trouble started and 
they held the island until the arrival of the army of pacification.”91 The end of the article 
mentions the names of the Rock Island men who were recruited into the Marines on that 
day as well. 
 Harllee’s strategy in Chicago was to add both exclusivity and elevation to the 
Corps’ recruiting material. Much like the editorial written by Harllee, a Chicago Tribune 
article from May 9, 1908 quoted Harllee as saying “Most of the men we have enlisted 
here have been young men from business offices; our requirements are strict and none but 
an intelligent man can fulfill them. A Marine is not only a sea soldier but he must be a 
naval gunner, a field artilleryman, and some times (sic) a horse Marine.”92 In The 
Dispatch of Moline, Illinois, an article ran which showed that not all applicants become 
Marines. With the headline “Reject 14 Out of 17 Who Apply to Enlist,” the article 
highlighted the high failure rate of recruits from Moline and Rock Island. Reasons for 
their failure to join the Marines included bad eyesight, color blindness, physically unfit, 
and under age.”93 
 Along with Harllee’s strategy of elevation and exclusivity, the Chicago Recruiting 
District also enacted a program called the “Follow-Up Book.” The “Follow-Up Book” 
was a log of all the recruits in the district who came and joined the Marines. Sergeant 
Proctor explained that “on the day men enlisted their names were alphabetically 
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entered…together with any pertinent opinions or distinguishing remarks regarding 
them.”94 That list would then be sent to the posts and ships of the Marine Corps and navy 
with an endorsement from Commandant Elliott, and the commanding officers would 
return comment on those Marines’ development and service in the period since their 
enlistment.  
The “follow-up” book is the example of the Corps tying itself into communities, a 
strategy that will be used continuously through World War II. When the Chicago 
Recruiting District received replies from the Marines’ commanding officers, the 
information would be used for two different purposes. The first was as “newspaper 
items,” in other words, “used in the preparation of newspaper releases for the press of the 
man’s home town.” Sergeant Proctor found that these clippings were “almost without 
exception published,” alongside a “brief paragraph setting forth the advantages in the 
Marine Corps for travel, promotion, rifle shooting, athletic sports, and special 
details…with the address of the local recruiting office.”95 The second purpose of 
gathering these remarks, according to Proctor, was to answer queries from relatives or 
friends of the Marine. “Relatives and friends were always favorable impressed with the 
fact that the recruiting officer was able to furnish this information and that he was enough 
interested in the men he enlisted to follow their career.”96 The “Follow-Up Book” system 
was an intuitive and highly successful method of using existing information (recruits) and 
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turning them into human interest stories for recruiting. This strategy would not be lost 
with the Chicago Recruiting District, but would later be used in the Second World War 
on a national level in the form of “Joe Blow” stories. 
Even as Captain Harllee developed a successful publicity strategy in Chicago, the 
Marines faced a significant institutional threat to their existence from within the military 
establishment. The Corps’ quick rise in the media coincided with suspicion on the part of 
government leaders of its corresponding political power, especially in Washington, D.C. 
President Theodore Roosevelt “felt that the Corps had inordinate influence on policy-
making, an influence heightened by the patronage appointment of new officers since 
1898.”97 President Roosevelt decided that because of the power the Marine Corps 
wielded through its self-promotion to the public it needed a reduction in size and mission 
so that it was clear that the Corps was a subordinate service to the navy.98  
As the Marine Corps enjoyed largely positive press coverage in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, a foe from the late nineteenth century would help to define the 
Corps’ future. In the late 1880s, a group of determined anti-Marine Corps naval officers, 
led by Commander William F. Fullam, sought to have the Marines removed from the 
ships of the navy. While those attempts were stymied by Congressional action, the core 
belief by these naval officers continued to surface as the naval political power structures 
changed over the following decade. In President Theodore Roosevelt, however, the aptly-
named “Fullamites” found a powerful individual favorable to their goals. In the waning 
months of President Roosevelt’s tenure, Marines’ worst fears came to life as the Corps 
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was stricken from the ships of the navy on November 12, 1908, through Executive Order 
969. This rarely discussed event in the Corps’ history actually played a pivotal role in the 
timeline of the Corps’ public relations renaissance prior to the First World War. While 
the other services attended to their public image only as the First World War acted as a 
catalyst, this real threat to the Marine Corps’ existence acted as an early warning to the 
service. The choice for the Marine Corps at that time was clear: establish a definitive 
purpose in the military establishment and make sure the public is informed, or potentially 
get rolled into the U.S. Army. 
The Marine Corps’ path toward this Congressional stand-off started nearly thirty 
years previous. The argument of the Fullamites in the 1880s was that the presence of 
Marines on board ships created a second class of men within the ranks and therefore 
inefficiencies of operation. Fullam argued that this was the case since the Marines were 
largely American citizens, and much of the naval ranks were actually non-citizens who 
had joined to attain citizenship.99 The Marines, then, in their position aboard the ship as 
guards and policemen, led many sailors to distrust and separate themselves from the 
Marines. This, according to Fullam and some other influential naval officers, created an 
inefficiency aboard the ship. Fullam further argued that sailors aboard the ship could 
easily take up the tasks heretofore performed by the Marines. In his original argument, 
made in 1890, then Lieutenant Fullam even went as far as to declare, “the fact that other 
navies kept Marines afloat for similar duties only proved the point…that such an 
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arrangement was acceptable only to men raised ‘under the monarchical forms of 
Europe.’”100  
Commander Fullam argued that, since the Marines were considered naval 
infantry, their service should be conducted independently from the capital ships of the 
navy, and they should instead travel to the fight in separate transport ships. As a member 
of the growing group of progressive thinking naval officers, Fullam believed the reasons 
for this change emanated from the natural progression of technological change aboard the 
ship. No longer were sailors in the era of the sailing ship, when the Marines were seen as 
necessary to keep order and act as sharpshooters. The “new navy” was a world of steel 
and oil. Sailors had to be trained in engineering and other more educated roles, thus 
reducing the need for a shipboard police force. 
While the Marine Corps survived Fullam’s attacks of the 1890s, the Roosevelt 
Administration proved to be a serious challenge to the Corps’ existence. The duration of 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration was a time of instability and upheaval for 
the civil-military relationship.101 Roosevelt sought to expand his executive power during 
this period, especially as it pertained to military matters. More than most American 
presidents before him, Roosevelt understood the burgeoning power of the press and 
publicity and his presidency coincided with one of the most significant periods in 
American journalism. With a keen understanding of the power of press and an agenda to 
strengthen his position as Commander and Chief, Roosevelt often intervened in matters 
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of military importance, often without notice to Congress or the public. Historian Matthew 
Oyos argues that Roosevelt represented the new generation in American military and 
politics; the generation that did not know the Civil War, but fought in the Spanish-
American War. In this position, Roosevelt also intervened in the promotion of younger 
officers (of his generation) over the older officers who had fought so long to achieve their 
rank in such a slow system.102  
Within this tense climate, the young upstart progressive officers of the navy 
finally managed to exert their influence to achieve the removal of Marines from the ships 
of the line through the use of Roosevelt’s growing executive power. Sympathetic with the 
still active Commander Fullam were naval officers Commander William S. Sims and 
Rear Admiral John E. Pillsbury. In 1908, the Fullamites together engaged President 
Roosevelt and his Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf in an assault on the Corps’ 
shipboard detachments.103 In the first memorandum, delivered to the President by 
Commander Sims, the Fullamites complained of the Marine Commandant, Major General 
George Elliott’s undue political power in protecting the Corps from the move for so long 
as they had. Every time the removal was proposed, argued Sims, “General Elliott goes to 
the Secretary and successfully combats the proposition.”104 Through these inroads, as 
well as other more informal hints to the president, the Fullamites finally succeeded in 
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motivating Secretary Metcalf to bring the proposition up at a cabinet meeting at which 
time President Roosevelt approved of the action.105 
 Major General George F. Elliott was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps 
in 1903 by President Roosevelt. There has been little scholarly attention focused on 
General Elliott’s commandancy and even the Marine Corps in general during this period. 
Historian Allan Millett argues that, while Elliott demonstrated his competence as a 
Marine field commander in places like Cuba, Korea, and Panama, he otherwise had an 
“undistinguished career.”106 Unlike future commandants Major Generals George Barnett 
and John Lejeune, Elliott also “had difficulty coping with the politicians in Congress, the 
Navy Department, and his own staff.”107 Ultimately, Elliott was a traditionalist. As 
commandant, Elliott largely failed to adapt the Corps’ mission and doctrine to fit into the 
expansion and increased action Marines saw throughout his terms. As such, Elliott firmly 
believed in the Corps’ role aboard the ships of the navy, and the threat to remove the 
seagoing Marines, Elliott believed, was a threat to the Corps’ existence.108 
 Elliott’s initial reaction to the proposal by the Fullamites was one of mild support. 
Perhaps Elliott may have known this mission was actually a glimpse into the future of the 
Marine Corps. The commandant is quoted saying it would be “the making of the Marine 
Corps.”109 Among the newest arguments of the Fullamites in front of Secretary Metcalf 
and President Roosevelt, was that the Corps had proved quite successful in the Spanish-
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American War, Cuba, Panama, the Philippines and elsewhere as an individual fighting 
force. Part of the Corps’ success was also defined by the fact that these were large units, 
transported in their own navy ships, to the place of action. These Marines were, for the 
most part, not ship’s detachments aboard the navy’s ships of the line. Amongst the 
public, tensions ran high over the proposal. An editorial in the New York Times on 
November 20, 1908, conveyed that “enlisted men in Newport have deemed it so little 
necessary to disguise their joy at getting rid of their unloved shipmates that they have 
addressed a letter of gratitude and approval to the President for the course to be taken.”110 
At the time, however, the Marine Corps did not have the protection of a powerful 
identity in front of the public that it achieved with the First World War. Instead, the 
drastic change to the Corps’ mission shook the Marine establishment, and “rumors 
circulated in Washington that Marine officers were organizing to lobby Congress for 
reversal of Roosevelt’s decision.”111 Elliott even reversed his original support and 
released a statement that such an activity would be contrary to the Corps’ motto and that 
he forbid it from taking place.112 Unfortunately, that choice was not his alone. 
 It is possible that the Marine Corps did not have enough political clout at this 
time to reverse a decision by a politically powerful, albeit outgoing, President, if not for 
the intervention of army Major General Leonard Wood. Early in the controversy over 
Roosevelt’s executive order, General Wood inserted himself into the discussion by 
meeting with Roosevelt over the matter and voicing his favor for the removal of the 
                                                 
110 “Unpleasant for Marines,” New York Times, November 20, 1908. 
111 Jack Shulimson and Graham Cosmas, “Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Seagoing Mission,” Marine 
Corps Gazette (November 1981), 58. 
112 Jack Shulimson and Graham Cosmas, “Teddy Roosevelt and the Corps’ Seagoing Mission,” Marine 
Corps Gazette (November 1981), 58. 
 55 
Marines. The caveat to Wood’s plan was that he believed the Marines should then be 
transferred to the army. Once rumors spread of General Wood’s overture to Roosevelt 
(and subsequent rumors that Roosevelt also favored the idea), the Marine Corps and its 
supporters revolted over the idea. Elliott would later recall, “While we had been 
following quietly our duties, elimination and absorption were casting unknown to us their 
shadows at our heels.”113 
The Wood intervention tremendously complicated the navy’s original proposal. 
While the Fullamites sincerely believed that Marines should not be aboard the ships of 
the navy, the group of naval officers never intended to have the Marines separated from 
the navy in full. Certainly, the navy saw the importance of its traditional connection with 
the Marines and even the Fullamites recognized the importance of the Marines as an 
expeditionary force for American interventionism. A full removal would also have a 
devastating effect on the navy’s budget and personnel allotments, both of which were 
often slightly pilfered from the Marine Corps’ allocation.  
The fight over Executive Order 969 began in December 1908 in Congress with 
the House Naval Affairs Committee. As rumors of General Wood’s proposal created a 
heightened political environment, the Fullamites, represented by Admiral Pillsbury began 
the hearings on the defensive. Instead of strengthening the argument for removal of the 
Marines on ships, Pillsbury needed to make sure the navy’s position on Wood’s proposal 
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was clear. The admiral stated “I think that it will be a very great mistake to put them in 
the Army. We want them in the Navy. We do not want them on board ship.”114 
As the controversy moved into a House Naval Affairs Subcommittee in January 
1909, the Marines also gained an edge over the hearings with the introduction of 
Congressman Thomas H. Butler, father of celebrated Marine Smedley Butler. In the 
transcript of the hearings it is clear that the Marines had support, not only from the other 
Marines in the room but also from the subcommittee members themselves. Secretary of 
the Navy Truman H. Newberry had replaced former Secretary Metcalf and was clearly 
not prepared for the tenacity of the anti-navy sentiment. Congressman Butler, as Acting 
Chairman, took Secretary Newberry to task for the decision of his predecessor and did 
not allow him to shirk questions he thought were softballs.  
Early on in the hearing, Butler asked Newberry, “Do you know whether during all 
that time [the Corps’ existence] they [Marines] have been detached from their ships as an 
organization or as a corps?” Newberry replied, “I do not. I would rather have you ask the 
General here [Elliott] as to that.” General Elliott dutifully answered in the negative, but 
Butler did not let Newberry of the hook. Butler continued, “I thought perhaps you would 
know from the history of the Corps?” Newberry doubled down and answered “I do not 
know. I would say that the General informs me they were detached for a short time and 
then put back.” Congressman Richmond P. Hobson, clearly irritated by Newberry’s non-
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answers, finally quipped “Is it your idea that we should ask someone else about the 
history of the Corps, Mr. Secretary?”115 
The hearings continued through February. While in the House, the committee 
hearings were decidedly localized to the relationship between the Marine Corps and the 
navy. The Wood intervention kept the Fullamites from making strong arguments about 
the removal of Marines as committee members continuously forced the naval officers to 
repeat their support for the Marines to continue with the navy at all. The cost of the 
removal (and subsequent increase in personnel for the navy to cover the missing Marines) 
was also constantly at issue. Roosevelt, however, was able to pressure members of the 
House committees, and supporters of the Marines were unable to stop a naval 
appropriations bill from passing without an amendment reversing Roosevelt’s executive 
order.116  
In the Senate, the hearings were largely defined by the perception that Roosevelt 
had overstepped his own presidential powers with this serious alteration to the military 
establishment. The chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, Senator Eugene 
Hale, was a staunch Roosevelt opponent and the issue at hand was tossed out and 
officially removed from the Naval Appropriations bill as Roosevelt ultimately conceded 
in favor of other naval issues. On March 1, 1909, the naval appropriation bill was passed 
with an amendment to reverse executive order 969 and return Marines to the fleet. 
Incoming President Howard Taft, unlike Roosevelt, sought to create a more subservient 
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Presidency to Congressional power and stated publicly that Congress should define the 
Corps’ role and not the president.117  
With the Marines returned to the ships of the navy, the Corps dodged what many 
perceived to be a real threat to service’s existence. It would not be long, however, before 
the Marines did embrace a complete change in their role within the navy, as an 
expeditionary and advanced base force. The presence of Marines detachments aboard the 
fighting ships of the navy, however, would not end until 1998. In the aftermath of the 
debacle with Roosevelt and the neo-Fullamites, the Marine Corps took organizational 
steps to formalize the publicity strategies it had begun in Chicago in 1907.  
Seeking to codify and institutionalize the work begun in Chicago, in 1911, the 
Marine Corps created a Publicity Bureau to be located in New York City with the 
purpose of serving all Marine Corps recruiting districts. In November of that year, 
Captain Harold C. Snyder took command of the newly created Marine Corps Publicity 
Bureau.118 Ultimately, the Publicity Bureau served two purposes. The first, was as a 
repository for former journalists and news-savvy Marines to help create and strategize 
material to manage the Corps’ public image and find recruits. The second was as a 
massive printing press to distribute materials to the recruiting districts. For the second 
purpose, the Corps supplied “a multi-graph for the printing of circulars, an envelope-
addressing machine, and a filing case that held 7,500 address stencils.”119 The Marine 
Corps Publicity Bureau had six sections, which included administrative, printing, 
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bindery, photographic multigraph, and press departments. It was in the press department 
where Marines wrote and crafted news stories to deliver to newspapers looking to fill 
space.120  
Building on the Chicago strategies, the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau distributed 
weekly news stories regarding interesting and newsworthy happenings throughout the 
Corps. The themes often included broad topics like the Corps’ battle history and famous 
Marines, but it also included small and seemingly insignificant stories that were written 
to grab the public’s attention, usually with humor. It was important for the Marines, 
based on the lessons learned in Chicago, that these stories not seem like advertisements, 
but instead looked like normal news stories. An example of this can be seen in a New 
York Times article from February 22, 1912. The story, titled “Girl, Disguised, Tried to 
Enlist,” tells the story of a young woman who disguised herself in an attempt to get 
deployed to China to join her sweetheart Marine.121 Another article printed in the New 
York Times told the story of a Marine whose uncle pledged him $77,000 of his 
inheritance only if he re-enlisted in the Corps.122 It is unknown whether these stories held 
any truth, however, the Marines recognized that these stories were easy to create and 
were widely accepted by newspapers in order fill space. 
With the creation of the Publicity Bureau and the Corps’ experience with working 
the newspapers following the Roosevelt removal, the Marines arguably received another 
boost in the public eye with the foreign policies of the new administration under 
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President Woodrow Wilson.123 Under the banner of progressive diplomacy, President 
Wilson believed that the American government and military should play an important 
role in social reform, especially in countries where it was believed, however 
paternalistically, that the people need America’s help to overcome civil war and internal 
strife. Ultimately, President Wilson intervened in seven different countries during his 
presidency, all of which were spearheaded by the Marines, bringing the Corps again to 
the pages of American newspapers, while stories concerning their sister services 
languished.124 A brief discussion of the Corps’ actions in these countries and the resulting 
headlines help to understand how the Marines were represented to the public during this 
period. It is also important to note that during this period the Corps also emphasized to 
potential recruits that joining the Marine Corps meant that one could immediately see 
action. Wilson’s policies and the Corps’ participation in interventionism certainly made 
this possible.  
A revolution brewing in Mexico at the start of Wilson’s presidency marked the 
first time the president would deploy the Marines as an international police force. In 
1914, American-backed Mexican leaders were deposed, which resulted in fighting from 
Mexico into Texas, including the kidnapping of American sailors at the port of Vera 
Cruz. These kidnappings were the last straw for Wilson and provided a publicly 
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supported cause for American forces to topple the new government in Mexico.125 On 
April 20, 1914, Marines landed in Mexico at Vera Cruz. The Mexicans did not resist the 
landing of Marines and sailors as they landed on the beaches, however, guerilla attacks 
and sniper fire in the city made the operation perilous, forcing Marines into urban 
fighting, clearing houses street by street.126 On April 22, the Marine contingent in Mexico 
reached a strength of 2,500. Successful in their mission, the Marines occupied bases in 
Vera Cruz and eventually departed Mexico with four dead and thirteen wounded. In an 
unattributed article (though most likely crafted by Marines), the Washington Post noted 
that the Corps’ action in Mexico reinforced the fact that the service was “always called 
upon to form the entering wedge, to blaze the trail in landing on foreign shores.”127 
On July 28, 1915, an uprising in Port-au-Prince, Haiti led the Marines into an 
intervention that would last decades and have a significant long-term impact, at times 
positive and others negative, on the Corps’ public image. President Wilson ordered the 
newly created Marine Expeditionary Brigade, a flexible and deployment-ready unit of 
Marines, to Haiti, led by Colonel Littleton W.T. Walker and Major Smedley Butler.128 
Unlike the Corps’ mostly military intervention in Mexico, the U.S. sought to control 
Haiti’s financial, political, and police establishments through the Corps’ intervention. 
President Wilson also demanded a new democratic election to be held in Haiti, with the 
ballots guarded by U.S. Marines.129 A Marine-controlled military police called the 
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Haitian Constabulary Police Force was also created under the leadership of Smedley 
Butler.  
The majority of these actions were portrayed in the American media in the 
language of a return to civility, led by the orderly Marine Corps. A Washington Post 
article published on July 29, 1915, announced “U.S. Marines Halt Chaos in Haiti.”130 In 
September of that year, Marines again appeared in the Washington Post, with the 
headline “Haiti Rebels Repulsed: American Marines Attack and Rout Revolutionary 
Band.”131 While leading the Haitian Constabulary Force, Smedley Butler received the 
Medal of Honor, further reinforcing his position as one of the Corps’ legends. While the 
Corps’ actions in Haiti would bring negative attention after the First World War, in this 
early stage of the intervention, the Marines were hailed as humanitarians. While this 
represented only the beginning of the Corps’ long future in Haiti, it started with mostly 
positive public reaction and the Corps benefited from the media’s coverage of actions 
there. 
The “chaos” however, was not limited to one half of the island of Hispaniola. 
Soon after the American intervention in Haiti, the Marines were deployed to Santo 
Domingo. On May 15, 1916, two more Marine Expeditionary Brigades were landed to 
support U.S. government interests on that half of the island. As with Haiti, the American 
press provided coverage of this intervention and portrayed the Marines as heroic 
civilizers of a chaotic nation. Soon after the Marines landed, the revolutionary 
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government fled and the Corps took control. The Dominicans rebelled against the new 
U.S. military government and the Marines took action to quell the riots.132  
As with all Marine Corps interventions to this date, the story, as it was told in the 
States, nearly always favored the Americans and was considered in the paternalistic and 
xenophobic, language of the day. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps as an institution 
benefited from this language and the portrayal of Marines as conquerors or civilizers of 
lesser nations. The Washington Post on June 7, cited “Americans Win Battle Against 
Arias’ Forces Without Losing a Man,” in which the individual bravery of Marines in 
Santo Domingo was highlighted along with their success in quelling the rebellion.133 
Throughout 1915, the newspapers published articles about the Marines in Santo 
Domingo, assuring their service would not leave the minds of the American public. 
Articles such as “Marines Are Rewarded,” and “Dominican Army Revolt is Crushed,” 
continued to portray the actions of the Marine Corps with a martial, and at the same time, 
democratic spirit.134 Articles such as these allowed the Marine Corps to continue to 
reinforce their combat history and (newly found) importance within the military 
establishment as America’s police force. 
In the midst of the Corps’ expeditionary duty to Mexico, Haiti, and Santo 
Domingo, the officer in charge of the Publicity Bureau, Major A.S. McLemore, founded 
a Marine Corps periodical dedicated to helping recruiting stations across the country craft 
their own news articles and gain more recruits called The Recruiters’ Bulletin. Historian 
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Robert Lindsay best sums up the Bulletin’s dual purpose as internal press agent and 
recruiter when he said “the Marines of the Publicity Bureau were not only interested in 
attracting enlistees but also in that prime aim of every public relations practitioner: 
getting the name of your institution before the public in a favorable light.”135 On the 
Bulletin’s masthead was described its purpose as “in the Interest of the Recruiting 
Service of the U.S. Marine Corps.”136 Captain L.P. Pinkston was the Bulletin’s first editor 
and under his leadership, the publication opened a dialogue between the Corps’ Publicity 
Bureau in New York and Marine recruiters around the country. The Publicity Bureau 
published the Bulletin monthly from 1914 until 1922 arguably some of the most 
important years for the development of the Marine Corps, both in its public image as well 
as its military mission.  
Much like the Marine Corps Gazette, the army’s Infantry Journal or the Navy’s 
Proceedings, the Recruiters’ Bulletin was a trade journal of sorts for Marine recruiting 
and publicity. The monthly published Bulletin generally ranged between 15 and 40 pages 
and during its eight-year run from 1914-1922 featured several regular authors and special 
features. The Bulletin not only generated short stories for the newspaper, but it also 
fostered a dialogue between the Corps’ recruiting personnel around the country. The 
Bulletin included sections like “With the Bulletin’s Correspondents,” that offered a space 
where recruiters discussed recruiting strategies of the day. Officers and enlisted alike also 
told their stories of success and failure in recruiting Marines.137 Another benefit of the 
Recruiters’ Bulletin was in its ability to act a repository for institutional knowledge. As 
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recruiting duty in the Marine Corps was often a short stint on rotation, new recruiters 
could always look toward the Bulletin for the knowledge needed to get a head start in 
their new recruiting duty. Another popular section of the Bulletin, called “Odds and Ends 
from Musty Files,” brought stories of lore and legends from the Corps’ past to recruiters, 
not only as a learning tool for Marines, but also to act as small stories for local 
newspapers. First introduced in 1916, the “Musty Files” section used archival research to 
discuss the history of recruiting going as far back as the late eighteenth century.138 In 
1920, the “Musty Files” section was picked up by Edwin McClellan, who was the first 
head of the Marine Corps Historical Division.139 
In 1916, five years after the Corps stood up its own Publicity Bureau, the army 
and the navy also created publicity and recruiting focused organizations and publications. 
To reflect the introduction of these services, in June 1916, the Recruiters’ Bulletin added 
a section called “With the Other Fellow: And His Work in the Recruiting Field,” which 
reported on developments of the army and navy in the field of recruiting. For army 
recruiting news, the Bulletin first cited a 1916 army publication called the Pacific Coast 
Recruiter, which in many ways mimicked the Corps’ own Bulletin, though it was only 
cited for a few months, before the Bulletin switched to reprinting “Army matter gleaned 
from various sources.”140 “With the Other Fellow” also reported on developments from 
the navy’s newly created Publicity Bureau.141 While short lived (the navy introduced a 
different department called the Navy News Bureau in 1917), the Navy Publicity Bureau 
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was a printing press and small publicity department much like the Corps’ own. Through 
the Corps’ Bulletin, it is evident that the navy’s Publicity Bureau released a weekly 
bulletin with input in regards to recruiting for the navy.142  
In general, the Bulletin reprinted stories that were helpful to the Corps’ own 
publicity and recruiting efforts as well as news about how each service developed or 
distributed its material. These pieces rarely had a competitive air about them and were 
often supportive of the efforts of the other services. In September 1916, the Bulletin 
noted, “The Army recruiting service is distributing a pamphlet in which the experiences 
of a Columbus, Ohio newspaper man, who went through the formality of enlistment and 
training at the Recruit Depot, are set forth at length. It is good reading and should add 
greatly to the Army’s literature.”143 In the same month’s column, the writers at the 
Bulletin laid out a specific problem the navy had encountered with recruiting based on the 
numbers released that month. The navy Publicity Bureau firmly believed there was a 
labor shortage or some type of similar issue in several different cities since those large 
population centers “had but one applicant per week for the period of one month.”144 This, 
of course, was also information that Marine recruiters could use to help boost efforts in 
those specific population centers in order to make up for lost recruits. 
For the average recruiter across the country, the Recruiters’ Bulletin included a 
section called “Our Press Department,” which printed the responses and opinions of local 
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newspaper editors about the performance and usefulness of Marine recruiting literature 
and methods. These responses essentially represented a monthly unsolicited satisfaction 
survey of the Corps’ public image management. At the header of each “Our Press 
Department,” the Bulletin’s editors explained the importance of the high-quality copy 
distributed by the Corps’ Publicity Bureau:  
Once upon a time, a city editor told a reporter that a good newspaper man could write the story of 
the crucifixion of Christ in half a column. And that is the idea our Press Department is carrying 
out. The stuff sent out by our press department is winning space and finding favor for one 
reason—it does not have to go into the rewrite. It is already put up in newspaper shape and editors 
everywhere seem glad to get it. Now and then a story comes back telling us to send it to the 
billboard man, but on the other hand, we have dozens of letters from editors, entirely unsolicited, 
complimenting us on the work.145 
If the Bulletin’s editors are to be taken at their word regarding the fact that these letters 
are unsolicited, this praise is evidence of the Corps’ success in actively crafting its public 
image through the American press. 
 The first run of the column, which included responses from editors in California, 
Illinois, Oregon, Ohio, and Wisconsin, highlighted perhaps the most important 
advantages the Corps had over any competition for space in the papers: quality writing 
and newsworthiness. The editor of the Journal from Quincy, Illinois wrote, “We want to 
express our appreciation of the inclosed (sic) and other good stuff we have lately 
received, and to say that we will always be able to find space for stories so cleverly 
written and so abundant in humor and human interest as this.”146 Another piece, from the 
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editor of the Statesman in Portland, Oregon, used similar language: “Your stuff is good. 
It has more fizz and human interest than 98 percent of the press agent dope that comes 
through the mail.”147 
 The editors of the Recruiters’ Bulletin were so thrilled with the response from 
these local newspaper editors that they next actively solicited responses from the even 
more editors for more details about what they were doing right and if they could improve 
upon their current methods. The questions posed to the editors included, “Are you using 
these stories? What do you think of the service we are sending you and how could we 
improve it?”148 The Bulletin received a stunning response from the editors. By August 
1916, nearly 1100 had responded, and by the Bureau’s own calculations, “about eighty-
five percent of the replies were very favorable, and the other fifteen percent were quite 
the opposite.”149 Positive responses included one from the New York Herald, which 
stated, “We use them. Interesting incidents serve our purpose best, yours too, I should 
think.”150 
The Bulletin included a large number of the replies to its survey in its August 
1916 issue, and while most included were favorable, the ones that were not revealed that 
some newspapers saw through the Corps’ folksy and humorous stories for the purpose 
they ultimately served. The editor of Free Press, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin wrote 
“Improve it by making the recruiting propaganda as little pronounced as possible.”151 
Even those that responded in the negative, admitted their usefulness as space-fillers. The 
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editor of The Standard in New Bedford, Massachusetts claimed “I use them every now 
and then. I don’t approve of the service at all. The United States ought to pay for its 
publicity. However, although I feel that way, I have used several of your squibs because 
they were interesting and snappy.”152 The Bulletin reprinted much of the praise from the 
surveys, however, which included unabashed favor toward its service. Editors wrote, “it’s 
the best press agent service I know,” “Yours is the first live publicity service for military 
affairs,” “The snappiest and most interesting department service sent out by the 
government,” and “it has all other government publicity backed off the map.”153 
More than just press articles and recruiting strategy, the Recruiters’ Bulletin also 
represented an important tool for the dissemination of Marine art and culture. In 
December 1915, the Recruiters’ Bulletin introduced color for its Christmas edition, 
adding a pop of color and design to the formerly drab publication. From that time and 
through the rest of its life the Bulletin added Marine-created cartoons and art to its issues, 
which is vital still to this day to aid historians and the Corps’ researchers to visualize the 
crafting of the Corps’ public image through the eyes of those who helped to create it. The 
art that was printed in the Bulletin, particularly during World War I, provides an 
insightful look into the Corps’ culture during this period. Throughout the Bulletin’s run, a 
section titled “All Sorts of Poetry” also ran in each issue, which provided another glimpse 
into the Corps and its culture. The poems were written by Marines, former Marines, and 
even civilians who were interested in the Corps. In the May 1916 issue, the Bulletin 
published a poem titled “United States Marine” by a Dr. M.F. Clark from San Francisco, 
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California, in which he captures well the importance of “manliness” in the Corps’ public 
image: 
There ain’t no stripes upon his sleeve or title to his name, 
 
He’s only one of thousands who protect Old Glory’s fame, 
 
He swelters in the jungle heat or on the desert sands, 
 
Or freezes to his very soul in distant arctic lands. 
 
No matter where you find the man, his work is done and well. 
 
And should we ever need him there, we’ll find the cuss in Hell. 
 
He’s here, he’s there, he’s everywhere, where vict’ry must be won. 
 
He’s first to dare, he’s first to do, the things that must be done. 
 
He gave his friends, he gave his home, he gave his love, his all. 
 
He gave up everything he had, to answer duty’s call. 
 
But when the Great Commander calls him to the distant shore, 
 
He’ll get the things he gave up here, a thousandfold and more. 
 
There ain’t no strings up on his sleeve or title to his name, 
 
He’s only one of thousands who protect Old Glory’s fame. 
 
He does the work that must be done and does it like a man. 
 
He’s brave, he’s true, he’s stanch, he’s clean, a real American. 
 
You’ll find him where the blizzards sweep or sunshine smiles serene. 
 
You’ll find him where he’s needed, the United States Marine.154 
 
The inclusion of important cultural elements in the Recruiters’ Bulletin highlights the 
significance of the Bulletin on the Corps’ public image. While Marines were 
indoctrinated with some of the history, legends, and lore of the Corps during boot camp 
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and training, in many ways the public received a more complex and nuanced 
understanding of the Marines through the consumption of news in daily life.  
At the Publicity Bureau, there were a few individual Marines who had a 
significant impact on the Corps’ recruiting and publicity activities. As a result, these 
individuals also had a significant impact on the crafting and creation of much of the 
Corps’ image and identity that persists still to this day. Perhaps the least studied of these 
Publicity Bureau Marines was Major Thomas G. Sterrett. For the most part, this was by 
design, as Sterrett liked to be behind the scenes and allowed the subtleties of publicity 
and the news to take the lead. Sterrett had an uncanny ability to capture the imagination 
of the press without putting himself in the limelight.  
Sterrett was a veteran of the Spanish-American War with the 15th Pennsylvania 
Volunteer Infantry and before he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1906, Sterrett was an 
actor and a newspaper man in his hometown of Erie, PA.155 It is clear that Sterrett stood 
out among other Marines, even in his early days. His first duty station was a position of 
honor as part of the Marine detachment aboard the presidential yacht, the Mayflower. It is 
unclear exactly how the Marines aboard the Mayflower were chosen, but Sterrett’s 
shipmates included another notable Marine of the era: Lieutenant Edgar Allen Poe, Jr.156 
Sterrett was also a prolific writer of short stories, fiction, and poems, a skill that certain 
aided in his success with the Corps’ Publicity Bureau.157 
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At the Publicity Bureau, Major Sterrett used the Recruiters’ Bulletin to 
disseminate some of the fun pieces he wrote, but also to help teach the Marine recruiters 
across the country how to create these little bits of interesting news for print. Sterrett was 
so important to the to the Publicity Bureau and the Bulletin in its early days that in the 
first and founding issue, Sterrett wrote nearly half of the articles.158 Perhaps one of 
Sterrett’s most important articles on his and the bureau’s strategy to publicize the Corps 
was “Working the Newspapers.” In it, Sterrett provided instructions for recruiters on how 
to create relationships with local newspaper editors so that they could have a direct line 
for their copy to get into print.159 In this article, Sterrett also describes how the Marine 
recruiters in any town could argue to newspaper editors their mutually beneficial 
relationship, because they stand outside of their office all day and observe the goings on 
in the city. Sterrett gives an example of what a recruiter could say to an editor: 
‘Here’ you say, ‘is a simple proposition.’ I stand for eight hours each day in front of my recruiting 
office. You know where it is…one of the busiest corners in own. Now then, I know, and you 
know, that no person could stand on that corner all day without picking up much of the news of 
the town. Then too, very often heart and human interesting stories ‘break’ in a recruiting office; 
sometimes criminals are apprehended by the shrewd recruiting officer. I’d like to be the 
[newspaper] representative on that corner, and, in return for protecting the news for your paper, I’d 
like for you from time to time to run such of my publicity matter as you can.”160  
With Sterrett’s experience in the newspapers and his position at the Publicity Bureau, 
Marine recruiters gained a step-by-step guide to “working the newspapers” in their 
respective towns, thus keeping the Marines in front of the public all across the U.S.  
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In 1916, with his enlistment complete, Sterrett left the Publicity Bureau and the 
Marine Corps for a brief period. He did not, however, leave behind his willingness to 
help the Corps’ public image as during this period he consulted on the Corps’ first major 
film, “The Peacemakers: An Educational Pictorial Showing the United States Marines in 
Barracks, at Sea, and on the Field of Battle.”161 Created in 1916 by the Thomas Edison 
Film Company along with the Corps’ Publicity Bureau, “The Peacemakers” became an 
important film in Marine Corps and military history as it was the said to be the first film 
to show actual combat footage of Marines in Haiti. There is currently no existing footage 
from “The Peacemakers,” though the script is reprinted in its entirety in the Recruiters’ 
Bulletin.162 As the First World War approached, it was clear that the Corps saw Sterrett as 
an indispensable part of their public relations strategy. Sterrett was offered an officer’s 
commission and he rejoined the Corps and the Publicity Bureau in 1917. Thomas Sterrett 
helped to make the Marine Corps a household name and his service on the public image 
side of the Corps’ activities was as important as those Marines who served overseas as it 
pertained to the future of the Corps. 
When Sterrett retired from the Marine Corps as a major in 1919, Colliers’ 
Magazine writer William Almon Wolff wrote an article about Sterrett’s importance to the 
Marines and to the public’s consumption of the Corps’ image and identity. The article, 
titled “Selling the Marines,” stated: 
In 1915, when Sterrett came to the Marine Recruiting Publicity Bureau, he was a sergeant. Also, 
neither he nor anyone else knew it then, he was an advertising genius. The Recruiting Publicity 
Bureau wasn’t worthy of its name then. It didn’t really go after publicity at all. It got out a few 
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standardized posters urging men to join the corps, stuck them up in post-offices and such places, 
and let it go at that. Marines didn’t mean much in your life then did they? You knew there were 
such fighters but weren’t your ideas about them pretty vague? . . .If there was trouble somewhere 
at the ends of the earth, Marines were likely to settle it. Here’s an illustration. There was a time 
when you would’ve gone into a grocery, on your way home, when you felt like a bite to eat, and 
said casually, “Give me half a pound of crackers.” You wouldn’t do that now. You’d ask for some 
package of nationally advertised biscuit. Just as now, if by some mischance, trouble developed in 
spite of what’s happening in Paris, you’d be pretty likely to say “Hello! Something doing. Looks 
like a job for those devil dogs. Sure—let’s get the Marines on the job!” 
And the reason you know the Marines and call for them by name is exactly the same reason that 
makes you ask for the biscuit instead of crackers, and that is—advertising. Sterrett sold you the 
Marines.163 
Sterrett worked hard from 1914-1916 for the Publicity Bureau and set the standard for the 
successful bi-weekly news syndicate service.  
From the explosion of the Maine through the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, the Marine Corps’ public image changed dramatically. With the Corps’ new 
roles as a result of American expansion in Caribbean and the Pacific, Marines began to 
receive positive news coverage as they were continuously called on to intervene in 
countries all over the world. As the press began to associate the Corps with concepts like 
bravery, conquerors, and defenders of American democracy, a rapid change took place, in 
which the Corps began to formalize a relationship with the press that had been, for the 
most part, so kind. In Chicago, Marine recruiters began to go above and beyond the 
typical “Help Wanted” ads in the newspaper and instead began to use newsworthy and 
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human-interest press copy to get published frequently in the newspaper and to have some 
control over the copy.  
When President Roosevelt nearly struck the Marine Corps from the navy in 1909, 
the Corps managed to survive through its political connections and prowess, and a newly 
found autonomy due to its recent publicized exploits all over the world. In the aftermath 
of the Roosevelt removal, the Corps continued to institutionalize its publicity and public 
image campaign through the creation of the military’s first Publicity Bureau in 1911. 
While the Publicity Bureau’s early years were spent as a printing press with a small 
contingent of press agent Marines, by 1914 with the creation of the Recruiters’ Bulletin, 
the Corps could disseminate some of the tremendously successful strategies founded by 
individual Marines such as Major Thomas G. Sterrett.  
Ultimately, The Marine Corps’ Recruiting and Publicity Bureaus then helped to 
reinforce the Corps’ public image in any city where men were recruited for the Marines. 
Alongside some of the earliest practices of public relations in the United States, this small 
military service sought former newspaper men, artists, and writers in order to establish a 
truly remarkable public relations system for its time. Through the publication of the 
Recruiters’ Bulletin, the Corps was then able to create a discussion of recruiting 
successes and failures in order to continue to improve its image alongside new 
technologies and mediums. At the onset of the First World War, then, the Marine Corps 
already possessed an able and experienced publicity and public relations infrastructure 
that would help the Corps to not only continue to hone its public image but also to ensure 
that Marines were in front of the public’s eyes in front of the other services.  
 76 
CHAPTER II – FIRST TO FIGHT!: CRAFTING THE MARINE CORPS’ PUBLIC 
IMAGE IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
In the opening decade of the twentieth century, the Marine Corps found itself 
involved in police actions and conflicts around the world. Having survived the Roosevelt 
Administration’s unification crisis in 1908, the Corps further institutionalized its 
relationship with the press and the American public through the development of the 
Publicity Bureau in 1916. The Marines embraced the positive press they received and 
sought to reinforce the Corps’ community-level relationships as World War I approached. 
If by 1917, the Corps’ public image was already dramatically different than it was prior 
to the Spanish-American War, the Corps’ public relations activities throughout World 
War I would create such an enduring public image that the Corps continues to rely on the 
myth and lore from this period to indoctrinate Marines to this day. During the war, the 
Marine Corps’ national and community level public relations activities created the image 
of an elite service that was integral to American public, and, would ultimately convince 
many in the American public that its role in World War I was far more significant than 
the small service could possibly achieve. Perhaps the greatest evidence of the Corps’ 
success lies in the conspiracy theories spouted by army officers at the end of the war who 
believed the Marines went too far in trying to steal recruits.164  
As the U.S. entered the war, however, there was already a stark contrast in public 
image between the army and Marines due to the activities in which they engaged. With 
the Marine Corps continuing to engage in police actions in the Caribbean, actions 
portrayed in the Wilsonian language of spreading democracy, the army was engaged in 
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the unsuccessful manhunt for the Mexican outlaw, Pancho Villa. General John J. 
Pershing, commander of the expedition described himself as “a man looking for a needle 
in a hay stack with an armed guard standing over the stack forbidding you to look in the 
hay.”165 
The army, of course, faced several challenges in this effort as President Woodrow 
Wilson sought to micromanage the operation and Pancho Villa launched arguably one of 
the greatest foreign propaganda campaigns of the era.166 Regardless, the articles in 
newspapers across the country portrayed two starkly different campaigns. Headlines 
regarding Marines in the Caribbean in the Washington Post in 1916 announced: 
“Dominican Army Revolt Crushed,” “U.S. Troops Defeat Dominican rebels,” and 
“Marines are Rewarded.”167 Both the navy and Marine Corps gained credit for their 
ability to restore order in Santo Domingo. For the army, however, headlines portrayed a 
poorly planned and executed headhunt. Headlines in the New York Times included 
“Pershing Halts” and “Bandit Not Surrounded.”168 It was within this context that the 
Marine Corps also began its own institutional fight to participate in the World War itself. 
In April 1917, as the United States declared war, the Marine Commandant, Major 
General George Barnett immediately began to lobby for the Marine Corps to have a 
significant role in a major ground war. With his personal connections in the political 
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establishment, and perhaps with the help of the confusion that attended the war planning 
process, Barnett managed to secure the Marine Corps a position in the newly formed 
Allied Expeditionary Force (AEF).169 With their position in the war secured, Marine 
leaders immediately set about to recruit men ready to fight.  
Only a day after the U.S. entry into the war, General Barnett sent a direct plea to 
newspapers in major cities around the U.S. for recruits who might be interested in signing 
up. General Barnett laid out why men should choose the Marine Corps over the other 
services. “Marine Corps service in times of peace is very attractive; in time of war it is 
doubly so to red-blooded men of action. Marines are always called first when war is 
imminent, and they have shown the way to fighting men since 1798.170 America’s entry 
into the war caused an enormous recruiting rush and the Marine Corps spent significant 
energy and money in convincing recruits why they should choose the Corps, especially in 
citing the Corps’ elite public image and opportunity to fight first. 
 As the repository for ideas on Marine recruiting activities, the Recruiters’ 
Bulletin portrays an insightful view into the Corps’ creativity in its recruiting endeavor. 
In the April 1917 issue, the use of trenches as a recruiting tool was proposed. “Where 
practicable, recruiters make arrangements to dig trenches, make them bomb proof and 
erect wire entanglements, in such suitable and available places as parks, public squares, 
etc.”171 It is unclear if any locales actually tore up their municipal parks to create faux 
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trenches, but this signifies the ways in which the Corps attempted to prove it would send 
recruits straight to battle in Europe.  
In Rochester, New York, the Marine in charge of recruiting, Sergeant George 
Kneller, provided a microcosm of recruiting and publicity strategy in the May 1917 issue 
of Recruiters’ Bulletin. Sergeant Kneller wrote “For the past 10 months local publicity 
has been confined to dignified, matter-of-fact statements, every article teeming with news 
quality and at the same time carrying with it the great facts, in some form or other, that 
the Marine Corps is the first line of defense or attack, that they are the van in all military 
operations, and that experiences within the Corps are not limited to a specialized branch 
but on the contrary offer the individual change and variety which run the whole gamut of 
both Army and Navy activities.”172  
News pieces in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle reveal how Sergeant 
Kneller’s strategy adhered to the Corps’ emphasis on hometown news pieces as it 
unfolded since mid-1916. The stories Sergeant Kneller described were not front-page 
stories, but instead were often several pages into the newspaper, usually where the stories 
of local interest appeared. In an October, 1916 news article amidst other pieces of local 
political interest as well as local meetings and opinions, there was an article titled 
“Rochester Marine Scores: Ellison Street Youth Attains Grade of Marksmen in Corps.” 
This article tells the story of local recruit Harold W. Hummel, who received his 
“preliminary instruction in gunnery at the U.S. Marines, Port Royal, S.C. training station, 
where the soldiers of the sea are drilled or their duties ashore and afloat.”173 By all 
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accounts, recruit Harold W. Hummel was certainly one of many Marines in training at 
Port Royal, S.C. who qualified as marksman. The article goes on to give detail into the 
equipment and shooting that took place, thus garnishing interest from young men 
interested in learning how to wield these weapons as well. “When but little more than a 
novice with the modern high-powered rifle, his splendid showing at slow and rapid fire 
gained for him this coveted distinction. Hereafter he will wear the badge of 
marksmanship and receive an increase of pay as a result of his success.”174 
In Rochester, the Corps continued to show that its focus on news of hometown 
interest during both peacetime and war was an effective way of both distinguishing itself 
as a service and advertising to a specific recruit; one who was athletic, masculine, and 
more interested in the fight than in the other “jobs” that may come with military service. 
Small articles published by Marine recruiters continued to run in Rochester newspapers 
up through the declaration of war. Some merely noted that a local Rochester Marine 
received a promotion, while others stressed the Corps’ need for good recruits for the 
coming conflict.175 Sergeant Kneller and the recruiters in Rochester also focused on the 
concept of the Corps being the “First to Fight.” On February 5, 1917, Sergeant Kneller 
announced in a newspaper article that the Corps’ recruiting station would extend its hours 
to twelve hours a day and noted that “Should war break, the Marine Corps would be the 
first to enter action. These “soldiers of the sea” would be sent ahead to clear the way for 
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the others. The organization has the reputation all over the world of being the best drilled 
body of men extant and also the most perfect as to physical fitness.”176 
The Corps also continued to stress that it only accepted the best recruits, a concept 
still reinforced today through the “Few Good Men” campaigns. In a February 8, 1917 
article, the headline read “Interest Grows in Recruiting for Navy: Marine Corps Takes in 
12 out of 85.” Citing that “in the last ten days the Marine recruiting station at No. 8 North 
Water Street has had eighty-five applicants for enlistment, of which number it has 
actually accepted twelve men for the corps.” This article is of interest because the 
reporter chose to highlight the fact that the Corps took in 12 of 85 applicants, a roughly 
14% acceptance rate (as highlighted by the sub headline). Yet, in the same article, it 
noted that navy only accepted 4 of 27 recruits (a roughly 12%) acceptance rate. The 
article mentions that foreign applicants made up a large number of navy recruits, hence 
the low acceptance rate. However, perhaps the most important factor is that the Corps had 
triple the amount of interested recruits versus the navy.177  
In Sergeant Kneller’s recruiting strategy as he laid out in the Recruiters’ Bulletin, 
the most important class of recruits, those were immediately accepted and best fit the 
Corps’ masculinity and fitness demands, were athletes. Kneller was particularly proud 
that “results were attained by attracting one notable figure or group of figures from a 
certain section and his admirers, cronies, club mates, or classmates as the case would 
happen, would flock to join with him. The most notable instance of this sort was the 
Crimson Football Team which joined in a body and attached sixteen other men physically 
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fit. Individual instances can be mentioned in the cases of...local athletes who drew about 
ten other accepted applicants.”178  
At Marine Corps headquarters, recruiters saw a practical reason to recruit athletes 
as well. Sergeant Bert Van Moss saw the need for athletic recruits for a different purpose. 
With the expectation of trench warfare, Sergeant Van Moss believed that as “it is useless 
to arm men with rifles unless you teach them their use. It is equally useless to train their 
bodies with calisthenics unless you teach them how to use their bodies to best advantage 
in a physical contact with an opponent…Therefore, let us mobilize the boxers and 
wrestlers and other athletes of the country and put them in our training camps and we will 
turn out a corps of fighters that will win with the least loss, let the enemy choose any 
weapons.”179 Later in the war, the Washington Post described the type of man who joined 
the Marines: “Not only is every United States Marine a picked man—picked for his 
physical condition and his hard, horse sense—but he is an all-around man, a three-in-one 
man, the multiple Marine, the typical incarnation of American adaptiveness and readiness 
to fit into every circumstance, to take care of himself in every emergency.”180 
In May, 1917, the Marine Corps released an article to major news syndicates that 
served to introduce the Marine unit that was deploying to France. In the New York Times’ 
May 20 issue, the headline read “Fighting Not New To Doyen’s Marines.”181 The article 
was aimed to educate the public about both the unit and its commander in order to 
establish the legitimacy of its participation in the war. To prove that the Marines would 
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see combat, the article made it clear that these Marines went to France as part of the 
“fighting division under Major General John J. Pershing.” The article also placed 
emphasis on the Corps’ public image as a combat unit. The second purpose of the article 
served as a small history of the Corps. This article also began to teach the public that 
throughout the history of the Marines, they were the first to fight when America called on 
them.182  
In New York, the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau stepped up its efforts at 
publicizing the Corps through the introduction of civilian media experts to aid the Corps 
in its recruiting efforts.183 Along with writers and publishers such as Charles Phelps 
Cushing, the Corps commissioned artists and illustrators including James Montgomery 
Flagg, L.A. Shafer, Louis Fancher, and C.B. Falls.to help visualize the Marine Corps’ 
public image.184 The Marine Corps also doubled several departments at the Publicity 
Bureau as America entered the war, including press, photographic, and printing. In 
American magazines, the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau found that editors and 
publishers were willing to give the Corps plenty of space. An article, “Marines in the 
Magazines,” cites that Marine publicity content was published in The Saturday Evening 
Post, Leslie’s, The Independent, The World’s Work, Physical Culture, Picture Play, 
Popular Science, Travel, The Nation’s Business, The Christian Herald, and the Review of 
Reviews.185 The Marine Corps was also featured as cover art in Collier’s Magazine, along 
with the headline “The Marines Have Landed.”186 The space in these publications 
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secured by the Marines, while perhaps modest in comparison to articles about the army 
and navy in general, far outweighed the Corps’ own size and significance on the 
battlefield. 
In the Recruiters’ Bulletin, Marine recruiters sought to create a discourse that 
helped to optimize their recruiting patterns and assure that the Corps was not at a 
disadvantage in the recruiting field. While many recruiting activities focused on the 
military recruiting stations, there was another locale where American recruits could sign 
up for the service: the local postmaster station. U.S. Postmasters actually received an 
incentive of $5.00 “for each accepted applicant they secure for any one of the three 
branches.”187 Enlistment cards were kept at these stations in every town that had one, 
which were far more in number than the service recruiting stations. The postmaster 
station, then, was one of the most contested public spaces for each of the services to reach 
recruits outside of their typical areas of operation and the Marines wanted to assure that 
the postmasters were helping their service. 
The Marine Corps recruiters began discussion over the importance of postmaster 
stations as soon as war became a real possibility. In February 1917, an article was 
published in the Recruiters’ Bulletin that laid out the issues the Corps faced at postmaster 
stations. “From a financial or patriotic point of view, it makes no difference to the 
postmaster to which branch he sends his men...They do not thoroughly understand the 
difference between the branches, other than that the army wants soldiers for land duty 
and the navy wants sailors for sea duty. Their knowledge of the Marine Corps is probably 
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decidedly vague.”188 Marine recruiter First Sergeant Francis E. Turin also recognized the 
geographic expansion that postmaster recruiting opened for the Corps as he noted that 
“Postmaster stations have opened up sections of the country from whence it was not 
possible to obtain recruits heretofore.”189 
The idea of influencing postmasters for recruiting is significant in that it was born 
out of the dialogue of ideas between motivated Marine Corps recruiters and discussed in 
the issues of the Recruiters’ Bulletin from the initial concept all the way to results in the 
field. Whereas in February 1917, an article in the Recruiters’ Bulletin proposed that 
“recruiters should, when practicable enlist the postmasters in the Marine Corps 
[emphasis from original]–not literally, but enlist their sympathy, interest and favor in the 
Marine Corps. Educate them as to the “two-in-one” advantages of our service, and in the 
methods of recruiting.”190 As it did with the nation as a whole, the Marine Corps saw an 
advantage in singling out postmasters because of their significant potential for recruiting 
Marines. This is important also because the individual Marine recruiters were not 
necessarily receiving statistical credit for these enlistments, outside of the Marines being 
enlisted under the general recruiting districts. Instead, this was an instance where Marines 
saw an opportunity to use education and focused publicity where it would make an 
impact on the both the Corps’ quotas and the public image as whole. 
By May 1917, Marine recruiters sought to go a step further and create a new 
recruiting position called the “Postmaster Sergeant,” which was a Marine who would 
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“perform the same duty as a traveling salesman. He will visit stations in order of where 
the field is best; he will see that the postmasters are stocked with literature, where he 
believes it would pay, he will recommend “A” signs as an aid to postmasters; he will 
recommend extensive advertising...and when necessary will personally work up a section 
for the postmaster; he will work in all lines to promote recruiting at postmaster 
stations.”191 Postmaster Sergeants, First Sergeant Turin argued, also acted as quality 
control agents for the type of recruit that filled out the enlistment cards at the station, thus 
assuring the Marine Corps would have less rejections. 
Results of “postmaster recruiting” appeared quite successful, at least as reported 
by one major recruiting district. Sergeant John J. Sheridan, reporting from St. Louis, cited 
that “Postmaster stations have furnished Missouri and Kansas City Districts with 
sufficient applicants last month (May), to cause us to believe we have set a record with 
forty-four for Missouri and seven for Kansas City, and we think possibly our methods 
may aid others in this line of work.”192 Sergeant Sheridan and his team of recruiters in the 
district created personal relationships with the postmasters, a move which endeared the 
Marine Corps to these important “middle men” of enlistment and recruiting. Sergeant 
Sheridan noted that, “through our corresponding we have become acquainted with the 
majority of our postmasters; some have held long distance talks with us at their own 
expense.” Sheridan’s advice was to “Never neglect [author’s emphasis] a postmaster’s 
request, no matter how trivial. Write heart to heart letters, not official letters for your 
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postmasters.”193 First Sergeant Francis E. Turin, who originally suggested the idea of 
postmaster sergeants, wrote in the September 1917 issue of Recruiters’ Bulletin that 
“Probably one of the most important avenues opened to recruiting is postmaster 
recruiting, and let us hope it remains a fixture. When one headquarters can procure 80 
enlistments from these stations...and at a very low cost per recruit, it surely is a paying 
proposition…Contemplate the territory to be worked and realize that postmasters are 
woven over the entire district, at work for us. One patriotic postmaster (and very 
energetic) issues circulars weekly, to his territory.”194 
From June 10 to 16, 1917, the Marine Corps held the “National U.S. Marine 
Corps Recruiting Week,” a national publicity campaign with major advertising 
endorsements from well-known figures such as Former President Theodore Roosevelt, 
Josephus Daniels, William Howard Taft, and novelist Winston Churchill (not related to 
the British statesman).195 “Marine Corps Week,” as it was called, was not just a drive for 
signing “4,000 enlistments...by Saturday night,” but also it was important education 
campaign for the public about what the Marine Corps stood for and why it was important 
to the United States. In anticipation of the mass scale of the drive, the Marine Corps hired 
Donovan & Armstrong, a Philadelphia based advertising firm. Donovan and Armstrong 
helped the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau to distribute 3,300,000 “pieces of publicity 
matter–ranging from handbills to posters, from “movie” slides to telegrams.”196 In major 
cities across the United States, the Marines held parades, rallies, and other publicity 
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stunts. The Publicity Bureau calculated that the Marine Corps received over six thousand 
columns of newspaper space across the country, “a great many of these were front page 
articles. Cartoons, illustrations, photographs, poetry, etc., with a large circulation, used a 
large three-color scheme to attract the attention of its readers of the Marine Corps.”197  
Newspapers in the major cities counted down the recruits needed from the Corps’ 
goal of 4,000. Each city was given a quota of recruits to reach. Chicago was set at 500, 
New York City at 250, while Los Angeles only needed 120.198 In Chicago, the Corps 
only raised 390 of the 500 needed, and, while it did not meet its quota of 4,000 recruits 
nationwide, Marine Week offered an ideal opportunity for the Corps to get its name and 
mission out before the public. The advertisers of Donovan & Armstrong understood the 
power of the recruiting campaign and were aligned with the Corps’ needs, especially as it 
pertained to their public image. “The editorial mind has been brought to the realization of 
the Marine Corps as a distinct branch of the service; and not only so, but as a military 
arm deserving of special recognition and appreciation on the part of the American 
people.”199 By the end of August 1917, the size of the United States Marine Corps 
swelled to over 32,000 Marines, up nearly 23,000 from the year before.200  
The publicity material created and distributed by the Marine Corps Publicity 
Bureau was of high quality and the Marine Corps was able to wield tremendously 
effective slogans during war time recruiting. It is important to note, however, that by all 
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accounts many enlisted Marines truly believed in their Corps and both its spirit and 
public image. In the Marines Magazine, a magazine that predated Leatherneck as a voice 
for enlisted Marines, the call to war and the influx of new recruits necessitated a special 
welcome from other Marines. In May 1917, under the headline “War!,” an enlisted 
Marine challenged Marines of the “old Corps” to educate the new recruits on the 
principles of their Corps: 
To the hundreds of recruits who have lately entered the Marine Corps we extend our greeting. 
These new comrades probably know little of the history and traditions of the Corps, and the 
important duty devolves upon our older men to instruct and guide them in this respect, as well as 
in military life. Tell them that Marines are frequently called upon to do impossible things, and that 
the more impossible the task the better they like it and the more efficiently they do it. If this seems 
vain boasting, tell them that the history of the Marine Corps is filled with examples of difficult 
tasks well done, and that the inbred spirit of the Corps is to recognize no assignment as too 
arduous for accomplishment. This is a gallant Corps, a proud Corps. In the crises of war before us, 
the greatest war of history, let no stain of dishonor and shame dim the glory of its past record.201 
That the Marine Corps was able to recruit men with such lofty language about esprit de 
corps and appeals to the warrior citizens of the public and continue to maintain and 
reinforce those ideals both during and after these men left the Marine Corps was a 
significant accomplishment. 
 While the Marines conveyed adventure and travel as incentives for young recruits, 
the single most important recruiting slogan of the First World War was “First to Fight.” 
No other military slogan used in posters, A-signs, pamphlets, or newspaper articles better 
and more succinctly conveyed the most pressing reason these men should join the 
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service. The ability to see action as soon as possible was incredibly enticing to recruits. 
Historian Richard S. Faulkner argues, “of all the services, the Marines seemed best 
positioned to draw those men most seeking adventure and who were eager to get to 
France.”202 “A Texan claimed that he enlisted in the Marines in June 1917 because “Back 
home the glaring posters had read “First to Fight!” “First on Land and Sea,” “France in 
90 Days,” and the like...Every man in that group wanted to fight, or thought he did.”203 
While the concept of “First to Fight” is now ingrained in Marine Corps lore and 
included as a verse of the Marines’ Hymn, the year 1917 certainly marked the first use of 
this term en masse for the Corps. A version of the Marines’ Hymn, not yet copywritten 
by the Corps presented in a September 1914 issue of Overland Monthly and the Out West 
Magazine, had the line “Admiration of the Nation,” in the place where “First to Fight for 
right and freedom” currently resides204 In editorials regarding the Corps’ history, the 
Marine landing at Cuba in the Spanish American War and their presence all over the 
globe was often used as on-the-spot proof of these claims. Pushback against the claim 
that the Marines were always the “first to fight” certainly existed as the editors of the 
Recruiters’ Bulletin provided clear responses to any questioning on the subject. “Perhaps 
it was inevitable that there should have been heard, here and there, a note of criticism of 
the recent recruiting campaign of the Marine Corps” wrote one editor, who explained to 
the reader that “the use of such slogans, descriptive of the Marine Corps as “Riot Squad 
of the Nation,” and “First to Fight,” is not braggadocio, but simply an epigrammatic 
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presentation of the functions of the Corps in the military, naval and diplomatic service of 
the country.”205 In the “First to Fight” slogan, the Marine Corps’ management and 
acceptance of press during the Spanish American War truly offered the institution 
credibility to fall back on. As discussed in the last chapter, the Corps’ constant focus on 
its history in the press in the years leading to World War I built the public image that 
young recruits eagerly embraced. 
 In December 1917, as the Marine brigade in Europe was training in the cold 
European winter, the Recruiters’ Bulletin sought to inquire of major publishers across the 
country about their thoughts of the Corps’ publicity successes. While these surveys are 
indeed biased (it is unclear exactly what questions were asked and which surveys were 
excluded), there were 44 responses from major newspaper editors, and many cited the 
“First to Fight” slogan and “human interest stories” as the primary reasons for the Corps’ 
success. W.B. Hayward, editor of the New York Post stated that “in regard to posters, it is 
generally conceded that the Marine Corps’ slogan “First to Fight,” is the very best 
recruiting appeal of the war.” A.R. Ferguson, editor of the New York Tribune added that 
“All over the country posters are appealing to brave men to join the organization that is 
“First to Fight” and the men who are responding are the men who want action and want it 
bad...Not only has the Marine Corps a real and separate appeal from the other branches of 
the service, but it makes excellent capital of it.”206  
The success of the Corps’ public image and recruiting campaigns is best signified 
by the fact that the Marine Corps recruited to its capacity throughout the war. The 
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Marines even made sure to note that while the Corps was forced to accept Selective 
Service draftees in August 1918, the Marines fighting in Europe were an “all-volunteer 
force.”207 As it is still today, the Marine Corps sent its recruits to training centers at 
several points around the United States for harsh and realistic training.208 In a letter home 
to his recruiter, one Parris Island Marine recruit lamented “I haven’t completed my 
training yet—so I don’t know what there is in store for me, but judging from past 
performances, I reckon that standing up before a machine gun and being shot at, or 
thrown from a speeding aeroplane, would be right in line. We ought to be puncture-proof 
when we get out of here.”209  
In order for the Corps to make sure its Marines stood up to its claims about being 
an elite fighting force, historian Allan Millett argued that “the rigor and standardization 
of Marine recruit training at the depot assured the Corps of better-trained enlisted men 
than the army could provide for the American Expeditionary Forces.”210 General Barnett 
assigned the combat-tested Major Smedley Butler as commanding officer of the base at 
Quantico. Regarding Butler’s focus on recreating the conditions in Europe, one Marine 
recruit at Quantico noted “a whole section of the Virginia woodland has been taken over 
and blasted, dug, and mined by the miners and sappers of the Marine corps until it is 
almost an exact replica of the country around Château-Thierry and Vimy Ridge.”211  
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The first of two Marine Corps regiments arrived in Europe by June 1917. 
Commanded by Colonel Doyen, the 5th Marine Regiment, one half of the 4th Marine 
Brigade, sailed for France to begin its on-site training.212 To General Barnett’s great 
dismay, army leadership ordered Marines to do exactly what the Corps’ publicity 
promised the public it would not do: security and police duty far away from the action on 
the front lines.213 In response, General Barnett turned to the newspapers to convince the 
public that the Marines were not used in such a way. In an article titled “Marines Force in 
France Not Split,” Barnett outright denied the fact that Marines “had been split up into 
small details and assigned to provost guard duty in towns where Americans troops are 
billeted.”214 In order to preserve the slogan “First to Fight,” and “Tell that to the 
Marines,” Barnett needed to keep the Corps’ reputation of a combat service intact. 
For the Marines in Europe, especially those who responded to the call of the 
Corps’ recruiting campaigns, the reality of war hit hard. This was especially evident for 
the Marines’ expectation that the Corps would be “First to Fight.” It was not until the 
winter of 1917-1918, that General Pershing ultimately integrated the 5th Marine 
Regiment and eventually the entire 4th Marine Brigade into the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry 
Division.215 In January 1918, then, the 4th Marine Brigade was officially at full capacity 
with the arrival and training of the 6th Marines.216 While perhaps rough on the Marines, 
the conditions of training during that winter reflected the harsh conditions soldiers 
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experienced at the front. In a letter home, Major Robert L. Denig briefly mentioned the 
obstacle he most resented, mud: “I am mud from head to toes, feet always wet in spite of 
hip boots. The woolen socks are fine. I usually have on three pairs, as the snow and mud 
cover everything and everyone. Mud on the western Front is no joke, it can’t be 
described; it is thick and sticky, and when it dries on you it is as hard as a brick. My 
overcoat will stand alone.”217 When they arrived, Marines also had to acclimate 
themselves to French weaponry, which they claimed were “heavy, clumsy, and 
inaccurate.”218 
 When it came to publicizing the Corps’ activities in Europe in early 1918, the 
Publicity Bureau and recruiters benefited from a few holes in the censorship rules. While 
the 4th Marine Brigade was underneath the leadership of the army, the Department of the 
Navy still controlled its policies regarding censorship. The army’s strict censorship policy 
was that the press was “not permitted to mention…the name, number, or location of any 
unit of the forces.”219 The press, however, were allowed to identify the Marine brigade, 
since it was a part of the navy. This small distinction meant that not only could the war 
correspondents in Europe call out the Marines for the service, but that the Corps’ public 
relations entities back in the U.S. could also take advantage of this loophole. There are 
many different accounts of the circumstances under which this policy played out; 
however, historian Allan Millett writes that: 
Barnett asked Pershing if the Marine brigade could be officially called the 4th Brigade (U.S. 
Marines), for it had become the fourth Marine brigade then serving in 1917. The brigade was 
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already the 4th Infantry Brigade of the AEF, so Pershing’s staff saw no objection to the special 
designation, thus assuring that the brigade would retain its Marine Corps identity not only in 
official reports but in the newspapers as well. This casual decision, routinely made, eventually 
created jealousy of the Marines in the AEF when Pershing’s censors in 1918 decided that 
newsmen could not identify AEF units by number but could refer to the Marine brigade by 
name.220 
While the U.S. had a massive army in Europe, it is then no surprise that the Marines, “a 
formation of only 7,000 strong, could generate a sense of community among reporters as 
well as its own members.”221 
 With the Marine brigade in France, the Publicity Bureau and recruiting activities 
back in the U.S. returned to the staples of publicity. Articles in the Recruiters’ Bulletin 
reminded Marine recruiters to create positive and close relationships with newspaper 
editors and reporters in order to get the Corps’ “human interest stories” out to the public. 
While the slogan “First to Fight” waned in its importance to new recruits (and because 
the selective service system filled the Corps to its quotas), the Corps sought to use both 
news coming in from the front and hundreds of short stories of interest to generate 
publicity. In the February 1918 issue of the Recruiters’ Bulletin, stories provided for 
Marine recruiters to pass on to newspapers included a wide range of topics, from a 26-
year-old little person who wanted to be a Marine, to movie stars, and “motorcycle 
Marines,” all geared toward keeping the Corps’ name in front of the public. During this 
period, the Recruiters’ Bulletin’s “Keeping the Corps in the Limelight” section, which in 
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1917 was usually one page or two, reached four to five pages in the early 1918 issues.222  
 From February 4-7, 1918, the Marines held the first U.S. Marine Corps Publicity 
Conference in New York City. The major players of the Marine publicity world, 
including Colonel A.S. McLemore, Captain Thomas G. Sterrett, and Commandant Major 
General George Barnett all agreed to temporarily retire the “First to Fight” slogan in 
favor of major generalized newspaper human interest publicity. It was also at this 
conference the Marines “agreed that the Corps device–globe, eagle and anchor–was its 
most staple trademark, and was also more closely identified with the Corps than the 
uniform or any of the various slogans.”223 
 In Europe, the Publicity Bureau also had correspondents reporting news back for 
recruiters in the U.S. A former Philadelphia newsman, only referred to as Sergeant 
Dietrich, wrote small interest pieces on the happenings for Marines overseas, from 
Thanksgiving dinners to the delivery of the mail.224 The most extensive war 
correspondent material for the Recruiters’ Bulletin, however, came from First Lieutenant 
Charles Phelps Cushing, the former editor of Literary Digest and Collier’s Weekly and 
future founding correspondent for Starts and Stripes. Cushing was “enrolled” in the 
Marine Corps in April 1917 and the Publicity Bureau immediately put him to work 
reporting on the Marines’ deployment to Europe.225 One year later, Cushing began 
writing short stories on the Corps’ activities, both military and civilian, in France. 
Cushing’s stories contained a different tone than most of the interest pieces coming back 
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from the front. Cushing was particularly talented at describing the small interactions 
between the Marines in France and French locals. In one piece, “Marine Billeted with 
French Family,” Cushing describes his time living at the home of a French couple, even 
staying in their son’s room, who was then fighting at the front.226  
 It was in April 1918 as well that the Marines in Europe mysteriously earned a 
nickname that become part of the Corps’ lore. The first mention of “teufel hunden,” 
translated by the Marines as “Devil Dogs” in a major American newspaper came on April 
27, 1918. In a New York Times article titled “Wounded Marines Were Known Here,” 
potentially written by the Corps’ Publicity Bureau, “a letter from a Marine, written from 
the first-line trenches, referred with a show of pride to a nickname which the Germans are 
said to have given the sea fighters. The name is “teufel hunden,” which means “devil 
dogs.”227 The following day, the Los Angeles Times ran an article from the “A.P. Night 
Wire,” headlined “Devil Dogs - German Title.” According to “letters” received from 
Marines overseas, “the name...saves the “soldiers of the sea” from selecting a substitute 
for the unfavored ‘Sammy”…Wow, those guys put us in the same class with the ladies 
from hell!” a veteran sergeant of the Marines was quoted as saying in one note home.”228 
 With the Corps’ Publicity Bureau only abandoning the slogan “First to Fight” a 
few months earlier, the appearance of the “Devil Dogs” moniker reinvigorated the Corps’ 
publicity machine. In the April 1918 issue of Recruiters’ Bulletin, the Publicity Bureau 
writers boasted, “the striking name [Devil Dogs] spread like fire. Papers in the United 
States readily grasped it and from now on Soldiers of the Sea apparently have lost the 
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title of “leatherneck” and are to be known as Teufel Hunden or Devil Dogs.”229 It is 
difficult to assess the veracity of the letter regarding the Germans calling the Corps teufel 
hunden, or, as is debated among the Corps’ historians, whether it was spelled in a 
different way or meant something entirely different in German. The name stuck, and it 
emerged at precisely the opportune moment for the Corps’ participation in the major 
action along the Western Front as it happened in June 1918. 
In terms of cumulative effect on the Corps’ public image, the most significant 
battle of the war for the Marines was the Battle of Belleau Wood. Historian Robert 
Lindsay argued that the Corps’ “slogans, use of civilian journalistic talent, initiation of 
the hometown release and the beginnings of the combat correspondent system,” all 
worked together in June of 1918 to help the Corps publicize its actions in a battle that 
would stay in the Corps’ lore for the next 100 years.230 The story of Belleau Wood, 
however, hinges on the activities of a few war correspondents who experienced a 
traumatic incident as the famous battle raged on. On June 5, three New York Sun 
correspondents, Arthur Hartzell, Tom Johnson, Dave Belamy, and Floyd Gibbons, a 
Chicago Tribune correspondent all traveled together to the edge of a wooded area called 
Belleau Wood.231 Gibbons, a “dramatic, colorful” writer, penned a story about the 
bravery of Marines based on rumors he heard about the battle from the day before. While 
the Marines were not the only unit present at the battle, Gibbons failed to mention any 
other military outfit in his story.232 Historian Emmet Crozier argues that “he [Gibbons] 
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expected to fill in authentic detail when he returned to Paris that night.” After writing the 
dramatic tale, Gibbons set off with the other reporters to catch up to the Marines who 
were then in pursuit of retreating Germans.233.  
 There are ultimately two perspectives of the Battle of Belleau Wood. The 
complex reality of fighting that occurred there and the version of events that emerged in 
the press that largely favored the Corps’ participation. The broader context and reality of 
the Battle of Belleau Wood is significant because it is important to note that the Marines 
were certainly not the only units involved in the broader line of battle. The Battle of 
Belleau Wood took place as allied forces collided with the head of a German advance on 
the town of Château-Thierry. To support the French, who represented the front-line 
forces, General Pershing deployed the U.S. 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions as reserves.  
That the Corps only represented a small portion of those fighting there does not 
beget the fact that the Marines suffered terrific losses in the engagement. However, 
throughout the operation itself, AEF headquarters denied that the Battle of Belleau Wood 
was “anything more than a minor local engagement.”234 For the Marines during the 
battle, however, “by the time the late twilight fell, the Corps had suffered more casualties 
(one thousand officers and men) than it had lost in its entire history.”235 While those 
numbers were small in comparison to the generation-killing battles at Verdun and the 
Somme, they did indeed have a significant impact on the Corps. 
 That the battle inflicted severe casualties on the Marines was important in the 
Corps’ history, however, the reality of the battle was still at odds with many of the reports 
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and stories that emerged. As is true in the fog of war, the Battle of Belleau Wood was 
mired in an environment of confusion, bad communication, and small, though bloody, 
engagements with the enemy.236 Even as the French bore the brunt of the German 
artillery on the front lines, the battle-wearied French soldiers defended their positions in 
the center of the line. In fact, historians argue that some of the most heroic actions of the 
battle was in the French army’s ability to hold out long enough for reinforcements of the 
American 2d Infantry Division to arrive. As the French focused their efforts on counter-
battery fire against the Germans, the Marines arrived in time to repel the German 
advance.237 When the Marines arrived, the French began to withdraw, and it was as the 
French turned that one of the Corps’ legendary interactions occurred. Reportedly, the 
conversation occurred between a French Major and Marine Captain Lloyd Williams, a 
company commander in the 5th Marines. Historian Robert Asprey argues that the 
interaction that transpired was a true moment of bravado for the Marine who encountered 
the retreating French major. 
In early afternoon Captain Williams reported to Wise that ‘all French troops on our right have 
fallen back, leaving a gap.’ On Williams’ right, Shearer’s troops reported similar information. To 
plug the gap Shearer sent in two platoons from his reserve which shortly made contact with 
Williams’ right…By the evening of June 3 the American positions were full of retreating French 
soldiers. One of them, a French major of Chasseurs, stumbled up to Williams’ second in command 
Captain Corbin. In broken English the major informed Corbin of the German attack and told him 
to withdraw his line. When Corbin paid no attention he took a pad from his tunic and in English 
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wrote a direct order to retreat. Corbin gave this to Williams who exploded: “Retreat, hell. We just 
got here.238 
Historian Edward Lengel, however, disputes the viability of the interaction that occurred. 
In his study of the battle, Lengel argues that the French major was, instead, “disagreeing–
as field officers are entitled to do–about the suitability of the American position,” 
specifically at Les Mares Farm.239 As is the story for so much of the Corps’ lore, the 
reality became far less important to history than Corbin’s words, which remain so 
ingrained in Marine Corps lore that they are carved into the walls of the National 
Museum of the Marine Corps. 
 The next morning, June 6, the Marines advanced under fire through the wheat 
field toward a small hill called Hill 142. When the Germans ended the artillery barrage, 
the Germany machine guns opened up on the Marines, beginning what many historians 
argue was “the most catastrophic day in Marine Corps history.”240 Several waves of 
German counter attacks on Hill 142 resulted in many stories of brutal hand-to-hand 
combat as the Germans employed infiltration attacks rather than massive wave attacks.241 
 The Marines represented only a fraction of the units along the front, to include 
numerous French and other American units. Back in the U.S., however, many 
newspapers attributed the halt of the German advance at Chateau Thierry and Belleau 
Wood to the Marines, and even credited the Corps for saving Paris. The sensational news 
back home was catapulted, in large part, due to the stories of the four American 
                                                 
238 Asprey, At Belleau Wood, 127. 
239 Edward G. Lengel, Thunder in Flames: Americans in the Crucible of Combat, 1917-1918 (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 88. 
240 George B. Clark as quoted in Lengel, Thunder in Flames, 102. 
241 Lengel, Thunder in Flames, 106. 
 102 
newspaper correspondents who followed the Marines into that wheat field at Belleau 
Wood. Gibbons, Hartzell, and Berry accompanied the Marines on a few scouting 
missions to test German positions. After hearing rumors of the Marines’ bravery the day 
before, the journalists wanted to see the action for themselves. As the war correspondents 
walked along a low fence line, a machine gun opened up and they all immediately 
dropped to the ground. Historian Emmet Crozier recounted the correspondents’ story. 
“Gibbons couldn’t see anything with his nose buried in the grass. Slowly he raised his 
head and looked around. Another sharp rattle of machine gun fire. Berry called, ‘Get 
down!’ but it was too late. One of the bullets had passed through Gibbons’ upper arm; 
another, through his left eye.”242 Direly injured, both Berry and Gibbons were 
immediately taken behind the lines to care for their wounds. Due to the severity of the 
wounds, Hartzell believed Gibbons had almost certainly died.243 Gibbons, however, clung 
to life at a Marine hospital. The short story he wrote a day earlier, the story for which he 
would later “fill in the authentic detail,” was then sent on to the Chicago Tribune by his 
colleagues. That story was then published without edit or censor as a memorial to 
Gibbons.244 The public reacted strongly to the dramatic language of Gibbons’ story. In 
his description of the moments before the attack (which he did not himself witness), 
Gibbons provided striking details. “The bullets nipped the tops of the young wheat and 
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ripped the bark from the trees three feet from the ground on which the Marine lay. The 
minute for the Marine advance was approaching.”245 
 There is no doubt the Marines fought a terrible and bloody battle at Belleau 
Wood. The Marines there put up a tremendous defense against a determined German 
enemy. While the press at home was interested the Corps’ successes, the Marines also 
recognized internally that the Battle of Belleau Wood was something special. In a letter 
to Commandant George Barnett, Major Frank E. Evans of the 6th Marine Regiment 
wrote, “I know you will be interested in what gallant work the officers and men are 
doing. The men have learned that the officers will lead them anywhere and the men 
worship them. And the officers will talk you to a finish at any time about their men. But 
they’ll hit us heavily on officers, for they had to fight with a reckless bravery to carry the 
day.”246  
The Marines also received recognition from the French, perhaps further 
entrenching their role in the battle. General Jean Degoutte, commanding officer of the 
French VI Army, changed the very name of the Belleau Wood to “Bois de la Brigade de 
Marine.” His 30 June orders read, “In view of the brilliant conduct of the 4th Brigade of 
the 2nd U.S. Division, which in a spirited fight took Bouresches and the important strong 
point of Bois de Belleau, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General 
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commanding the VI Army order that, henceforth, in all official papers, the Bois de 
Belleau shall be named “Bois de la Brigade de Marine.”247 
The Marines paid a high price for their efforts at Belleau Wood. By June 8, the 
4th Marine Brigade had lost nearly sixty percent of its strength, thought its Marines 
continued to fight on.248 The brigade reassembled and took on replacements and by late 
June, reentered the same sector and were able to secure a victory. Casualties for the 
Marines and for the whole division were terrible. The 2d Division lost 8,963 casualties, 
while the Marines alone lost 4,710.249 
 For the Marines’ first major battle of the war, Belleau Wood not only cemented 
their abilities in the eyes of the Corps, but also to the American public. Even though the 
Marines were under the command of an army division, animosity grew over the Corps’ 
visibility in the press. Historian Robert Asprey found that “soldiers remained victims of 
static war, tempers frayed and occasionally flared.” One army major called the reports 
that emerged from Belleau Wood “ludicrous and in many cases impossible.”250 That the 
Marines were credited with victory and even saving Paris, did not sit well with army 
leadership. At one point, “Pershing personally intervened to gain the army better 
publicity.”251 During a visit of the French premier, Georges Clemenceau, Pershing did 
not invite any Marines to the event. Pershing also tried to get the order for the name of 
Belleau Wood, now changed to Bois de la Brigade Marine, to be cancelled.252 That the 
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highest leadership of the army became concerned with the Corps’ publicity practices is a 
significant indication of the Marines’ success in getting their name out in front of the 
other services. 
 The cover of the July 1918 Recruiters’ Bulletin was a somber artistic expression 
of a Marine placing a wreath on a memorial dedicated to the Marines who fought at 
Chateau Thierry the month before. This was quite a contrast to the boastful publicity 
covers from the year previous, and it signified the beating the Corps had taken, even if 
the Marines put up a spectacular fight.253 Stories of death, wounds, gas, and fear quickly 
overshadowed the circuses, parades, and publicity stunts from before. Whereas prior to 
the war, the Marines were the friendly service that sought to get itself out in front of the 
public and promised to be the “first to fight,” the realities of war altered the way publicity 
was handled in general. The Marines were no longer an in between service. The Corps’ 
actions in Europe helped to legitimize and solidify its place in the military establishment 
and recruiting began to gear more toward the Corps’ elite status.  
Stories in the Recruiters’ Bulletin, such as the death of Captain Edward C. Fuller 
marked the tone moving forward. Fuller “exposed himself fearlessly to a terrible barrage 
to superintend personally the assurance of shelter to his men.” His commanding officer, 
Major Holland M. Smith, penned a touching tribute to this Marine who he “had 
watched... since he joined the Brigade and have been interested in him.” “Ted helped to 
immortalize the Marines in the hearts of the French people...helped to stem and then push 
back the hordes of Huns…[and] took a prominent part in adding glorious pages to the 
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history of our beloved Corps.”254 The Recruiters’ Bulletin also published an ongoing list 
of the Marines who were killed in the war. 
 In September 1918, the Corps received publicity for its actions in two separate 
theaters of war. Widely reprinted articles about the Corps’ service in Europe, some with 
titles like, “U.S. Marines Punish Hun Treachery,” continued to run in newspapers across 
the country. These articles were often unattributed and contained few details, making it 
most likely that they were crafted by the Publicity Bureau. Published in the Albany (New 
York) Daily Democrat, this article told the story about a Marine platoon that corned a 
German unit, which yelled “Kamerad!” and surrendered. As the Marines waited for the 
Germans to drop their arms, the Germans suddenly opened fire on the unprepared 
Marines, killing thirty before the Marines defeated them.255 No location or date for the 
action is provided. 
 During this same period, there were also Marines fighting an insurgency in Santo 
Domingo, continuing the Corps’ part as America’s police force in the Caribbean. Much 
like the previous news releases regarding the actions of Marines in Haiti, Cuba, and 
Panama, the headlines on September 18, 1918 read, “Kill 20 Dominican Bandits: U.S. 
Marines’ Only Casualty in Skirmish is Wounded Mule.”256 Articles such as these serve 
only to bolster the Corps’ reputation and do little by way of presenting the news. In the 
article it is stated that the information was announced by Marine Corps headquarters, 
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further reinforcing that the Marine Corps sought to craft and reinforce its image through 
controlling and the type of news that was presented to the public where it could. 
Marine involvement in battles and skirmishes in Europe continued to reach 
American newspapers, though none penetrated the news cycle in the same way Belleau 
Wood and Chateau-Thierry had. In fact, the actions of Marines at these two early battles 
appeared in the newspapers far more than the Corps’ bloodier engagements at places like 
Blanc Mont Ridge in October 1918. It appears that this was, in large part, the making of 
the Publicity Bureau. As wounded Marines returned from Europe following these more 
famous early battles, their stories were pushed to the media with gusto.  
Much like the recruiting strategy of the early Chicago recruiting district in 1907, 
the Corps focused in on the individual hometowns of Marines who served in these 
battles. On one day in October 1918, articles were published in Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
and Kansas about local Marines who fought in these battles. In the Wichita Eagle, a large 
photo of two local Marines appeared on page two of the October 17, 1918 edition. The 
headline read, “Wounded Marines Return, Battle Scarred,” and reported that “like all 
brave men, they are modest in the extreme when telling about their own part in the 
fight.”257 A popular article reprinted in Pennsylvania was about former professional 
baseball player, Private Hugh “Hughie” Miller, who joined the Marine Corps and was 
wounded three times at Belleau Wood. The article noted, however, the Private Miller 
continued to serve in France with his fellow Marines.258 
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As the war raged on while the 4th Marine Brigade rested in late September 1918, 
the Corps continued to benefit from its showing at Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood. 
That the Marines benefited from the censorship gap surrounding press’s ability to 
reference their brigade by name in France is evidenced in a widely reprinted article 
appeared in the Dunkirk (New York) Evening Observer titled “Yanks Blocked Drive on 
Paris.” The wording was favorable to the Marines, as it stated “A graphic eyewitness 
account of the fighting near Chateau-Thierry, in which American divisions, including the 
Marine brigade, took part, early in June, was made public recently.”259 While several 
U.S. Army divisions took part in the conflict, the Marines are highlighted, despite only 
representing a tiny fraction of the actual forces there. 
 In the October 1918 issue of Recruiters’ Bulletin, the Publicity Bureau sought 
several outside opinion pieces about the Corps’ activities in Europe, particularly at 
Chateau Thierry and Belleau Wood, and they received quite a number of positive 
responses. Correspondent A.W. Brown of the Pittsburgh Gazette-Times described the 
response the Marines received at a march in Paris. With the headline “Joyous Acclaim by 
All of Paris Gladdens Hearts of Marines While on Parade There,” Brown reinforced the 
narrative that the legend of the Marines saving Paris potentially stemmed from local 
French press reports. At the parade “the great crowd caught sight of their banner. Then a 
cheer arose: “Vive les Marines.”260 In a story by Martin Green, a correspondent with the 
New York Evening World, the reporter wrote of the Marines at Belleau Wood, “they were 
aided by the Ninth and Twenty-Third Infantry, but it happened that the Marines were in 
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the hottest of the fighting and it also happened that the Marines were the first to go ahead. 
When the history of the war is written, it will be found that the Marines were the pioneers 
in advancing into German territory at the most crucial period of the war.”261 This 
particular claim an insightful contrast to the reality, as historian Edward Lengel quotes a 
German report of the Marines’ first attack into Belleau Wood, who reported that they [the 
Germans] “were stunned by the clumsiness of the American tactics, which compared 
unfavorably with those employed by the adjoining French units that day.”262 Similar 
articles gave the same enthusiastic reports of Marine gallantry from a British cartoonist 
who was in the area, as well as from Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.  
When the war ended in November 1918, the Marines returned home and were 
often lauded as victors of the war in the press. Support from major political figures like 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels certainly helped. In December 1918, an article in 
the New York Times stated, “Daniels Tells How Marines Saved Paris,” with a sub-
heading that read “American Boys, Bare-chested, Wiped out Machine-Gun Nests in 
Heroic Charge.”263 Historian Allan Millett argues that the publicity for Marines came at a 
cost. “The principal loss was the chance for harmony with the United States Army, for 
some of the army’s senior officers returned from the war convinced that the Marine 
Corps would do anything it could to belittle the regular army’s reputation.”264 
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November 1918 also marked the end of the Recruiters’ Bulletin in the form it had 
taken since 1914. In a final editorial, the Marines of the Publicity Bureau summed up the 
reasons why the Recruiters’ Bulletin was no longer needed as well as its significance on 
the Corps during its run. “New rules and regulations have come into being. It is no longer 
a necessity for the Marine Corps to seek its men, to induce them to enter the great order 
of the Globe, Anchor, and Eagle. Through the provisions of the Selective Draft Act, those 
men will be waiting at the portals for their call to arms as they are needed, ready, eager, 
high-minded, strong: amply able to live up to ever requirement and every tradition of the 
Corps we love.”265 Here, of course, the editors of the Recruiters’ Bulletin underestimated 
the effects of their promotion of the Marine Corps to the public as a whole. Indeed, the 
Corps had proven itself in combat in the World War and the newspapers strongly picked 
up where perhaps the Recruiters’ Bulletin had lagged behind in the latter months of the 
war. However, just because there was a new mechanism for gaining recruits, the Corps 
still needed to manage its public image for the rest of the military establishment. 
The Recruiters’ Bulletin not only taught Marine recruiters and members of the 
public about the Marine Corps but also it provided a place where individuals who worked 
at the Publicity Bureau could learn more about the art of public relations and publicity. 
Marines such as Quartermaster Sergeant Percy Webb and Thomas Sterrett left a 
tremendous mark on the Corps’ ability to conduct public relations, especially as it 
pertained to the “human interest stories” so sought after by newspapers. Historian Robert 
Lindsay considered Quartermaster Sergeant Percy Webb so important to the Corps’ 
image, he dedicated an entire chapter to the Marine who was at the Publicity Bureau from 
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1916 to 1918.266 Sergeant Webb would go on to represent the Corps in the media through 
different mediums over the next decades and was considered the “Kipling of the Corps” 
because of his abilities in rhyme and poem. Along with Major Thomas Sterrett, Webb 
helped to pioneer the Corps’ approach to human interest stories. Webb is attributed to 
have said “Publicity must have an object...our aiming point...is to bring out the travel, 
adventure, and educational features of our service. Some of the Bureau stories don’t go 
over twenty-five words–some go as high as 150, and that’s about the maximum. There is 
one form of publicity that is “sure-fire” ninety-nine times out of a hundred: the personal 
item. Editors have written us many times telling us they can use all this kind of matter we 
send.”267 
The former Recruiters’ Bulletin changed its name to the Marines’ Bulletin in 
November 1918, but only for a short period. When the draft ended after the war, the 
Corps again recognized the need to continue its work on attracting the “right” type of 
recruits. In December 1918, the Marines’ Bulletin published an article about the reasons 
why the Corps had publicity success in the war, written by reputed magazine editor 
William Almon Wolff. Wolff cited several factors that made the Corps’ publicity 
campaign particularly successful.  
First, the Marines taught “all Americans to know a Marine at sight. They knew 
the product they had to advertise, of course. They knew that the Marines were the best 
possible advertisers of their Corps. They taught...to look for Marines among all the 
uniformed men who began crowding the streets soon after April 6, 1917. They taught all 
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Americans to do that; to recognize the globe, anchor and eagle, to know that a campaign 
hat that didn’t have a cord belonged to a Marine. Second, Wolff attributes the Corps’ 
focus on newspaper and magazine editors as an important factor. “They sent letters to 
every newspaper and magazine editor who handled photographs telling him how to 
identify Marines in the pictures that came to the desk, and urging him to see that the 
Corps was mentioned in the captions he wrote. So every Marine you saw became a 
living, walking advertisement for his Corps.” Finally, Wolff recognized that the Corps 
sought a specific type of recruit and commended the Corps for their use of the “First to 
Fight” slogan as well as “Tell it to the Marines.” “It did attract the cream and flower of 
American manhood. All the advertising and publicity, of course, made one thing very 
plain indeed–that getting to be a Marine wasn’t easy.268 
During the course of the war, the Marine Corps not only grew in numbers, from 
less than 25,000 Marines to a wartime high of 75,000, but the Corps’ public image also 
grew in a tremendous fashion. The Corps’ institutionalized publicity and recruiting 
strategies, which connected the elite service to hometowns through community-level 
public relations proved far more successful than was perhaps envisioned at the onset of 
the war. To the Corps’ benefit, the language used in the newspapers to describe Marines 
was consistent with the way it had been since the War with Spain in 1898. Heroism, 
bravery, gallantry, and honor all continued to appear as descriptors of Marines in front of 
the American public. During the war, however, that language was often written and 
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created by the Marines at the hometown level, an improvement on the Corps’ earlier 
publicity strategies.  
With Marines committed to the fight in Europe, the Marine Corps’ Publicity 
Bureau chose the phrase “first to fight” as the Corps’ call to recruits, finding tremendous 
success in attracting the type of men the Marines wanted in uniform. In Europe, the 
Marines fought bravely, and the results were widely publicized back home. The 
nickname “Devil Dogs” and the tremendous public reaction to the Battle of Belleau 
Wood all became part of the Corps’ lasting legends and lore. While Marines only 
represented a small fraction of the forces present at the Battle of Belleau Wood, both the 
publishing of the Floyd Gibbons story and the Corps’ well-established publicity machine 
raised the Corps’ participation from a “solid defense” to preventing the fall of Paris. The 
Publicity Bureau and the Recruiters’ Bulletin continued to disseminate recruiting ideas 
and discourse to the Marines’ recruiting stations around the country, a tactic that truly 
embraced civil-military relations at the local level. Ultimately, it was the Corps’ proactive 
stance on publicity and its ability to get the Marines name and activities into hometown 
newspapers around the country that helped the small service receive praise arguably far 
exceeding its own true potential on the battlefield. 
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CHAPTER III – PROGRESS, REFORM, AND LEGITIMACY: MAJOR GENERAL 
JOHN A. LEJEUNE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS’ 
PUBLIC IMAGE IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
While the Great War represented a time of growth and prosperity for the U.S. 
military, the post-war environment proved far less friendly, particularly to the Marine 
Corps. The Corps’ participation in World War I greatly improved its image in the public, 
and the massive publicity efforts led by the Publicity Bureau and men like Major Thomas 
Sterrett brought a greater understanding among the public of the Corps’ history and roles 
within the military. Entering the interwar period, however, created new challenges for the 
Corps in terms of its future mission within the military as well as its continued attention 
to public image. The single most important shaper of Marine Corps’ public image during 
this period was Major General Commandant John Archer Lejeune. Lejeune’s experience 
with the Corps’ growth and changing roles since the 1880s allowed him the opportunity 
to continue the Corps’ rise to prominence.  
 Lejeune served as Commandant of the Marine Corps for nearly half of the 
interwar period, from 1920 to 1929 and was one of the longest serving commandants of 
the twentieth century, second only to Major General Charles Heywood, who served from 
1891 to 1903. From 1929 to 1941, there were four other commandants, many of whom 
were Lejeune protégés themselves. This meant that it was largely Lejeune’s postwar 
leadership, reforms, and attention to the Corps’ public image that helped define the 
Marines’ interwar developments. While the Depression in the 1930s took a significant 
toll on the Marine Corps’ budget, and as a result, its reputation, Lejeune’s ability to 
legitimize the Marine Corps’ existence through both organizational reforms and a 
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continued focus on its public image helped the Marine Corps survive a particularly anti-
military interwar period. While there is no doubt that it was the Second World War that 
officially brought the Marine Corps out of a dangerously thin era, without Lejeune’s 
influence, the Marine Corps might not have prepared itself to be on the front lines of that 
war. 
For a man so important to the U.S. Marine Corps, only a small group of historians 
have approached the difficult task of assessing his significance, especially as it pertains to 
the legitimization of the Marine Corps as a military service in the twentieth century. The 
keys to Lejeune’s success were both his appreciation of the Corps’ public image and his 
progressive approach toward leadership and military organization. This chapter will 
examine Lejeune’s life and career and argues that Lejeune’s progressive education and 
continued attention to the Corps’ public image through education and fraternity saved the 
Corps from extinction as the military downsized to proportions dangerous to the Corps’ 
effectiveness.  
Throughout his tenure as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General John 
Archer Lejeune introduced sweeping changes in both training and warfare doctrine that 
solidified the Marine Corps’ mission and its place within the U.S. military. While many 
different figures in military history played their own part in spurring doctrinal or 
organizational change, John Lejeune stood apart. The thirteenth Commandant of the 
Marine Corps employed ideas emblematic of the progressive movement and policies such 
as efficiency, economy, and education in order to continue the transformation of the 
Marine Corps that began in the late nineteenth century, and it was because of these 
principles that Lejeune was able to garner so much success.  
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Lejeune is remembered for his service in the First World War, for his skills and 
genius as a leader of Marines, and for his attention to Marine Corps traditions. Lejeune 
has reached a level of mythic proportions in today’s Marine Corps. The general’s combat 
experience as a division commander in the First World War and his expeditionary 
experience, along with his major accomplishments as commandant are well established. 
What is often forgotten, however, is that John A. Lejeune became one of the most 
accomplished commandants because of his loyalty to principles of the progressive 
movement, precisely during a period of extreme conservatism after the First World War. 
Lejeune succeeded in reforming and publicizing the Marine Corps amidst highly 
competitive interservice rivalries and in an atmosphere defined by massive drawbacks, 
budget cuts, and demobilization. Among all these factors, Lejeune continued to forge the 
future of the Marine Corps.  
 John Archer Lejeune was born on January 10, 1867, in Point Coupee, Louisiana, a 
small Mississippi River community and one of the oldest communities in Louisiana. The 
location of a major slave uprising in 1795, after the Civil War Point Coupee was still a 
hot point for racial tension, particularly in the atmosphere of the failed Reconstruction. At 
the time of his birth, Lejeune’s father, Ovide Lejeune, was the owner of a cotton 
plantation in Point Coupee. By the first of his recollection, however, Ovide had gone 
bankrupt and was forced to sell his plantation. While he was able to buy back the home 
on the plantation, Ovide was relegated to sharecropping on his former plantation.269 
In his memoir, Lejeune recalled the period from his first recollections through 
1877 as a dark period for his family and for Louisiana. In his own words, “no Louisianan 
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whose memory extends to all or a part of the ten-year period preceding 1877, can fail to 
have vivid recollection of the corruption, and the failure to function, of the state and local 
governments during that time. A combination of “carpet-baggers,” native white 
“scalawags,” and ignorant blacks filled the offices, drew their salaries, and either did 
nothing or worse than nothing for those who would not join them in misgoverning [the] 
state.”270 It was because of these factors that Lejeune’s father took up leadership in one of 
the local “Vigilance Committees.”271 The Lejeune family’s Reconstruction experience 
continued to shape Lejeune’s views on race and the “Lost Cause” ideology well into his 
life, particularly after he retired from the Marine Corps. 
While in Louisiana, Lejeune came in contact for the first time with a ship of the 
U.S. Navy. The USS Alliance cruised down the Mississippi River in 1880, and it stopped 
in Natchez, Mississippi where Lejeune was visiting. During his visit, Lejeune took notice 
of an officer on board who had a different uniform from the other sailors on the ship. As 
it happened, it was a Marine officer who Lejeune later found was First Lieutenant George 
F. Elliott, a Marine who went on to the be the Commandant of the Marine Corps from 
1903-1910.272 In 1881, Lejeune started school at the Louisiana State University, which at 
the time was a men’s-only military school. While the school’s academics were in 
shambles at the time, Lejeune credited the school for teaching him the ways of military 
life, especially physical training. Lejeune stated that “I am confident that several years at 
a first-class military school or college would be of incalculable value to every American 
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boy in fitting him to engage in life’s arduous struggle and in preparing him to perform the 
duties of American citizenship in times of peace.”273 Unfortunately, Lejeune was forced 
to drop out of LSU because him and his family could not afford the room and board 
demanded of its students. Lejeune looked toward the U.S. military academies as a way to 
get back into college and military life. While he preferred the U.S. Military Academy at 
West Point, there were no appointments available. There were, however, appointments 
available for the Naval Academy and his Congressman, Judge E.T. Lewis appointed him 
to the academy. After passing a number of arduous entrance exams, Lejeune entered the 
Naval Academy in 1884.274 
 Much like LSU, the Naval Academy that Lejeune entered in 1884 was far 
different than what it is today as it was in the throes of educational change and upheaval. 
The U.S. Naval Academy of the 1880s was embroiled in transitional politics in regards 
the type of education it provided. The U.S. Navy of the 1880s had not yet let go of the 
age of sail, even as the new age of steam had proven dominant at the outset of the Civil 
War. As such, the Naval Academy of the day immersed its midshipmen in the life of a 
sailor aboard a sailing ship of the previous era, focused on navigation, life at sea, and 
other tenets of seamanship in the age of sail. Historian Jennifer Steelman argues that by 
the late nineteenth century, the complexity and hazards of the new propulsion system 
raised serious questions about the efficiency and training of sailors. The traditional 
methods of shipboard training did not expose sailors to the newest technological 
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skills.”275 As the progressive ideologies of professional education and expertise found 
their way into the military academies, it was only by the turn of the twentieth century, 
that schools such as the Naval Academy added technical training such as advanced 
engineering, however, “a tension remained between the competing philosophies of how 
best to produce professional officers.”276  
When Lejeune and his classmates began their first year at the academy, they were 
sequestered to an old sailing ship in the harbor called the Santee. The cadets lived aboard 
the Santee for their first month, learning the language of sailors and the basics of sailing. 
Following their time on the Santee, the plebes went on a cruise for the summer on an old 
frigate off the shores of the Chesapeake and up to New England. Life aboard these 
vessels proved challenging for the plebes as they lived just as regular sailors had in the 
time of sail. Lejeune remembered that it was a “hard, rough, three months experience, an 
experience which the present-day midshipmen could not possibly visualize or 
comprehend.”277 The naval cadets of Lejeune’s class drank “dark-brown water which was 
obtained from the Dismal Swamp near Norfolk, Virginia” and ate salted meat, hard tack, 
and other sea fare.278 
Lejeune’s experience at the Naval Academy, as he recalls it, consisted of long 
periods of hard labor, either at sea or aboard the Santee, combined with being hazed and 
difficult school work. Lejeune recalls a particular experience where he was bullied by a 
number of upperclassmen, to the point where it was noticed by an officer who offered 
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retribution if Lejeune gave up the names of the offenders. Lejeune refused, and those 
same upperclassmen later protected him when he was targeted again. Lejeune’s loyalty 
helped him make a good number of friends in the Class of 1888, many of whom became 
prominent figures in the navy and Marine Corps. In his memoir, Lejeune cites a list of 
those fellow graduates, which included Curtis D. Wilbur, who became Secretary of the 
Navy under President Calvin Coolidge; Charles F. Hughes, who was the Commander in 
Chief of the U.S. Fleet in the late 1920s, and Eli K. Cole, a Marine who was the Assistant 
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In this sense, the Naval Academy, despite 
Lejeune’s ambivalence toward his time there, had a great influence on his career.279  
Upon graduation, the naval cadets of the era were required to take part in a two-
year cadet cruise, in order to familiarize themselves with the fleet activities of the U.S. 
Navy. By the end of the cruise and as a result of one particularly terrifying experience, 
Lejeune would definitively choose the Marine Corps for service and cast off the U.S. 
Navy as an option for his commissioning. A few months into his cruise, Lejeune’s ship, 
USS Vandalia, anchored at the island of Samoa. In March 1889, a powerful cyclone 
moved in on the island. Lejeune was on watch that night and recounted that he was 
washed off his feet numerous times by enormous waves. There were seven warships in 
the harbor, including three American, one British, and three German vessels. By the 
morning, one ship had already sunk with a total loss of the crew, and the six remaining 
ships at anchor in the harbor began to drag their anchors and drift dangerously toward 
each other. By noon the next day, the USS Vandalia had run aground and the sea 
continued to beat the ship against the rocks. Lejeune saw first-hand the horrors the sea 
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had to offer as he witnessed sailors and Marines drown or be washed overboard never to 
be seen again. Lejeune managed to climb the rigging and survive the ordeal. More than 
forty crewmen from the Vandalia, including the ship’s captain, perished in the storm, 
which accounted for 95% of American casualties.  
When Lejeune finally returned to Annapolis for his commissioning, he 
immediately chose the Marine Corps, no doubt partially influenced by his experience at 
sea. In his memoir, Lejeune also states that he “preferred the military to the naval side of 
my profession; I foresaw that the sail as a means of propulsion and the old-fashioned 
sailor would soon become extinct and be replaced more and more by machinery and more 
and more by men skilled in engineering;...I realized that whatever ability I had lay in the 
direction of handling and controlling men rather than in the direction and handling and 
controlling machinery.”280 
 As a graduate of the Naval Academy at the height of a period of progress and 
reformation, Lejeune entered a military service in transition, one of forward thought and 
upward mobility. These ideas, born from officers whom historian Peter Karsten has 
termed “armed progressives,” were indicative of the greater progressive movement and 
significant to Lejeune as a politician and military leader later in his life.281  
Peter Karsten’s article titled “Armed Progressives” is key when approaching the 
topic of “Progressivism” and how to define what it meant for one to be a progressive in 
the military. In it, Karsten discusses the major changes that occurred in the army, navy, 
and National Guard during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Karsten 
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concludes that during this period, “the U.S. Military underwent a virtual 
revolution…involving new missions, managerial and technological streamlining, 
professionalization, and sheer growth.”282 Karsten goes on to describe how each of these 
factors affected policy and doctrine for the military services. What is missing, however, is 
how those principles affected the Marine Corps. It is easy to assume that, because the 
navy underwent serious changes, that the Marine Corps immediately followed suit, yet 
that is not the case.  
The Marine Corps did undergo serious change during the same period, yet a far 
different transformation than that of the navy. As Jack Shulimson has comprehensively 
revealed in his book The Marine Corps’ Search for a Mission, reform-minded 
commandants fought for the continued professionalization of Marine Corps officers, as 
well as a purpose for a Marine Corps attached to the “new navy.”283 While some have 
argued that the Naval Academy “failed to affect him,” Lejeune certainly learned a good 
many things from the state of the naval ranks, if not from the academy itself.284 As with 
any graduate of the Naval Academy during that time, Lejeune entered the ranks of a 
military service wrought with stagnation in its promotion system.  
Most men who entered the navy had low expectations and faced certain 
consternation in trying to make a career out of the navy. These factors certainly weighed 
on Lejeune’s mind as he performed his post-graduation cruise and prepared to select 
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which side of the naval service to join: the navy or the Marine Corps.285 In letters to his 
sister, Lejeune frequently commented on his place in line as he was promoted, keeping 
close track of his number on the promotion list.286 Lejeune’s experience at the Naval 
Academy influenced his promotional ambition, along with his recognition for the 
necessity of political skill to rise within the ranks of the Marine Corps. The promotion 
system took a prominent place in Lejeune’s mind as he not only mentioned personnel 
legislation in letters from the 1890s and 1900s, but also he went on to make that 
legislation a high priority as commandant.287 Lejeune thus graduated from the Naval 
Academy with a different mindset than those perhaps only a decade earlier. As Peter 
Karsten noted, progressive principles such as efficiency and professionalization had 
swept through the ranks of the navy, and young officers like Lejeune spent their early 
careers in partial fear of the antiquated promotion system, especially within the Marine 
Corps. The idea of efficiency in all sectors of the Marine Corps never left Lejeune’s 
mind, and he as well as other navy and Marine Corps officers would spend their later 
careers trying to fix the problem that so plagued them early on.  
John Lejeune’s personality has been described in different ways, including 
ambitious, charming, strong-willed, folksy, and devoted. Lejeune’s personality and 
southern charm put him in a good position to make friends and gain political prominence. 
In a later interview, General Thomas Holcomb, former aide-de-camp to the thirteenth 
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commandant, compared Lejeune to another commandant, Brigadier General George F. 
Elliott. Holcomb stated, “what separated politician Elliott, from statesman Lejeune, was 
that Lejeune fervently believed what most Americans merely paid lip service to. He was 
completely frank and unfailingly courteous to the elected and appointed officials who 
were responsible to oversee the military.”288 While Lejeune’s personality played an 
important role in his ability to make friends in Washington, the very fact that a military 
officer was so heavily involved in politics was also another product of the progressive 
movement in the military. 
As both Karsten and Shulimson have discussed, the naval reform movement in 
the late nineteenth century began with an explicit recognition of the need for officers to 
garner external support for their causes, both personal or military. It was then, that “the 
officers of the ‘rising generation’ were in the van of the movement to demonstrate the 
importance of naval power to the public.”289 More importantly, “by the 1890s, all naval 
officers, young and old, were becoming adept at the art of lobbying.”290 Just as John A. 
Lejeune emerged from the Naval Academy, naval officers, with the support of leaders, 
including then retired Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, began to reject the formerly 
“strictly apolitical habit” of military officers. Mahan “assured his active brethren that 
politics were the proper concern of naval progressives.”291 So while Lejeune’s personality 
gave him an advantage in making friends in the highest echelons, the fact that he did so 
was only a recent development in the naval community. Lejeune’s statesmanship and his 
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recognition of the need to insert himself, and eventually the Marine Corps as an 
institution, into the broader political structure became an important catalyst for the Corps’ 
larger effort for public and congressional recognition.  
Lejeune’s ambitions led him to take every expeditionary post he was offered 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. During this period, Lejeune served on 
tours to Panama, the Philippines, and Japan. When he returned home, it was Brigadier 
General Elliott who offered Lejeune an opportunity that would inevitably serve to both 
form his conceptions of military structure and launch his career to the heights for which 
he had so hoped. Elliott recommended Lejeune for a position at the Army War College. 
In 1909, Lejeune entered one of the most rigorous schools in his career and immediately 
gained a sense of the true importance of education for military officers.292 The War 
College gave Lejeune a chance to do some of his favorite things and served as a time 
during which the Marine lieutenant colonel could ride on horseback and contemplate 
warfare and the military. In his memoir, The Reminiscences of a Marine, Lejeune takes 
special care in noting the importance of this time for him.  
In looking back on my career, it is perfectly apparent to me that the fourteen months at the 
War College constituted a very marked dividing line in my professional life, and that during 
the years that have followed the completion of the course, I have been conscious that I 
possessed greater mental power than I before realized, and have felt able to meet 
successfully any difficulty which might confront me, or to overcome any obstacle which I 
might find in my path.293  
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Merrill Bartlett provides further insight into what the Army War College meant for 
Lejeune. Bartlett finds that until that time, Lejeune, while highly intelligent, lacked the 
“panache and élan” that other more celebratory Leathernecks did, so it was Lejeune’s 
success at the War College that separated him from the others.294 Lejeune’s War College 
experience also helped to legitimize him outside of navy-Marine Corps circles, a factor 
that would not only be important in regard to his leadership in the World War, but also to 
his commandancy and the Marine Corps writ large.  
 It was Commandant George Elliott who promoted Lejeune to lieutenant colonel, 
and Elliott played a major role in shaping Lejeune’s mind as well. Elliott not only raised 
the educational standards for the Marine Corps (a task Lejeune would expand during his 
commandancy), but also he helped to save the Marine Corps during one of the more 
dramatic unification debates in its history spurred on by President Theodore Roosevelt in 
1909. During that episode, Elliott showed, for better or worse, the importance of political 
clout in defense of the Marine Corps.295 Thomas Holcomb recalled, “if Elliott, by 
thwarting one of the most willful U.S. Presidents, showed Lejeune how to wield political 
power, the teacher would live long enough (1931) to see his pupil outdo him.”296  
 Lejeune emerged from the War College confident in his abilities and of the 
support he garnered from political and military allies alike. For the next few years, 
Lejeune, as a lieutenant colonel, applied for the position of commandant twice as 
successor to both George Elliott and William Biddle, ignoring nearly ten line colonels in 
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front of him.297 The majority of Lejeune’s official correspondence between 1910 and 
1913 mention letters of support as well as his own lobbying for the commandancy.298 By 
this time, Lejeune, as a graduate of the Naval Academy and the Army War College 
achieved credibility among his peers in all of the major services, assuring that he would 
not be seen as solely as a Marine. This credibility, along with his political savvy proved 
significant for the Marine Corps’ future. It was during his second application for 
commandant that Lejeune caught the eye of President Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of 
the Navy, Josephus Daniels. Daniels went on to play a significant role in Lejeune’s 
career, yet their relationship developed as early as 1913.  
Lejeune’s time at the Army War College also taught him the importance of 
critical thought in a military service. In 1913, a number of Marine officers who were all 
coming up at the time, including Littleton W.T. Waller, George Barnett, Logan Feland, 
and Lejeune were all stationed together at Guantanamo Bay. During that period, these 
officers together decided to form an “association to promote the cause of the Marine 
Corps.”299 In his own words, Lejeune described the role for the association’s publication 
as a medium for the “dissemination of information concerning the aims, purposes, and 
deeds of the Corps, and an interchange of ideas for the betterment and improvement of its 
officers and men.”300 That publication became the Marine Corps Gazette in 1916 and the 
Marine Corps Association continues to act as both a private archive of Marine Corps 
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history as well as a forum for Marines to critique their service with the aim of making it 
better.  
Woodrow Wilson’s rise to the Presidency also played a critical role in Lejeune’s 
ascension to commandant. Very outwardly a progressive, Woodrow Wilson’s foreign 
policy took the Marine Corps to new heights as an integral service in the U.S. military. 
Over the course of his presidency, Wilson intervened seven different times in different 
countries across the world as well as in World War I.301 Outside of the expedition to Vera 
Cruz in 1914, Lejeune’s participation in the First World War would define much of his 
experience before his rise to the commandancy, yet the power of the publicity gained by 
the Marine Corps in Wilsonian foreign policy cannot be underestimated in allowing the 
Marine Corps to gain ground in both the government and public realms. 
The progressive movement applies to many different areas significant to the 
military. Immediately out of the Naval Academy, Lejeune was subjected to different 
pressures because of the transformation between old and new. Promotional anxiety and 
political ambition are two of these factors, yet Progressivism also reached into 
organizational and managerial sectors. Beginning with the Army War College and 
extending through the rest of Lejeune’s career, the Marine officer experienced the 
failures and successes of different leadership and management styles.302 Lejeune’s first 
major experience with Marine Corps organizational change was as Assistant 
Commandant to Commandant Major General George Barnett from 1915 to 1917. It was 
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during this period that the Corps experienced significant personnel growth. It was 
General Barnett who managed to lobby the Marines into the First World War, but 
Lejeune played the role of administrator to the burgeoning Marine Corps.303  
It is likely that after studying the German staff and education system, Lejeune first 
experienced the merits of progressive managerial style. Lejeune learned that in order to 
manage a rapidly expanding military service such as the Marine Corps, efficiency and 
economy of mobilization was of the utmost importance. The United States itself was in a 
unique position by 1917. As a neutral country, the American people played the part of 
“armchair observers,” to the mass mobilization that occurred in Europe. In his book, 
Atlantic Crossings, progressive historian Daniel Rodgers argues that “it was not war in 
and of itself but the economization of the struggle that mattered.” Germany’s successes in 
mobilization and England’s obstacles created a learning curve for American policy-
makers.304 These principles, including efficiency and economy, proved very influential 
on Lejeune when he later took the commandancy.  
John Lejeune’s success at the Army War College, along with his extensive 
expeditionary experience finally gained him the position he wanted in Europe as America 
took to war with Germany. Against the wishes of Barnett, who recognized Lejeune’s 
capabilities as an administrator, Lejeune deployed to Europe to be the first Marine officer 
to command an army division. According to Lejeune in his memoir, it was his request to 
join the war that served to spark Barnett’s suspicions as to Lejeune’s aims to take away 
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the commandancy.305 Lejeune’s accomplishments as commander of the U.S. Army’s 2nd 
Division in the American Expeditionary Force in Europe are well documented and 
certainly contribute to his mythic status. The war itself also provided a chance for 
Lejeune to directly view the power of publicity and public relations as Lejeune skillfully 
used both during his commandancy.  
 Lejeune and Josephus Daniels maintained a warm friendship throughout the war, 
writing each other numerous times, and, along with another famous Marine, Smedley 
Butler, they each supported each other in the political arena.306 Upon his return home, 
Lejeune took command of Marine Corps Base, Quantico and immediately began to 
employ some of the lessons he learned during the previous ten years. The year 1919 
marked the beginning of the massive drawbacks in military spending and recruitment. 
Lejeune essentially returned to a situation much like that he had first entered out of the 
Naval Academy. The cost of the war in both money and blood forced public opinion of 
Wilson’s party into decline. The Marine Corps, however, was a completely different 
institution than the fledgling service had born its name during the Gilded Age. Much to 
the army’s chagrin, the Marines emerged from the World War heroes in their own right. 
Innovative publicity and a focus on educating the public about the Corps’ actions in 
Europe had brought the Marines out of obscurity.  
 Lejeune continued to develop his managerial style, and in an interview with a 
newspaper in 1920, outlined his views on the importance of education in the military. 
Lejeune’s familiarity with the virtues of Progressivism and social politics are particularly 
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evident in this interview as Lejeune speaks of elevation through education in regard to his 
education reforms at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, which resembled the progressive 
mindset of solving the “great city problem.” 
Education is the great need in America today. When all our people have been elevated 
through education, when they have a common viewpoint based on knowledge and 
experience, then they will act together for the solution of our problems and the 
strengthening of our democracy. Our new educational departure embraces also a 
correspondence school plan. Our facilities will be extended throughout the entire Corps. 
Whether a man is afloat or ashore, at home or abroad, he will be enabled through this plan 
to pursue his education. Special correspondence school courses have been arranged; we 
want not only a well-trained military organization but a well-educated group of American 
citizens. I can think of no better Americanization movement than this plan to take boys, 
who have not had the advantage of higher educational facilities at home, into the Marine 
Corps, and develop them through specialized vocational courses.307 
General Holcomb also reflected on Lejeune’s approach to the Marine Corps’ education 
system. With a sense of somber remembrance, Holcomb recalled “We all went back to 
Quantico for demobilization. General Lejeune’s postwar plans were clear: he would 
rebuild the Marine Corps within the framework of his three “E’s”: Economy, Efficiency, 
and Education.”308 Here in this philosophy, it is easily apparent how Lejeune’s 
experiences at the Army War College, as Assistant Commandant, as a division 
commander during the war, and as a progressive shaped his postwar philosophy. 
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 Lejeune’s political allies, including Daniels and Butler proved stronger than 
Major General Barnett could compete with, and in 1921, Lejeune was promoted to Major 
General and named the thirteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps. Lejeune’s political 
alliance was in fact so strong, that General Barnett felt he had been deceived and betrayed 
by a man he called his friend. In a later interview, the twentieth Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, Clifton Cates, Barnett’s aide-de-camp during the change of command in 
1920, commented on Lejeune’s dilemma. “I could see Lejeune’s dilemma: Both Barnett 
and Daniels were extremely close friends of his but mortal enemies of each other. And, if 
‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ does that make the friend of my enemy my friend 
still or is he now my enemy? Perhaps what it really does, as General Lejeune discovered, 
is it ‘ties your hands’ when your friends’ interests collide.”309310 
 John A. Lejeune’s commandancy is not sufficiently addressed in much of the 
scholarship regarding his life. Lejeune’s wartime experience is usually chief among the 
annals of his own histories. Perhaps this is because Lejeune only dedicated 25 pages of 
his nearly 500-page memoir to his time (nearly a decade) at the helm of the Marine 
Corps, leaving historians with little of Lejeune’s own recollections. It could also be 
argued that much of Lejeune’s commandancy is ignored because it happened during a 
period in which Marines did not achieve much of military interest to outside observers. 
The Corps, however, began solidifying its advanced base defense doctrine during this 
period, developed the Marine Expeditionary Force, guarded the mail, and fought in 
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Russia and the Caribbean. Perhaps the most important events, both for the evolution and 
publicity of the Marine Corps, however, were a series of training maneuvers and 
organizational changes to be discussed later in this chapter. While Lejeune’s wartime 
achievements catch the attention of an audience, it was his leadership in progressive 
organizational change, training, and public reinforcement that left a lasting impression on 
the Corps. Much like the oft forgotten importance of logistics and staff work in wartime, 
Lejeune’s organizational leadership built a lasting Marine Corps with a clear mission for 
the future. 
Through the lobbying of Josephus Daniels as well as Smedley Butler and his 
father, Lejeune took the reins of the Marine Corps as a progressive in a conservative era. 
This is where Lejeune steps ahead of many other progressive minded military officers. As 
Peter Karsten notes in his discussion on armed progressives, the majority of these officers 
who emerged into the transformational environment of the 1880s and 1890s did not carry 
their progressive virtues on with them past their time as junior officers. Once they 
achieved the ranks they desired, all need for reform and progress was no longer an 
issue.311 Lejeune, along with his 1888 classmates Eli K. Cole and later Secretary of the 
Navy Curtis D. Wilbur, though, forged ahead and continued reforms for both the navy 
and the Marine Corps into the 1930s.312 The views of the presidents under which Lejeune 
served did not phase the Marine. In his memoir, Lejeune praises and admires Calvin 
Coolidge’s management style, a testament to Lejeune’s dedication to the principles of 
management.313  
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 John Archer Lejeune was a product of the period in which he entered the U.S. 
Marine Corps. His graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy during a time of intense 
transformation and reform led Lejeune to form his own opinions and ideas regarding a 
solution to the problem at hand. In a progressive atmosphere, Lejeune began his military 
service paying close attention to how the navy and Marine Corps worked out problems 
regarding promotions. Lejeune also took advantage of a relatively new habit within 
military circles, the use of political savvy, and, in his case, southern charm, to lobby for 
both his own career and for the future of the U.S. Marine Corps.  
Lejeune’s experience at the Army War College and as assistant to the 
commandant of the Marine Corps all contributed to his future approach to military 
organization and management. Using progressive principles such as his “three E’s”: 
efficiency, economy, and education, Lejeune maintained a progressive mindset even on 
into his commandancy under a conservative administration. Lejeune was indeed an 
exceptional officer and significant figure in the U.S. Marine Corps, yet history has paid 
little attention to some of his most important achievements. Major General Lejeune never 
forgot the importance of keeping the Marine Corps in the public eye during his 
commandancy. Perhaps due to the success of the publicity bureaus during the 1910s or 
perhaps due to Admiral Mahan’s call to keep the navy in the limelight, Lejeune oversaw 
some of the Marine Corps’ most important interwar activities in view of the public.  
Even though the Marine Corps conducted landings and actions in Nicaragua and Haiti in 
the early 1920s, Lejeune sought to bring the Corps before the public in the U.S.  
When Lejeune took command of the Marine Corps as commandant in 1920, he 
immediately implemented his “three E’s” policy. Lejeune paid close attention to the 
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administrations before him and he noticed that during the Elliott, Biddle, and Barnett 
commandancies, the headquarters staffs had become virtual fiefdoms in their own 
right.314 “Lejeune chose instead to reorganize the staff of Headquarters, Marine Corps 
and, in the process to eclipse the power of the principal staff officers. What the new 
commandant sought was a staff that responded to direction from his office to the 
demands and requirements of the Marine Corps at large.”315 In his memoir, Lejeune 
recalled his approach to organization:  
It was necessary, too, that efficiency go hand in hand with economy, and I, therefore, bent 
my energies towards the adoption of policies and the execution of plans which would 
promote the steady upbuilding of that essential attribute. To succeed in the campaign for 
economy and efficiency, it was first necessary to obtain the enthusiastic and loyal 
cooperation of the officers and men. This was obtained, not only by means of official 
communications and orders and by personal correspondence and personal interviews, but 
also by frequent conferences which were attended by the officers on duty at 
headquarters.316 
Lejeune also split headquarters into different sections including aviation, military 
education, recruiting, training, intelligence, and planning. Lejeune conceived the planning 
section while he was assistant to the commandant prior to World War I, yet Barnett did 
not heed his advice. The planning section was a top priority to Lejeune because he 
believed that readiness was pivotal in maintaining a status quo in foreign affairs.317  
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 Lejeune was a man of the Wilson Administration. He was a Daniels man. Yet the 
most important era of Lejeune’s career as it pertains to the Marine Corps itself began 
with the Warren G. Harding administration. Harding was elected on a conservative 
platform, largely abandoning the successes of the progressive movement. Lejeune’s 
combat experience and political prowess, however, convinced Harding and his Secretary 
of the Navy, Edwin Denby to keep the Marine as commandant. Denby himself had 
enlisted in the Marine Corps at the ripe age of 35, in order to play what part he could in 
the mobilization for World War I.  
 Commandant Lejeune’s focus on education played a significant role in the Corps’ 
legitimization throughout the 1920s. One of the most important actions Lejeune 
undertook was to create the Marine Corps Institute in February 1920. The Marine Corps 
Institute (MCI) embodied Lejeune’s call to “elevate through education.”318 The MCI was 
largely conducted as a correspondence school through the International Correspondence 
Schools in Scranton, PA. Through the MCI, Marines ranging from privates through 
officers could get a free education no matter where they were stationed in the world. 
What separated the MCI from many of the educational reforms of the late-nineteenth and 
early-twentieth centuries was its focus not just on the duties Marines carried out day-to-
day, but to offer the Marine a chance to gain promotion through education or prepare for 
a career outside of the military. 
In the late 1880s, the Marine Corps established the School of Application, which 
was considered a particularly reformist approach to the problem of poorly trained enlisted 
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men throughout the Corps. The School of Application was offered to all of the rank and 
file of the Marine Corps; however, it was focused on “classes and practical exercises in 
infantry tactics, gunnery instruction, torpedoes, high explosives, ‘field service and 
modern tactics,’ and field entrenchments.”319 These education reforms were aimed at 
solving a problem different from the one Lejeune had identified in the 1920s: technology. 
In the 1880s, the navy had begun a tremendous overhaul toward steel and steam ships, 
and the skills necessary to operate these ships had changed dramatically, down to the 
enlisted man. The Marine aboard navy ships played an important role in this 
technological revolution as they played the part of gunners and gunnery experts, a field 
highly affected by modernization. Thus, the School of Application provided that officers, 
noncommissioned officers, and “other enlisted men of sufficient intelligence,” “would 
receive instruction in logarithms, solutions of plane triangles, and the practical use in the 
field of angle-measuring instruments in making military reconnaissances and hasty 
surveys.”320 
 The types of courses held at the MCI in 1920, however, separated it from previous 
efforts to educate enlisted personnel such as the School of Application. In an article from 
the Dearborn Independent republished in Leatherneck Magazine in October 1921, the 
breakdown of subjects studied by the MCI’s 4,000 students that year displayed the truly 
broad range of education accessible to these Marines. The most popular course was 
automobile mechanics with over 700 Marines enrolled. Second was electrical engineering 
with over 400 Marines enrolled. Over 200 Marines enrolled in a course called 
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salesmanship, “with a view of getting jobs as traveling salesmen after their careers on the 
briny deep are a closed incident of their lives.”321 Other subjects included: plumbing, 
mining and metallurgy, concrete engineering, structural engineering, civil engineering, 
banking, commercial law, business management, commerce, higher accounting, railroad 
accounting, traffic management, civil service, general English, chemistry, 
pharmaceuticals, architecture, and many others.322 The MCI also offered courses in 
foreign languages, art, illustration, culinary arts, and other sectors of the arts. The MCI 
had a faculty of over 100 Marine and civilian instructors who were all themselves 
graduates of the correspondence school. The Marine Corps also designated a special 
officer aboard every ship of the navy to help the men enrolled in the courses and to allow 
them time to complete their work.323 
 The MCI was created to help Marines become more advanced not just at their 
jobs in the Marine Corps but also in their futures outside the military. This principle is 
perhaps best explained by Lejeune’s friend and mentor and former Secretary of the Navy, 
Josephus Daniels. Daniels also believed strongly in the importance of education in social 
progress, and he applied those beliefs to the navy. In an article aimed toward the young 
officers of the navy in 1913, Daniels said “Remember that the enlisted man today is a 
man who has been touched with the spirit of modern progress. He is just as ambitious as 
you are. He is wide-awake. He may have been taking advantage of the facilities of the 
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present day for advancement, such as the night school and the correspondence school. He 
does not consider that his education has ended. He is not at the end of his goal. Indeed, he 
may be only beginning to run his race in life.”324 
While the core tenets of the MCI were not necessarily unique to the Marine 
Corps, the education of Marines nevertheless played a significant role in the development 
of the Corps’ public image after World War I. Major General Commandant Lejeune’s 
goal with the MCI was to provide for all Marines to have the option of an education that 
would serve them after their service to the Corps. Lejeune knew that the public image of 
the Marine was as important, and in fact, the same as the public image of the Marine 
Corps. Just as important to Lejeune was the idea that the MCI might have the ability to 
educate Marines into more promotions, a sign for Lejeune of progress in the service. 
Having fought the promotion system since his time as a young officer, Lejeune’s 
education policies were also aimed at elevating Marines in their own service. That the 
MCI has operated in different forms up to the day of this writing is a testament to its 
importance and Lejeune’s foresight.  
During the first year of Lejeune’s commandancy, an ongoing scandal involving 
the Marines’ treatment of Haitians during the intervention there threatened to mar his and 
the Marine Corps’ image. In Haiti, the American military government set up a 
Gendarmerie, consisting of both Haitian and American personnel to be dispersed among 
the people in order to keep the peace. According to Haitian officials in their complaint 
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against the American occupation, the reality of the Gendarmerie was against the 
principles upon which it was built and ultimately put Haitians in harm’s way.325  
In the Congressional testimony from the investigation into the occupation of Haiti 
and Santo Domingo in 1921, the Haitian representative, Mr. Stenio Vincent, stated that 
“as a general rule, the American officers of the gendarmerie are privates (in the American 
Marine Corps) who have been made officers in Haiti, and who have had nothing but a 
most elementary education, which naturally renders them incapable of any military 
training.”326 In her study of the American occupation in Haiti, Historian Mary Renda, too, 
attributed many of the issues of violence and paternalism not only to the fact that young 
privates were put into a position of command over Haitians, but also that many of these 
Marines were southern, thereby carrying with them the bias of white men in the 
American South toward the “uncivilized” Haitian people.327 The accusations from Haiti 
included reports of abuse and murder and the use of the “corvee system,” which those in 
Haiti considered a prison labor system. It was primarily employed to build a better 
system of roads for military use in the rural regions so that Marines could travel faster 
and in greater numbers toward (or away) from conflict.328 
It is entirely possible that the Marines used the same system of governing in Haiti 
(violence and labor included) since the beginning of the occupation in 1915. What 
changed, however, by 1919, was that President Woodrow Wilson’s own message about 
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the self-determination of nations had spread throughout the world. There is no doubt that 
those in Haiti received the message loud and clear. In their testimony, the Haitian 
representatives stated “from the point of view of international law it is plain that the 
Wilson government had no right to order an invasion of Haitian territory and to take 
possession of that small and friendly country.” President Wilson himself, at almost the 
same time, proclaimed that “all the Governments of the Americas are, as far as we are 
concerned, upon a footing of perfect equality and unquestioned independence,” and that 
“no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every 
people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, 
unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.”329 Many 
of these words were taken directly from President Wilson’s speech to the Senate on 22 
January 1917 called the “Monroe Doctrine of the World,” in which Wilson described the 
entire world as being “off limits” to foreign powers just as President James Monroe 
described the Western Hemisphere in 1823. This speech began to outline some of the 
principles of non-interference later described in Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech. 
The public outcry over Marine activities in Haiti in early 1920 was sparked by the 
leak of comments from an unedited letter by Marine Commandant George Barnett related 
to an investigation into violence there. Barnett had called for an investigation, led by 
Colonel John H. Russell, into the mistreatment of Haitians by U.S. Marines. In the letter 
from Barnett to Russell, Barnett sought clarification of an off-hand remark made by the 
defense attorney of a Marine on trial for murder. The lawyer stated that he believed 
“neither his client, nor Private McQuilkin, should be judged too harshly for their actions, 
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for they were merely following a general custom.”330 This was, of course, a startling 
comment given the charge, and Commandant Barnett rightly queried Russell 
immediately. Barnett wrote, “the court martial of one private for the killing of a native 
prisoner brought out a statement by his counsel that showed me that practically 
indiscriminate killing of the natives has gone on for some time.”331 It was only five 
months before the presidential election of 1920, and this was a bombshell revelation 
when it reached the American press. This was, by no means, an unwarranted public 
reaction. However, in his response to the press, Barnett argued that he was not claiming 
“indiscriminate killing of the natives” actually happened, but instead was querying 
Colonel Russell about the way it came across. This response further fueled speculation, 
and Presidential Candidate Senator Warren G. Harding led the charge against Wilson’s 
military leaders.332 
When Lejeune succeeded Barnett as commandant in July 1920, he took it upon 
himself to begin a publicity campaign to silence critics of the Marine Corps’ occupation 
in Haiti. According to his memoir, Lejeune stated that he “requested Secretary Daniels to 
authorize me to proceed to Haiti and Santo Domingo for the purpose of inspecting the 
Marines and of familiarizing myself with conditions as they then existed there.”333 
Lejeune brought celebrity Marine Smedley Butler with him on his tour and visited nearly 
every Marine garrison in both countries. As Lejeune remembers his own assessment of 
Marines there, “the reputation of the...Marine Corps... who have served Haiti can well 
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afford to rest on the comparison between conditions as they exist now [1936] and as they 
existed fifteen years ago. In the impartial tribunal of history I am confident that the 
verdict will be, ‘Well done, good and faithful servants.’334 Newspapers of the time hung 
on a line in Lejeune’s post-tour report, in which he claimed that “Peace and tranquility 
prevail through Haiti.”335 Even though Candidate Warren Harding declared in September 
1920 that “this [Wilson] government is waging...‘unconstitutional warfare’ in Haiti, as 
President, Harding kept Lejeune as Commandant of the Marine Corps and also kept 
Marines in Haiti.336  
In terms of newspaper reporting, after Lejeune’s tour of Haiti and claims of peace 
and tranquility, articles in the major papers regarding Haiti were slim. Lejeune, however, 
continued to reinforce to the American public the idea of Haitians as uncivilized and 
unhuman. In a letter to the United States Marine League of Chicago in March 1921, 
Lejeune spoke of deep rooted cannibalism in Haiti after reports surfaced of two Marines 
who were left behind after an ambush were found torn to pieces and displayed for all to 
see.337 Chesty Puller, a Marine of tremendous fame and veteran of Haiti, claimed to have 
investigated their fates. After speaking with several “minor Caco chiefs,” one of them 
told him “We were four chiefs to make the sacrifice. As always we took off the head 
from the Leftenant, and cut up his body...Then we opened the chest...and took out the 
heart. It was very large. And we ate of it, each of the four chiefs, to partake of the 
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courage of your Leftenant Muth.”338 It is not entirely clear as to whether these events 
occurred, but under Lejeune’s leadership, the Corps sought to build sympathetic press 
surrounding their activities in Haiti. 
American evangelicals helped to provide at least one way in which the public 
perceived the Marines in Haiti as beneficial. Reverend Dr. Arthur R. Gray, the Secretary 
for Latin America of the Board of Missions of the Protestant Episcopal Church wrote an 
opinion piece in the New York Times in June 1919 in which he declared that “United 
States Marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic are real and effective 
missionaries.”339 Dr. Gray went on to discuss the importance in particular of the 
infrastructure improvements being completed by the Marines in Haiti. “A detachment of 
marines is an important part of that force, a number of them having been appointed 
officers in charge of the native constabulary. They protect the people from brigands, 
build roads from one town to another, repair and keep clean the city streets and aid in 
projects to improve sanitation,” work that Dr. Gray cited “is real missionary work and 
prepares the way for the missionaries later sent out by the various churches.”340 The 
argument made by Dr. Gray is similar to those made in Germany for the autobahn and in 
the United States with the national highway system, in which modern infrastructure 
serves not only a military purpose, but also helps to connect rural and urban population 
centers. For the Marine Corps, this meant it was easier to quickly respond to outbreaks of 
violence, to Dr. Gray and the missionary community, this meant evangelical advantages. 
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In either scenario, the Marines benefited in the public eye from the support of the 
evangelical community. 
While the Marine Corps received positive press, especially in the newspapers for 
most of their activities in the Caribbean during those 20 years, it appears that the duty in 
the Caribbean–the small wars, occupations, police actions, interventions, 
counterinsurgencies–did not age well, both for Marines and the Corps itself. Without the 
relative shelter of President Wilson’s paternalist attitude and “intervention-for-the-sake-
of-democracy” rhetoric, the Corps languished in the same places, fighting the same 
peoples for years. The occupation in Haiti started in 1915 and Marines did not leave there 
until 1936, only to return again in the 1990s. The Marine Corps “landed” in Nicaragua 
nine separate times from 1900-1930. In his many public speeches as commandant, Major 
General Lejeune told of the Corps’ history dozens of times all over the country and for 
many different audiences.  
 While the Marine Corps was often assigned expertise in what was then called 
“small wars,” the 1920s, under the leadership of John A. Lejeune, was a period in which 
the Marine Corps sought missions far beyond the occupations and police actions of the 
Caribbean. General Lejeune led an army infantry division in combat in Europe during the 
First World War and Commandant Lejeune sought a mission for the Marine Corps that 
positioned the Marines as assault troops in major future campaigns, especially as they 
were tied to the U.S. Navy’s war plans.  
One of the side effects of such a deadly World War was also that some in the 
public were no longer lured by the soldierly duties, battles, and bloodshed. In order to 
promote the Marine Corps while simultaneously downplaying it as a military service, 
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Lejeune developed an advanced sports program in order to promote the Marine Corps 
through athletics. “The effect of the new athletic policy as originated and promulgated by 
the Major General Commandant has been far reaching in proving to the public that the 
Marine Corps is abreast of the times in a matter which is of common interest as well as to 
the interest of the future of the Corps from an advertising standpoint.”341 In 1921, with 
the help of well-known Marine Smedley Butler, Lejeune turned the Marine Corps base at 
Quantico into an exhibition of sorts. Lejeune ordered the Marine Corps baseball and 
football teams to play games against major college teams (and faired quite well) in a 
show of the Corps’ athletic prowess.342 
Lejeune also found publicity for the Marine Corps during this period as the 
Marine East Coast Expeditionary Brigade began re-enacting Civil War battles each fall. 
Lejeune had experience in analyzing Civil War battles from his time at the Army War 
College. Brigadier General Smedley Butler described these exhibitions as training 
exercises as well as excellent opportunities for good publicity. During the first 
reenactment of the Battle of the Wilderness in 1921, Butler reportedly sought out the 
burial location of Stonewall Jackson’s arm (buried by itself) in a publicity stunt meant to 
prove that the burial of the arm was just a rumor. Upon finding the actual remains of a 
shattered arm under its monument, Butler reburied it in a metal box and erected a bronze 
marker at the site to verify its existence.343 Even President Harding attended the Corps’ 
reenactment and it became such a success that further maneuvers of the same type 
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continued: Gettysburg (1922), New Market (1923), and Antietam (1924).344 These types 
of actions, while rather insignificant in the chronicles of Marine Corps history, kept the 
Corps in the press even while money and men were on the decline.  
On November 1, 1921, General Lejeune created a Marine Corps tradition that is 
perhaps one of his most enduring contributions to the Corps’ public image. Lejeune 
issues Marine Corps Order 47, which is considered the first Commandant’s Marine Corps 
“Birthday Message.” Until this time, the Corps’ “birthday” was not only a topic of some 
debate, but generally reserved as a time to recount the Corps’ history and not otherwise 
considered with much reverence. In his order, Lejeune described the “spirit” of the 
Marine Corps that helped to define its public image for the next century.  
This high name of distinction and soldierly repute we who are Marines today have received from 
those who preceded us in the corps. With it we also received from them the eternal spirit which 
has animated our Corps from generation to generation and has been the distinguishing mark of 
Marines in every age. So long as that spirit continues to flourish, Marines will be found equal to 
every emergency in the future as they have been in the past, and the men of our Nation will regard 
us as worth successors to the long line of illustrious men who have served as “Soldiers of the Sea” 
since the founding of the Corps.
345 
With this message, Lejeune sought to assure every Marine, present or former, that they 
were of a special sort. Lejeune argued that the Marine Corps had its own spirit that 
separated it as an institution from the other military services.  
 Despite the tight budgets and low quotas for the Marine Corps in the 1920s, the 
Marines thrived in popular culture and Commandant Lejeune largely supported and 
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facilitated their representations in the public sphere. Recruiting ads across the country 
lured interested men with themes of adventure, travel, and the ability to see action. One 
such ad in the San Francisco Chronicle had the headline “WHERE ROMANCE AND 
ADVENTURE FLOURISH STILL: Travel by Land and Sea to the Picturesque Places of 
the World – Afforded by the United States Marine Corps.”346 If the Corps’ experience in 
the “small wars” did not aid its future mission militarily, it certainly provided a global 
canvass for the recruiting campaigns. In one advertisement, the recruiters mentioned the 
possibility that recruits may be assigned to places like Guam, Haiti, Hawaii, China, Cuba, 
Great Britain, France, the Philippines, and Panama. Adorning the first lines of the 
advertisement was a witty poem: 
If you’re tired of the factory 
Or you’re weary of the plow,  
And you don’t find any romance 
In the job you’re doing now.  
Here’s a chance to go a-roving 
To the place Adventure’s found 
So come a-runnin’ buddy.  
When you hear the bugles sound. 
They’re cheering from the ferries. 
And they’re waving from the shore. 
The dull old life’s behind us 
And the new life lies before. 
We’re off to make talk “howdy: 
With the More and Chinee. 
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The Marines have got their orders, 
And they’re putting out to sea.347 
The message of the advertisement was clear. Those who were living their lives in the 
factories, offices, and even fields could find true adventure, the same kind you could find 
in a good book, in service with the U.S. Marine Corps.  
 The Marine Corps’ Western Recruiting District published another advertisement 
in the San Francisco Chronicle the following day, this time aimed squarely at veterans of 
the Great War. The headline read, “EX-SERVICE MEN HEAR THE CALL OF THE 
OLD LIFE: Former Soldiers and Sailors Find Civil Life Too Tame. They Are Joining the 
Marine Corps, Combines the Desirable Features of Both Army and Navy.”348 Adventure 
and travel are featured in this article as well, though it also emphasizes education and job-
training as well as exercise and healthy living. With those veterans in mind, the 
advertisement focused on all the things a veteran might miss about the service. 
“Remember those days when we were fit as fiddles, could eat the hind leg off a table and 
enjoy it, could lick our weight in wildcats and weren’t afraid to say so. And remember the 
buddies who bunked with us, hiked with us, scrapped with us, took all our money, 
bummed our tobacco, called us bad names and–would give us the shirts of their backs if 
we asked, eh? Somehow civil life doesn’t often give us friends like that. The man who 
has never done a hitch in the service has missed a lot. Isn’t that so?”349 When speaking of 
the mysteries of service in wartime, the concept of the “Band of Brothers” is ever 
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constant, and the Marines knew that veterans of the service were not only already 
experienced in military life, but that they might add further to the quality of Marines 
overall. 
In 1924, two New York World writers, Maxwell Anderson and Laurence Stallings 
created the play What Price Glory? for Broadway. What Price Glory? was a comedic 
drama featuring two Marines, Captain Flagg and Sergeant Quirt, which took place in 
France, both at the front and behind the lines. The story revolves around their competition 
for the love of a French woman. Stallings was a former Marines who served in France 
and lost a leg after her was shot in the thigh in battle. Stallings brought a realistic 
portrayal of the absurdities of military life in the First World War, which contained the 
same type of humor one might find in the 1980s British sitcom Blackadder Goes 
Forth.350  
What Price Glory? was extraordinarily popular for the time (running for 299 
shows), however it initially gained notoriety due to its outward vulgarity. When the show 
opened at the Plymouth Theatre in New York City in September 1924, Mayor John 
Francis Hylan immediately launched a police investigation into that play and others then 
showing on Broadway. On September 24, plain clothes police sat in on the showing and 
according to Variety “Save for a quiet tip given Arthur Hopkins, producer of “Glory,” the 
descent of the police on the Plymouth...was a surprise. The manager was informed there 
might be arrests, that being the clear assumption because of the plainclothes men in the 
audience and inspectors backstage. Hopkins made no effort to keep the latter from behind 
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the scenes, but he ordered the changing of oaths in the play. Exactly 12 words or terms 
were deleted.”351 
The intense public reaction to both the vulgarity and popularity of the show 
brought the Marine Corps much press. Under a subheading “Marines in Favor” in 
entertainment magazine, Variety, it was noted that “a number of Marine officers had 
already witnessed the performance, and favored it, while Mrs. Barnett, wife of Major 
General Barnett, who was formerly in charge of the Marine Corps, and praised “Glory.” 
Mrs. Barnett has been affectionately known as the “Mother of the Marines.” 352 Variety 
approached Marine Corps officials regarding comedic claims that the Marine Corps 
might have made money from the show due to Stallings’s status as a former Marine. The 
Variety reporter quipped that “they all smiled and let it go at that. The Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, General Lejeune, was the most interested, but he refused to be quoted, 
stating that he hadn’t made up his mind.”353 Lejeune was indeed interested. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps took his wife to go see the play on February 1, 1925 
while on vacation in New York City.354 What Price Glory? was released as a silent film 
in 1925, once again sparking debate over its vulgarity. In true comedic tone, the 
filmmakers left in much of the “pugnacious dialogue” but did not transcribe the actual 
words into the subtitles.355  
                                                 
351 “Police Investigate Three B’Way Shows; “Glory” Heads List,” Variety, October 1, 1924. 
352 “Police Investigate Three B-Way Shows; “Glory” Heads List,” Variety, October 1, 1924. 
353 “Capital Off “What Price Glory?,” Variety, October 1, 1924. 
354 Letter, February 1, 1924, Folder 2, Container 8, Lejeune Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
355 Jack Smith, “When lip reading between the lines had the subtitles beat by a long sight,” Los Angeles 
Times, July 20, 1987. 
 152 
 To highlight General Lejeune’s appreciation for making sure the Corps’ public 
image was in good hands, in September 1925, he issued an order to establish a Marine 
Corps “publicity officer.” From a Headquarters Memorandum, Lejeune stated “Major 
Joseph C. Fegan (Room 3012) is the Marine Corps Publicity Officer at Headquarters. In 
order that he may exercise the functions of his office, it is necessary that matters 
deserving of publicity be brought to his notice.” “We seek good publicity…It is requested 
that all…at headquarters Marine Corps bring to the attention of Major Fegan any matters 
which they consider would be of value to the Marine Corps if published.”356 
Perhaps based on the successes of the Corps’ relationship with the entertainment 
industry during World War I, and at General Lejeune’s request, the Marine Corps sought 
to develop a film with MGM in 1926. Lejeune “plunged [the Marine Corps] unreservedly 
into moving pictures,” having signed a contract with MGM for “exclusive rights to make 
all feature pictures of the marines” for one year, specifically with the film Tell it to the 
Marines.357 This was news primarily because the other services had not signed such 
exclusive contracts with the private sector before. Lejeune was central to the 
development of this film having made contact with MGM after watching another war 
film, The Big Parade, which “brought him to the conclusion that a similar picture with 
members of the Marine Corps playing the stellar role would stimulate recruiting.”358  
Tell it to the Marines, starring Phantom of the Opera’s Lon Chaney was an 
unabashedly pro-Marine Corps film that legitimately captured audiences across the 
country. Released in late 1926, the silent film followed a “young tout from Kansas City” 
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named “Skeet” Burns, who enlisted in the Marine Corps to get a free train ride to some 
horse races in Tijuana (via San Diego). Upon arriving in San Diego, Skeet’s cover was 
blown and the tough-as-nails Marine Corps Drill Sergeant, Sergeant O’Hara gave him a 
lecture which convinced him to give the Corps a real try. The film, nearly 100 years old 
at the date of this writing, contains the same type of humor used in the Marine Corps to 
this day. Private Skeet is introduced to the demanding life of becoming Marine, all while 
suffering light hearted hazing along the way. Sergeant O’Hara enthusiastically poses a 
question to the squad, “Who wants to skip drill and drive the general’s car for day?” 
Private Skeet gladly accepts in order to escape the monotony of drills in the California 
heat, however, “the general’s car” is actually a wheelbarrow full of rocks to be hauled 
from one point to the next.359 
Unlike What Price Glory?, Tell it to the Marines follows the Marine Corps’ 
activities around the world. Scenes are set at sea aboard American battleships, at rainy 
Marine Corps bases in the Philippines, and guarding the streets of Shanghai, China. In 
this sense, Tell it to the Marines appealed to the adventure-seeking recruits the Corps 
sought at this time. In the Variety film review, Tell it to the Marines was considered a 
“sure-fire box office if there ever was one.” “Many may say that it is out and out 
propaganda for the U.S.M.C....but the chances are that any fellow seeing what the hero of 
this yarn had to go through before he made the grade would lay off the Marine Corps if 
he is looking for a soft snap.”360 These are the qualities the Marine Corps under Lejeune 
consistently projected to the public and they are still foundational to the Corps’ recruiting 
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campaigns today. The idea that joining the Marines is no easy feat. It takes tough men to 
join the Corps, but when they do, they not only have an opportunity to see the world, but 
also to see action, and, perhaps more importantly to become part of the national network 
of former Marines.  
 Major General John A. Lejeune rose to the leadership of the Marine Corps with 
invaluable experience from the two military services the Corps sought to distinguish itself 
against. Lejeune started his military service at the Naval Academy at a time when Naval 
officers were questioning the viability of that service’s manpower and mission. Lejeune 
attended the Army War College and served as an army division commander in the First 
World War. His experience with the other services helped to legitimize Lejeune, 
especially in Washington, D.C. circles. Lejeune served as commandant from 1920 to 
1929, under three administrations, both Democrat and Republican. Lejeune’s progressive 
reform of the Marine Corps, specifically as he introduced his three “E’s,” economy, 
efficiency, and education helped to streamline the Corps at the staff level and turned the 
Corps into a place where even enlisted men could get practical education for the future.   
By the end of Lejeune’s commandancy, the Marine Corps was a different 
institution in many respects. Lejeune sought to develop a new mission for the Marine 
Corps with the Marine Expeditionary Force and, while managing conflicts across the 
Caribbean, tried to focus the Corps’ military training toward future conflicts, such as 
Pacific island hopping. Lejeune’s interest in how the Corps was represented in popular 
culture also led to its public image being developed both on Broadway and in Hollywood, 
a relationship that would serve the Corps well in World War II. Despite the tight budgets 
of the 1920s and the effects of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Arms, 
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which forced the navy to make millions of dollars of uncomfortable budget cuts across 
the service, Lejeune helped the Corps to appear continuously active and militarily 
effective. That there were no major unification debates in the 1920s was surprising, yet 
quite fortuitous for the Corps. The British Royal Marines, an organization to which 
Lejeune often compared the U.S. Marines in speeches to the public, failed to secure a 
similar mission in the British military, thus facing amalgamation into the other services.  
 The legacy of the Marine Corps Lejeune crafted in the 1920s lasted well into the 
1930s, in large part due to the commandants who succeeded him. While Major General 
Wendell C. Neville replaced Lejeune after he stepped down, he only served for one year 
before his untimely death in 1930. In the commandants who took over after Neville, 
including Major Generals Ben H. Fuller, John H. Russell, Jr., and Thomas Holcomb was 
a representation of the class of officers who entered the Marines during the Corps’ 
professionalization. Not only did their similar experience in education at the Naval 
Academy tie them to Lejeune, but Lejeune’s progressive legacy and attention to the 
Corps’ public relations lived on in these commandants.  
 In 1928, Lejeune designated then Brigadier General Ben Harbord Fuller as his 
assistant commandant and when Fuller was promoted to Major General and selected as 
commandant by President Herbert Hoover, he took the helm of a Marine Corps in a 
similar situation that Lejeune commanded at the outset of World War I. Fuller’s Marine 
Corps was understrength, having only 18,000 of the Congressionally allotted 27,000 
Marines.361 Indeed, as the Depression continued to worsen, with no end in sight, the 
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Marine Corps came under attack from Washington and the military establishment as 
Congress and the Hoover Administration tightened the noose around the navy’s budget. 
In 1931, the Corps was at the point where it could not even fill out the 18,000 it had 
earlier, then reaching a just over 16,500 officers and men.  
 By the early 1930s, American support for the type of interventionism for which 
the Corps initially received so much praise began to wane. Japanese expansion in the 
Pacific had not registered yet with American military planners and the Marine Corps, 
albeit positioned to take a leading role in a future Pacific War, languished in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere. The intervention in Nicaragua, begun in 1927, yielded negative 
press for the Corps, as newspapers focused more on casualties than the sensationalist 
items of the past. While the Marine Corps once had a national publicity system in which 
it could get ahead of the news, the publicity establishment had, by 1932, tightened along 
with the Corps’ budget.  
 In 1933, Major General Commandant Fuller sought to reverse that course with the 
creation of a Public Relations section at Headquarters, commanded by Major Joseph C. 
Fegan, the Marine who Lejeune designated the “Marine Corps Publicity Officer.”362 The 
small size of the Corps’ new public relations and publicity establishment, however, 
certainly hampered its efforts to get ahead of the news and get the Corps into the press in 
a positive light. According to Fuller’s order, the strategy was similar if not the same as it 
had been both before, during, and after World War I. Fuller ordered that “a continuous 
supply of timely photographs and news items of general public information as well as 
those applying to individuals, the latter for home consumption, are essential to the 
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success of this Public Relations Sections, and to this end you are urged to encourage the 
collection of such information and photographs of all activities under your command.”363 
Without a sensationalist press or the public excitement for news of a foreign war, 
however, the Corps failed to penetrate the news cycle as it had before. 
 Perhaps the American cultural shift toward isolationism and a focus on domestic 
issues had a more significant impact on the Corps during this period than previously 
believed. Whereas prior to the Depression, the Corps was often the darling of an 
interested press, it appears that even some prominent members of the press began to rally 
against the Marine Corps in the 1930s. In 1934, John Boettiger of the Chicago Tribune 
Press Service, even published an editorial in the Chicago Tribune with the headline 
“Consider Plan for Abolishing Marine Corps.”364 Boettiger argued that “the new policy 
of nonintervention enunciated by the President in a speech last month has eliminated the 
one essential excuse for the maintenance of a Marine Corps. The Corps has been used 
during past years to enter and occupy certain territories over which the United States has 
maintained a paternal surveillance and which got out of hand.”365  
 It is important to note that throughout this period, the Marine Corps, despite the 
perceived turn in public opinion, never abandoned the strategy of an open dialogue and 
relationship with the public through publicity. While the army and navy both had public 
relations and news sections with their services, they were often subordinate to those 
services’ intelligence and censorship commands. Whereas the army and navy’s public 
image institutions were reactionary and used mainly to control and censor the news and 
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news correspondents, the Marine Corps continued to operate its public relations and 
publicity operations either by as a command by itself or directly under Headquarters 
Marine Corps so that it was allowed more freedom to interact with the public.366 This was 
an important legacy that the Marine Corps carried through to World War II. 
 Major General John H. Russell succeeded Fuller as commandant in March 1934, 
bringing yet another Naval Academy graduate of the 1880s and 90s to the helm of the 
Marine Corps. Russell’s stint as commandant was a short one, though in terms of public 
relations, the Major General reiterated much of Lejeune and Fuller’s guidance on public 
relations, even going as far to criticize officers who failed to deliver to the Public 
Relations Office the material needed for the Corps’ publicity. In one memo, Russell 
encouraged commanding officers to “show more interest in the matter of public relations, 
as much valuable material for stories is being overlooked.”367 Marine Corps publicity in 
during Fuller and Russell’s eras, however, had to be much different than it was during the 
first two decades of the twentieth century. Far from the original tactics of Captain 
Harllee’s Chicago Recruiting District in 1907 and the Publicity Bureau during the war, 
one recruiter during Russell’s commandancy stated “In the preparation of publicity, every 
care should be used to eliminate even a trace of ‘Ballyhoo’ or war propaganda.”368 
Russell’s policy on publicity as stated in a Marine Corps Gazette article in November 
1934 offers insight into how the American public’s views changed toward the old types 
of publicity. “There is a strict taboo on anything which savors of propaganda, 
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flamboyancy and that undesirable type of publicity which can best be described as 
“bunk.”369  
 While it may be argued that the Corps’ public image somewhat languished during 
the Depression, the legacy of Lejeune’s interest in the Corps as an advanced base force 
and rising tensions in the Pacific helped the Marine Corps survive the “post-small wars” 
era. In 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt selected Major General Thomas Holcomb to 
be Commandant of the Marine Corps, a move that designated one of Lejeune’s most 
significant protégés to lead the Corps. Unlike Neville, Fuller, and Russell before him, 
Holcomb was not a Naval Academy graduate or part of the Corps’ professionalization in 
the late nineteenth century. Instead, Holcomb’s pre-Marine Corps experience was as a 
clerk at a steel mill, a job which allowed him to witness the complex machinations of a 
large business, skills that he would eventually hone as a staff officer under Lejeune.370 
Holcomb was a great fan of Lejeune and especially Lejeune’s progressive 
managerial style and organization. Holcomb biographer, David Ulbrich argues that “all 
Lejeune’s E’s (Economy, Efficiency, Education) in the 1920s clearly left lasting 
impressions that would have positive effects during Holcomb’s own commandancy.”371 
As Lejeune had, Holcomb “devoted many of the Corps’ limited resources to maintaining 
a positive public image.”372 Ever the progressive manager, Holcomb created a new 
structure for the Corps’ public relations system that was aimed toward a reduction in 
editorial griping about the Marines in the press. In January of 1937, Holcomb “demanded 
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that a stop be put to practices which resulted in publication of items not cleared or 
released through the Public Relations Section, or which resulted in disgruntled editors—
the victims of “beats” by their opposition.”373  
While Holcomb, like the other commandants who succeeded Lejeune, attempted 
to reinforce the Corps’ publicity efforts, by 1937, the Corps failed to attract even the 
minimum number of recruits needed to outpace those Marines leaving the service. The 
lack of inventiveness and adaptation, qualities that defined the early years of Marine 
publicity, and America’s isolationism, left the Corps dwindling, in both numbers and, 
some argue, in reputation. Also important to the Corps’ decline in recruiting during the 
Depression was the reduction in recruiting stations as a result of budget cuts. Historian 
David Ulbrich finds that “from 1930 to 1937, the total number of ‘main stations’ and 
‘substations’ dwindled dramatically, from 103 to only 17, and recruitment personnel 
dipped from 26 officers and 303 enlisted to 15 officers and 70 enlisted Marines.”374 As 
evidenced with the Chicago Recruiting district’s “follow-up book,” and the Publicity 
Bureau’s hometown news focus in World War I, the Corps’ recruiting success often 
hinged on the hometowns of Marines, especially those well-covered by recruiters across 
the country. 
In his book Underdogs, historian Aaron O’Connell opens with the argument that 
“before World War II, the United States Marine Corps was tiny, unpopular, and 
institutionally disadvantaged.”375 This is, of course, only part of the story. By the end of 
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the Depression, the Marine Corps faced numerous obstacles that impeded their growth 
and reputation. The Corps’ poor reputation at the start of World War II was only 
temporary. While funding prevented the Marines from executing a publicity strategy on 
the level they achieved from the Spanish-American War through the 1920s, the Corps’ 
leadership entered the war era with nearly 40 years of experience with public relations 
and publicity. The army and navy’s censorship-focused news and public relations bureaus 
represented an institutional knowledge of controlling the news, rather than exploiting it. 
In the interwar period, it was General John A. Lejeune’s legacy as seen in the 
leadership that succeeded his own, and his foresight both in terms of the Corps’ military 
mission as well as its public image helped to keep the Corps from serious institutional 
damage prior to World War II. As the Japanese began to fortify bases in the Pacific, it 
became clear that an expeditionary Marine Corps was necessary to the military 
establishment. As the war began in Europe and rumors of war circled the United States, 
the Corps’ public image as an elite fighting force once again attracted recruits, even after 
the downturn in the 1930s. By 1941, surveys completed by recruits who just completed 
their basic training at Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego overwhelmingly cited 
education, travel, and a sense of adventure as reasons for joining the Marine Corps, the 
same reasons the Marines sought to reinforce throughout the entire interwar period.376 
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CHAPTER IV – JOE BLOW ON THE HOMEFRONT: COMBAT 
CORRESPONDENTS AND THE MARINE CORPS’ PUBLIC IMAGE IN THE 
SECOND WORLD WAR 
As the U.S. entered World War II, the Marine Corps benefited from nearly four 
decades of institutional knowledge of public image management and publicity in order to 
quickly establish a successful public relations framework. In particular, the Marine 
Corps’ use of media professionals during World War II and its focus on telling the stories 
of the average Marine to hometowns across the United States represents a prime example 
of why the Corps surged beyond its fellow services with the public perception of 
America’s “elite” military force. The global nature of the Second World War and the 
Marine Corps’ expanded role in a single theater made that war a defining moment for the 
future of the institution. Perhaps the most recognizable achievement of the Marines 
during World War II was the flag-raising during the Battle for Iwo Jima in February 
1945. It was at this moment in the war that Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 
observed, “the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 
years.”377 The flag-raising and Associated Press (AP) photographer Joe Rosenthal’s 
image of Marines and a U.S. Navy Corpsman in that symbolic act became icons for both 
the Marine Corps and the Pacific War, yet the American public already knew the Marine 
Corps well.  
Beginning in mid-1941, the director of the Corps’ DPR, Brigadier General Robert 
L. Denig, created a war correspondent system using similar yet adapted tactics of the 
Corps’ Publicity Bureau thirty years prior. These correspondents, professional journalists, 
                                                 
377 J. Robert Moskin, The U.S. Marine Corps Story (New York: Back Bay Books, 1977), 364. 
 163 
photographers, artists, moviemen, and radiomen, were recruited from newspapers, 
magazines, and other media outlets around the country and became Marines through 
commission or enlistment and thus acted as Marine writer-fighters. The organization 
Denig created, known as Marine Corps Combat Correspondents (CC), played a vital role 
in further endearing the public to the Marine Corps, which allowed the significance of 
Rosenthal’s photo in 1945 to penetrate deep into the hearts of Americans, solidifying the 
Corps’ place in history. 
The Corps’ relationship with the American public, however, did not occur within 
the vacuum of World War II, but instead began nearly 40 years earlier. The Corps’ close 
attention to public relations prior to World War II provides the institutional context for 
the Corps’ strategies during the 1940s. Despite retired Marine Colonel James A. 
Donovan, Jr.’s argument that “the Marine Corps’ public image is not the result of a well-
organized public relations program,” the U.S. Marine Corps had actively sought a 
positive public image since 1907, and possibly earlier.378 As a service subordinate to the 
U.S. Navy, the Marine Corps underwent dozens of attempts from different sources to 
disband and unify with the other services. Partly because of this, the U.S. Marine Corps 
has developed a considerable sense of self-identity, and in turn, recognition of the need 
for self-preservation. As retired Marine Lieutenant General Victor Krulak dramatically 
stated, “in the military establishment they were perennially the smallest kid on the block 
in a hostile neighborhood.”379 This “under siege” mentality led the Marine Corps to 
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actively seek the approval and understanding of the American public. As early as 1914, 
Marines such as Captain Thomas Sterrett appealed to recruiters across the country to 
build local relationships by establishing themselves in the community, creating 
relationships with prominent local individuals, and approaching the newspaper editors in 
that town.380 The focus on the Corps’ relationship with the public continued in World 
War II and is best represented by the sign that hung above General Denig’s office during 
the war, which read “If the public become apathetic about the Marine Corps, the Marine 
Corps will cease to exist.”381  
In order to better understand the CC system as a case study for the Corps’ 
employment of public relations, it is important to understand both the man who created 
the system as well as the origins and mission of the DPR and the CCs. Brigadier General 
Robert L. Denig was an Ohio native and, as of his first retirement in 1941, a nearly forty-
year veteran of the Marine Corps. For some, Denig’s name does not conjure images of 
war correspondents, but of his service as part of the Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua and 
of his wartime heroics during some of the Corps’ engagements in World War I. By 1941, 
Denig had retired from the Marine Corps as a war hero. No longer than twenty-four hours 
after his retirement, however, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General 
Thomas Holcomb, ordered Denig to his office and asked him what he knew about public 
relations. In Denig’s own words, he replied, “I don’t know anything about it. I’ve never 
heard of it before.”382  
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Yet, despite his efforts at aloofness, Denig did have experience with the Corps’ 
public relations activities. In 1912, less than a year after the creation of the Marine Corps 
Publicity Bureau, Denig, then a lieutenant in charge of a recruiting bureau in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, proposed some of his own recruitment material to the Publicity Bureau for 
publication in the Minnesota area.383 While his proposal was rejected, it clearly showed 
that Denig understood and recognized the need for recruiting material directed toward a 
specific location. While Denig may not have connected his pamphlet with professional 
public relations, he still had a special interest in Marine Corps recruiting. In 1913, he 
worked with the Assistant Surgeon General of the U.S. Navy on a study involving the 
improvement of mental standards for recruits of the U.S. Marine Corps.384 Denig’s thirty 
years of experience with the Marine Corps and his curiosity for recruiting and publicity 
made him one of the best candidates for the position at the head of the DPR just before 
World War II. 
During the last six months of 1941 and into 1942, Denig and the DPR sought out 
public relations professionals and newspapermen to staff the new department. In July of 
1941, soon after Denig agreed to return to active duty, George Van der Hoeff and a 
professional from J. Walter Thompson accompanied him to the DPR.385 Van der Hoeff 
was a public relations and journalism expert in Washington, D.C. and Denig immediately 
gave him a commission in the Marine Corps as a major. According to Denig, it was soon 
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after the attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s declaration of war that he and Van der 
Hoeff made the decision to seek out journalists and newspapermen to join the Marine 
Corps.386  
The primary catalyst for the recruitment of journalists into the Marine Corps, 
which was the foundation of the Combat Correspondent system, was what many 
prominent officers in the Marine Corps believed to be the “paucity of any real news 
coming from Wake Island.” This lack of news, often referred to as the “silence at Wake,” 
“opened the eyes of many of the senior staff officers, especially in the Division of Plans 
and Policies, to the need of having on-the-scene correspondents with Marines in the 
field.”387  
Americans waited in fear during the intense days following the attack on Pearl 
Harbor as the Japanese expanded their empire from Southeast Asia to the Philippines. At 
Wake Island, American defenders, including a forward-deployed Marine Corps Defense 
Battalion, put up a stiff defense. The understaffed unit sank or damaged nine Japanese 
naval vessels with coastal artillery weapons before they expended their ammunition and 
were finally overrun by the Japanese more than two weeks later.388 Throughout this 
episode, Americans on the mainland heard little of what was happening, with the 
exception of small communication blips that stated, “still holding out” and “send us more 
Japs!”389  
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The initial lack of news from Wake Island was both a matter of geography and 
censorship. In the first days after Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt Administration sought to 
lighten the public’s perception of the severity of the Japanese attacks on America’s 
Pacific bases. The attack at Pearl Harbor, closest to the U.S. mainland, was immediately 
censored. “The news blackout was approved by the White House, which promptly 
appropriated the right to issue war bulletins from the Navy and War Departments.”390 
Due to military censorship of the news, the press had to get its news from the rumor mill 
in countries around the Pacific. The news, however, seemed bleak. On December 8, the 
New York Times ran a short release from Reuters in Shanghai, that “quoted an 
unconfirmed report circulated there saying that United States-owned Wake Island had 
been occupied by the Japanese.”391 For Denig and his newly created Division of Public 
Relations, the “silence” in the press of the Marine Corps’ defense of Wake Island was 
unacceptable.  
For the Marines, both in the Division of Public Relations and the Division of 
Plans and Policies, the “silence at Wake,” of course, was less a matter of timely military 
news, but instead a lack of human interest news, especially about the Marines involved. 
The reality, understood by Marine Corps leaders, was that Wake Island was all but lost. 
With the American fleet paralyzed at Pearl Harbor, there was little to nothing U.S. armed 
forces could do to back up the Marines and sailors at Wake Island, especially against a 
significant Japanese force. However, the Corps’ leaders know that Marines continued to 
play a significant role, even if that role was as defenders of the doomed island.  
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Fortunately for the Marine Corps, the “silence at Wake” was a short-lived period. 
Marines at the isolated atoll of Wake Island managed to issue short wireless 
communications to Hawaii that encouraged the public as to its defense and began to bring 
the Marines into the public focus. On December 10, a dispatch from Wake Island read, 
“SHELLED AT DAWN BY SURFACE VESSEL[S] X ONE LIGHT CRUISER AND 
ONE DESTROYER DEFINITELY SUNK BY SHORE BATTERIES...X FOURTH AIR 
RAID 2100...X TO DATE FIVE BOMBERS SHOT DOWN BY AA AND FIGHTERS 
X.”392 Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb saw this report as an opportunity, 
both to report some good news amidst the terrible defeats suffered by the U.S., as well as 
a way to show that his Marine Corps was putting up a tremendous fight. With the help of 
Holcomb, this report and others reached the newspapers and the response was a 
tremendous burst of news for the Marine Corps. Historian David J. Ulbrich found that 
“suddenly the Wake Marines dominated the news wires with their heroic actions.” “The 
nation’s confidence and resolved soared to renewed heights. Americans, who previously 
had not known that Wake Island existed, now anxiously awaited more reports from the 
island. Holcomb made use of that coverage to bolster national will to fight and, of course, 
to increase the Corps’ visibility.”393  
As for the Wake Island defenders, the fate they suffered was a high price, even if 
their defense helped to stir the nation. The dispatches that emanated from Wake Island 
made it to the newspapers every day for nearly two weeks as the Marines, sailors, and 
civilians were subjected to aerial bombing and attacks while the Japanese prepared for 
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the invasion of the island. On Christmas Day, 1941, the Marines surrendered the island as 
the Japanese came ashore. Americans learned about the fate of the plucky Marines on 
Christmas Eve.394 Historian Gregory J.W. Urwin argues that “considering all that Wake 
Island now represented to the people of the United States, its conquest should have 
sharply lowered national morale. Strangely, though, the home front reacted with cheerful 
defiance.” “If fewer than four hundred Marines could give the Japanese so much trouble, 
Americans told themselves, just imagine what this great country would do once it was 
fully mobilized and ready to fight.”395 
In response to the Corps’ perceived “silence at Wake,” General Denig went 
directly to Commandant Holcomb and requested 100 men for correspondent duty in the 
Pacific.396 After a careful study of the Corps’ manpower predicament, Major General 
Holcomb decided Denig could have ten men for his Combat Correspondent system.397 
Denig immediately dispatched his chief administrative officer, Sergeant Joe Shipman, to 
Washington, D.C. to recruit journalists for the CCs. Shipman went directly to the 
Washington Post, Star, and the Times-Herald. Shipman stated that he “prepared for the 
mission by putting on my blues, my decorations, probably took a few short ones, and then 
went to the city editors for permission to talk to their personnel—and got it in each 
case.”398 Shipman made sure to use the lure of actual combat reporting to draw in the 
eager journalists, and with a promise of immediate promotion to the rank of sergeant 
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upon graduation from boot camp, he returned to Denig with 20 of Washington’s top 
newspapermen, 10 for duty, and 10 back-ups for use if any of the first ten failed to finish 
training.399  
Denig’s recruitment of journalists from the D.C. area was so thorough that it 
created a negative reaction from some within the D.C. newspaper community. Cissie 
Patterson, owner of the Washington Times-Herald wrote to President Roosevelt to 
complain about Denig’s recruitment activities and succeeded in getting the president to 
personally scorn Commandant Holcomb and force Denig to find journalists from other 
cities.400 Denig, however, did not feel that he had participated in any wrongdoing, as he 
later stated, “I kept hearing that we were robbing the office force of these newspapers. 
Well I wasn’t bothering anybody. He went over there and announced what he wanted. 
They came in.”401 The Washington Post sent a number of its own staff to the Marine 
Corps and even sought to publicize that fact. In an August 1942 article, “4 of Post Staff to 
be Combat Writers of U.S. Marine Corps,” the editors of the Post seemed proud of their 
newsmen’s contribution to the war effort and highlighted the idea that that combat 
correspondents were different from regular war correspondents because they would see 
action. “These “fighting writers” will work with photographers on stories concerning the 
Marines in action.”402 From Washington, Denig spread the word about the possibility of 
more CC positions to Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York City, where the editors of 
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newspapers in those cities ordered some of their men to go and report from among the 
enlisted men of the Marine Corps.  
While the very first few journalists who joined Denig received automatic 
commissions as officers (some ranked as high as Major), the other incoming CCs 
immediately went to boot camp at the Corps’ two recruit training camps, Parris Island, 
South Carolina and Camp Pendleton, California. This was where the CCs contact and 
personal connections with enlisted Marines began. Many of the incoming journalists 
barely met the requirements for enlistment in the Marine Corps, yet they often credit their 
experience at boot camp with keeping them alive in the South Pacific.403  
At the beginning of the process for turning the journalists into Marines, Denig and 
other staffers at the DPR also worried about how the enlisted men would receive them. 
Many of the reporters and cameramen were much older and far more educated than their 
counterparts at boot camp. Correspondent Samuel Stavisky found himself questioned by 
his drill instructor as to why he would go through boot camp when he could receive an 
officer commission due to his education. Stavisky responded, “all I want to do is become 
an infantryman and I turned down the offer of a commission.”404 Despite the Corps’ 
small size, Denig also worried that his small contingent of CCs would get lost in the 
system once they graduated from boot camp, perhaps to become destined for a logistics 
or desk position that would keep them far from the action. 405  
As the CCs finished boot camp and became sergeants in the Marine Corps, 
General Denig made it his personal mission to train and prepare the CCs for their 
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assignments overseas. In his own words, the mission of the CCs was “give most of your 
time and attention to the enlisted man and what he says, thinks, and does. Tell the human-
interest side of the Marine Corps. If Pvt. Bill Jones of Cumberland Gap wins the boxing 
championship of his unit, tell the people of Cumberland Gap about it.”406 To prepare for 
their service in the Pacific, many CCs were sent to other locations around the world 
where Marines had units deployed. CCs often started out in Iceland, Brazil, Dutch 
Harbor, Alaska, and the United Kingdom.407 By November 1942, the Marine Corps 
already wielded nearly 60 combat correspondents.  
The most important part of the CCs mission in the Pacific was to collect stories 
from the enlisted men of the Corps. The stories collected by CCs received the nickname 
Joe Blow stories because of their personal nature and their ability to get those stories to 
the hometowns of the men they interviewed. Just as the Publicity Bureau in World War I 
disseminated stories of human interest to local newspapers across the country, the Joe 
Blow stories brought the Marine Corps to the homes of many in the United States. In a 
war where much of the big-picture news was censored by the Office of War Information 
(OWI), Joe Blow stories informed the local public of what their sons experienced as well 
as how the war progressed. By 1943, the DPR simply had to notify local newspaper 
editors that they would provide CCs for stories of men from their town and “almost every 
local editor responded and soon the country was covered with Marine Corps Joe Blow 
stories.”408 Integral to getting these stories was the CCs status as a Marine and not a 
civilian correspondent. Marine CCs landed in and amongst the Marines at the various 
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battles throughout the war and also carried a rifle, which meant that these enlisted 
journalists and photographers conducted patrols with the Marines and in some cases also 
died alongside their fellow Marines.  
The Joe Blow-story of World War II closely resembled the “human interest” 
stories that emerged from the Marine Publicity Bureau in World War I. General Denig 
and the Corps’ Department of Public Relations sought to distinguish the activities of 
Marines around the world in a way that highlighted the individual, not apart from the 
institution, but as a product of it. In many ways, the term “human interest” was used in 
the first part of the twentieth century as a way to separate that type of content from much 
of the other content the people confronted daily. Unlike the other military services, the 
public relations and publicity personnel of the Marine Corps sought to associate the 
Marine Corps not specifically with items of “military interest,” or “political interest,” or 
“technological interest,” but instead with content of “human interest.” In this strategy, the 
Marine Corps, a military institution that perhaps could not otherwise separate itself from 
the other larger and better funded services in all the other types of “interests,” succeeded 
at convincing the public that Marines were more interesting as humans. This is an 
important distinction and achievement, because if the Corps’ public image strategists 
could convince the public that Marines were more interesting, then it could also convince 
that public to pay more attention to the institution as a whole, and to convince the public 
to invest in an invented “character” of the Corps.  
Small town newspapers across the country published stories of their own 
hometown Marines or even reprinted particularly interesting stories from other papers 
around the country. An example of a Joe Blow story appears in the Cass City Chronicle 
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of Cass City Michigan. In it, Marine CC Sergeant James Finan presents a short story 
about Robert Gracey, a 29-year old Cass City resident and enlisted Marine serving on 
Okinawa. In the story, Finan describes Gracey’s brush with death as a Japanese bullet 
grazed his helmet, knocking him down into his foxhole. Finan even included a short bio 
on Gracey, including the names and ages of his wife and children as well as his civilian 
occupation as a truck driver.409  
Many of the Joe Blow stories printed in small town newspapers reflect how those 
stories became synonymous with the enlisted soldier’s experience of the war. In an article 
in the Adams County Free Press of Adams County, Iowa, Marine CC Technical Sergeant 
Jeremiah A. O’Leary’s story about the heroic actions of a navy corpsman in aiding 
wounded Marines accompanied a letter written home from Mrs. R.B. Leander, a nurse 
serving in Guam whose parents were Adams County residents. Although the article’s 
subjects were from St. Paul, Minnesota, their story offered a window on realities of war 
that were shared by many who served in the Pacific, from combat troops to nurses.410  
Due to their ready-for-print style, newspapers throughout the United States also 
used stories from CCs to inform their readers about the Marine Corps’ actions in the 
Pacific. A Cedar Rapids, Iowa newspaper reprinted a story by Staff Sergeant James 
Hague that recounted the Corps’ battle for control of Guam, while at the same time 
providing a human side to the war, as he wrote, “U.S. Marines fighting a desperate 
enemy cling to their sense of humor.” In the article, Hague recounted the story of a 
“green” private first class newly attached to an artillery unit. With the heavy barrage of 
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shells from the Japanese, the private asked an older Marine how he would know whether 
the shell was incoming or outgoing, to which the older Marine replied, “Keep your eye 
on me. If they’re coming, I’m going.”411 These stories from the frontlines presented to the 
American public a way of understanding the war from the Marine’s viewpoint, even 
showing the difference between replacements and the “old salts” with shared information.  
While many historians have identified the Joe Blow stories as an important part of 
the CC program, many have failed to identify the continuity of community-level public 
relations practiced by the Marine Corps for nearly half a century. That the Marine Corps 
solicited attention at the national level is a fact shared by the other services, some with 
public relations sections that numbered in the many thousands. At its height, the Marine 
Corps’ public relations section consisted of just over 250 officers and Combat 
Correspondents. By comparison, the navy’s photographic section alone reached 5,000 
photographers by 1944.412 Yet, the Marine Corps managed to receive the title of “a 
propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin’s” from President Truman after the 
war, despite the fact that the Corps was a fraction of the size of its sister services.413 The 
Joe Blow stories and the Corps’ understanding of the need to maintain a positive 
relationship with the American public helped it to rise to near mythic status by the end of 
the war.  
A number of other factors helped to streamline the process of censorship and 
transportation of the CCs completed work back to the United States after the CCs 
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interviewed the Marines on the frontlines. Unlike nearly the entirety of the Marine Corps, 
Denig’s CCs did not fall under the Corps’ Table of Organization and thus, technically did 
not exist.414 This became quite useful for the CCs as they used any and all means possible 
to get their stories back to the United States faster than those of the civilian 
correspondents. The benefit of being outside the system, however, also put the CCs in 
danger of being called to any kind of duty—from digging latrines to clerking for officers. 
Denig was apparently also not immune from his CCs “freewheeling” status. One of his 
former CCs, Alvin Josephy, while interviewing Denig for his oral history, mentioned that 
he “realized (Denig) got summoned to the commandant’s office or some part of the 
Marine Corps and asked some pretty tough questions about this or that fellow in the field 
who had done something that had caused a problem.”415  
Combat Correspondents in the Pacific managed to build an efficient logistical 
network through the use of legitimate as well as some not-so-legitimate means. Denig 
even found that “we beat them (other services) on getting stuff back.” The CCs needed to 
make sure that the bureaucratic censorship practices of the larger services did not slow 
down their copy from reaching the United States. In some cases, CCs maintained an 
“outstanding” relationship with the navy so that their material reached the proper 
channels throughout the mainland. It also helped that the Marines took part in the first 
major commitment of offensive ground forces of the war, the invasion of Guadalcanal. 
As the American public starved for information on the war, families also began receiving 
news about their sons, husbands, and fathers. Historian Benis Frank also found that “as 
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soon as the men in the field began receiving hometown news clippings from their 
families, they and their officers realized that those wonder of wonders, those unknown 
quantities—the unit CCs—we doing something after all.”416 
The Corps’ small size and relatively small and unhindered bureaucracy created 
the precise environment needed for Denig’s CCs to thrive and become successful, but 
Marines also begged, borrowed, and stole whatever they could to expedite the process of 
getting their material to the U.S. quickly. Benis Frank described the CCs as “wheelers, 
dealers, scroungers, and operators.”417 In many instances, CCs promoted good 
relationships with the key personnel who controlled their stories and material once it left 
their hands. In some instances, Marines went as far as to personally bring their material 
back to the states via military transport. The DPR, while effective, did not have the same 
infrastructure that the army and navy’s public relations offices maintained, and thus it 
was often necessary for them to use the equipment and facilities of the other services. In 
one case, Marines befriended an army officer in a Wire photo shop and ended up making 
their own material higher priority over the army content passing through the same 
office.418  
While much of the material left by Marine Combat Correspondents resides in 
their stories printed in American newspapers, there are a few CCs from whom we can get 
better insight into their wartime experience through both their stories and their lives at 
war. The first large group of combat correspondents graduated from boot camp in July 
1942. In that group were experienced newspapermen such as former Washington Post 
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journalist Technical Sergeant Sam Stavisky and Staff Sergeant Richard J. “Dick” 
Murphy, as well as Staff Sergeant Jim Lucas, and Public Relations Officer (PRO), 
Lieutenant William P. McCahill. The stories they sent back to the U.S. from the war zone 
not only offer insight into the war’s progression itself but also into the ways in which the 
Marine Corps’ public image was crafted from the voices of the Marines who were 
fighting at the front. 
The Corps’ first major offensive engagement was the Battle of Guadalcanal, 
waged from August 1942 to February 1943. At this early stage in the war, every move by 
U.S. forces in the South Pacific was a tremendous gamble as Japanese naval forces were 
superior to the fleet the Allies mustered. On August 7, 1942, the 1st Marine Division 
landed at Guadalcanal where Marine and Japanese forces vied for control of the strategic 
island in the Solomons chain. The tenuousness of the situation was highlighted by the 
naval battles that occurred offshore of Guadalcanal as the U.S. Navy was decimated by 
the Japanese in night battles, withdrawing from Guadalcanal and leaving the Marines to 
hold the island. The stories that emerged from Guadalcanal focused on the heroics of the 
Marines there, particularly Marine aviators, whose “Cactus Air Force” fought a desperate 
air battle with limited supplies and an airfield that was under constant attack. By 
February, 1943, American forces wrested the island from the Japanese, securing that 
critical geography and allowing Marine aviators and naval forces to operate from 
Guadalcanal’s airfields as they continued up the Solomon Islands in Operation 
Cartwheel. 
Marine Combat Correspondent Sam Stavisky, a former Washington Post assistant 
city editor was sent to Guadalcanal to write Joe Blow stories for the Marines on the island 
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and their folks at home. When Stavisky arrived in Noumea, New Caledonia, a staging 
area for American troops prior to deployment, leadership on the island had a difficult 
time understanding his post. Upon arrival to headquarters on the island, an officer 
reportedly questioned him: “What the hell are the combat correspondents? we’re getting 
all sorts of directives about what to do with them, but no one told us they were coming. I 
read the Washington Post, I like the Washington Post, and now you are here.”419 
Stavisky’s reputation as a Post reporter preceded him. The CCs were often given vague 
orders by the Corps back in the U.S. In some situations, that allowed the Marine-reporters 
to operate freely within the combat environment, while at other times stymieing their 
progress to the battlefield. 
Stavisky’s close relationship with the editors at the Washington Post allowed the 
newly minted combat correspondent to attain space in the paper, even for his long form 
stories. When Stavisky’s first story was sent back to the U.S., the Post dedicated a large 
column to it and included a picture of Stavisky in his uniform. His first story recounted 
the action of a Marine tank unit as it destroyed a Japanese machine gun nest on 
Guadalcanal. Stavisky, however, made sure this Joe Blow story was a little different from 
the rest. In his opening lines, Stavisky wrote, “Setting out to destroy three Japanese nests 
impeding infantry advances, a Marine tank company gave their commander, just out of a 
hospital, a rousing “homecoming” on Guadalcanal, blasting more than 12 emplacements 
with cannon and machine guns deep behind enemy lines.” The name and parents of the 
tank commander associated with this attack, however, were familiar to both the Post and 
the Marines. “Leading the mission of destruction was Maj. Robert L. Denig, Jr., 
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U.S.M.C., 33, of Sandusky, Ohio.” “Major Denig is a son of Brig Gen. Robert L. Denig, 
U.S.M.C. His wife, Mrs. Mary Drake Denig and a 3-year-old son, Robert L. 3d, live at 
4003 Monument Avenue, Richmond, Va.”420 General Denig’s son was a Naval Academy 
graduate, and by all accounts, a talented Marine officer. It is unclear as to whether Denig 
himself appreciated the news and mention in this story. 
Sergeant Stavisky sought to separate himself and his stories from the other 
correspondence reaching the United States from Guadalcanal. In January 1943, Stavisky 
volunteered to ride along in the gunner seat of a Marine SBD Douglas Dauntless dive 
bomber on a mission over Guadalcanal. While most of the Japanese resistance had been 
neutralized by this time in January, it was perhaps not an enormous risk, but his story no 
doubt garnered attention in American papers. In Washington, D.C., the Post gladly took 
credit for their former reporter’s actions and published Stavisky’s story. Stavisky 
immediately drew the audience into his experience, as he escorted the readers through the 
bombing run. “For a split second, the Dauntless Douglas poised, as if she were a giant 
eagle eyeing her prey. Then, with screeching hate, she hurled herself earthward–down–
down–down–with terrifying speed.”421 Stavisky was particularly talented at opening his 
stories as if they were adventure novels. With this style, his stories had an impact both 
with the hometowns and families of the Marines he interviewed as well as the type of 
recruits the Corps wanted. 
Stavisky survived the war and, like many other combat correspondents, returned 
to the business of writing news for the public. Stavisky returned to the staff of the 
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Washington Post after the war and used his experience as both fighting Marine and 
newsman in order to cover “the adjustment problems of veterans” who returned to the 
workforce. Stavisky went on to start a public relations firm in the 1950s, the crowning 
achievement of which was playing a “key role in getting congressional support for an 
international coffee agreement, which for more than 25 years stabilized the price of 
coffee coming from Latin America and Africa.422 Stavisky lived to the age of 93 and died 
on September 21, 2007. 
William P. McCahill was a Midwesterner by all measures. Born in Iowa in 1916, 
he also lived in Minnesota, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. McCahill was a graduate of 
Marquette University’s College of Journalism and had experience in newspaper writing 
and editing with the A.P. Bureau in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In March 1941, McCahill 
joined the U.S. Marine Corps and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant by May of that 
year. By 1942, McCahill earned a promotion to First Lieutenant and was brought in by 
General Denig to become part of the Marine Corps’ Division of Public Relations as a 
Public Relations Officer (PRO).423 
Lieutenant McCahill’s experience as a PRO in World War II took him to many of 
the Corps’ battles, large and small. McCahill witnessed the loss of friends and other CCs 
and continued to write prolifically for the Marine Corps back home. His close 
relationship with General Denig and status as an officer also allows insight into the 
relationship between the Corps’ CCs and the top ranks of the DPR. Lieutenant McCahill 
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was deployed to the Pacific with the 4th Marine Division. As a PRO, McCahill had to 
create the division’s public relations rules and doctrine from scratch, including the 
standard operating procedures to be followed by the CCs in the field.424 McCahill set 
down a controversial directive in which, when authorized, stories written by the Marine 
CCs could be “distributed to civilian correspondents on the spot.” Historian Benis Frank 
argues that this policy was not well liked by the Corps’ CCs because “PROs would 
sometimes have a CC turn a story over to a civilian correspondent because the latter was 
either lazy, incompetent, had bad luck, or was filing a yarn that would not do the Marine 
Corps any particular good, especially if ready out of context.”425 
McCahill was one of the first members of the Division of Public Relations to 
write General Denig about the details of his son, Captain James Denig’s death on Namur 
in 1944. Captain Jimmy Denig was a Marine tank commander and was considered one of 
the most popular Marines in the division. McCahill’s letter to Denig read just like a Joe 
Blow story only with a tragic ending. “Jimmy died like a true Marine facing the enemy in 
the very forefront of our advanced lines. His tank was leading the way into the last 
stronghold of the enemy...Six japs jumped out of the brush, climbing around and onto the 
tank. One of them dropped a grenade through the signal port.” “Three of the men got out 
of the tank, Jimmy, Corporal William D. Taylor and... Corporal Dan T. Smith. Jimmy 
died of shrapnel wounds and burns about 15 minutes later in the arms of Corporal 
Taylor.”426 
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In order to communicate the directions of the DPR with CCs deployed worldwide, 
Denig had his section produce a newsletter called Memorandum for all Combat 
Correspondents that would keep the CCs up-to-date with each other and give the Marine-
journalists feedback about the work they sent back to the United States. The first issue of 
Memorandum released in September 1942, reported that “the first real stories from CCs 
in the field scored smash hits all around” and that the Washington Star, New York Times, 
and Herald-Tribune all placed a story from CCs on Guadalcanal on page one of their 
papers.427 The Memorandum also disseminated information about what the Corps and the 
public needed in terms of photographs and stories. Another statement in the first issue 
noted that “Headquarters is very short of pix (sic) of individual officers, and they are 
needed.”428 
While the Memorandum fulfilled practical needs for both the DPR and the CCs in 
the field, it also mimicked the practices of the DPR’s predecessor, the Publicity Bureau’s 
own monthly pamphlet, the Recruiters’ Bulletin. Started in 1914, the Recruiters’ Bulletin 
was managed by former newspapermen for the purpose of informing recruiters across the 
country on how to properly build relationships with local communities and newspapers. 
In the first issue, Captain Thomas G. Sterrett, a former newspaperman, published an 
article titled “Working the Newspapers,” in which he gave advice on both approaching 
newspaper editors, and perhaps more importantly, writing small newsworthy articles for 
publication in the papers.429 These stories are reflective of the stories in Memorandum 
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nearly 30 years later. While the CCs had experience in writing copy for print, the DPR 
used Memorandum to guide the CCs toward the stories Denig felt the American public 
needed.  
The organization of the Marine Corps and especially its recruiting stations 
situated throughout the United States also played a major role in facilitating the CCs 
work of keeping local towns aware of their hometown Marines’ actions. Denig realized, 
just as Sterrett had in World War I, that the Corps’ ability to reach as many towns 
throughout the United States as possible would make sure to keep the Corps’ name in 
minds of the American public. During World War I, the Publicity Bureau had massive 
lists of newspapers and editors across the country and Marine recruiters developed 
relationships with local postmasters in order to disseminate pamphlets and news articles. 
Denig also found a way of making sure the DPR’s influence was as local as it was 
national through the use of “a book that gives you all the small newspapers in the 
country…high school magazines, everything.”430 While Denig clearly underscores the 
arrival of this “book” in his own oral history, it was clearly one of the most important 
tools at the DPR’s disposal for the CCs to make sure their stories made it to each 
Marine’s hometown. 
Another way in which the DPR managed to reach Marine hometowns was 
through a system of surveys and personal information filled out when a Marine finished 
recruit training at the Marine Corps Recruit Depots. At San Diego in 1941, the Corps 
queried all of the graduating Marines about a number of aspects of their lives, which gave 
the editors back at the DPR the ability to add information about a Marine perhaps not 
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collected by the CC in the field. The questions in the surveys offer insight both into the 
Corps’ interests in why their Marines joined, as well as the backgrounds of a social cross 
section of the Americans who joined the Marines and completed Marine training.  
The purpose of the surveys for the Corps was clearly stated at the top of the form: 
“This information for use in home town paper, please give correct details.” The top part 
of the survey asked for the Marine’s name, address, birth, and other personal information. 
Further down the form, however, the survey began to delve into the Marines’ interests. 
The qualitative information contained in the surveys included education, hobbies, and 
even “ambition in the Marines.”431 At the end of the fillable form, there was a more 
subjective question posed to the Marines, with room to type the answer on the back of the 
form. It stated, “On reverse side of paper, give reason why you enlisted in the United 
States Marine Corps, and what your impression of the Corps is, and also what branch of 
the service you are most interest in and why. Activities before enlisting, family 
prominence (political or social) Type of work you have been doing – and any other 
information that will be of interest, whether of a military or civil character.”432  
The information requested in these surveys was essential to the DPR, especially 
as it disseminated the Joe Blow stories to hometowns across the U.S. While only a few of 
these surveys and the Marines’ answers still exist, they represent an important connection 
between the Corps and the public. In a survey completed by Taylor Clark West of 
Coolidge, Arizona, a graduate of Platoon 102 from Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San 
Diego, the Marine stated that his “ambition in the Marine Corps is to become a clerk in 
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the Air Corps and to take flight training, if possible.” West stated that he “joined the 
Marines to get a better education than…[he] possesses. West also wrote, “I like the 
Marines very much because it builds a fellow up in more ways than one.” When it came 
to his family, West was not shy in declaring that his “family is one of the best-known 
families in Coolidge Ari., and my father has many friends in this town, and few if no 
enemies.”433  
The surveys also reflect that the core tenets of Marine recruiting and publicity in 
the 1920s and 1930s, themes of travel and adventure, continued to influence recruits even 
on the cusp of the Second World War. In nearly half of the 44 surveys available, the 
newly graduated Marines mention either term in the sections “ambition in the Marines” 
and “Why Enlist in the Marines.”434 Education was also a frequent answer in the same 
sections. Howard Herbert Lucas of Yakima, Washington listed his ambition in the 
Marines as “to get an education in Architectural Engineering and save money to go to 
college.” He enlisted in the Marines “for an education and to get money to go to school 
when I get out. My impression is that the Marines is a highly respected organization. I am 
of the impression that I will get my education in architecture and an education in health 
and discipline.”435 Many Marines enlisted in the Marine Corps, especially during and 
shortly after the Depression, in order to learn a trade that they could translate to a job 
outside of the service. Four of the Marines surveyed listed aviation mechanic as their 
ambition in the Marines, this may be because it was a much rarer trade than automobile 
mechanic, and thus offered them a better chance at a job in a smaller field. 
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The Marines in the San Diego Recruit Depot surveys largely went on to serve 
with the 2d Marine Division in World War II. Eight of the Marines surveyed were 
wounded or killed during the war at some of the 2d Marine Division’s most difficult 
battles, including the Solomon Islands campaign, Tarawa, and Saipan. Tarawa accounted 
for three of the eight casualties, with one killed and two others wounded in the battle. 
Private First Class Royal L. Waltz from Cambria, California was killed on November 21, 
1943 at Tarawa and is still Missing in Action. Waltz’s ambition in the Marines was “to 
make the best of my four years in the Marine Corps and to serve my country, the United 
States of America.”436 Unfortunately, PFC Waltz’s Joe Blow story was one that Marine 
families never wanted to see. In the Fresno Bee - The Republican on December 10, 1944, 
it was revealed that PFC Waltz was Killed in Action at Tarawa. The commanding officer 
of Waltz’s platoon wrote to the parents that “We couldn’t find out much. Your son was 
wounded on November 20, 1943. According to members of the platoon he received 
immediate first aid and remained in the shelter of a sea wall when the group moved 
forward. He wasn’t seen or heard after that time by any of his outfit.”437 
While many tragic stories emerged from the Corps’ invasion of Tarawa, there 
were Marine Combat Correspondents in the field with Marines to tell the stories of 
heroism and courage-under-fire that emerged from the conflict. In the November 20, 
1943 issue of the Memorandum for Combat Correspondents, which touted the 1,681 
stories released by the Division of Public Relations in October, Master Technical 
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Sergeant Jim Lucas was highlighted as the “most prolific writer in the field.”438 Six 
thousand miles away on the very same day, Lucas was with the 2d Marine Division as it 
approached the island of Tarawa. If Lucas had already gained notoriety within the 
Division of Public Relations, his actions and stories from the Tarawa battle would gain 
him international renown. 
Prior to joining the Marine Corps as a Combat Correspondent, Lucas was a writer 
for some of his hometown papers, including the Muskogee (Oklahoma) Daily Phoenix 
and Times-Herald, as well as the Tulsa Daily Tribune. As a Combat Correspondent, 
Lucas quickly became a legend to the other CCs in the field. Fellow correspondents 
considered Lucas a “human writing machine.”439 Lucas reported the stories of the Marine 
Raiders in the Solomon Islands in early 1943 and continued to establish himself across 
the Pacific.  
On November 21, Lucas joined the 2d Marine Division on Tarawa. Lucas’s 
stories from Tarawa were some of the first to make it back to the United States. In the 
Memorandum for all Combat Correspondents, the DPR wrote that “Master Technical 
Sergeant Jim Lucas became a national figure overnight. His personal narrative story of 
the action was featured on page one of practically every major newspaper in the country 
and was given the streamer line by many of them, including Chicago, New York, and 
Washington papers.440 The Chicago Tribune ran the headline “HOW U.S. WON 
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TARAWA! STORY BY A MARINE,” on the front page of its December 4, 1943 issue. 
The story took up nearly six columns of space, which was a tremendous amount, 
especially for a story by a Marine CC. It shows, however, that the public was anxious for 
news from the Pacific front, especially this early in the war.  
Lucas’s own hometown newspaper, The Sun, of Tulsa, Oklahoma published an 
editorial about Lucas’s writing style and his story that compared him favorably with past 
war correspondents, including Stephen Crane and Leo Tolstoy. “Here is the full story of 
one man’s experiences in what will rank as one of the great engagements of the United 
States Marines. The account consists almost wholly of brief declarative sentences. Those 
sentences tell of the approach from the sea, the landing under fire, the fearful night when 
the battle hung in the balance, the slow ascendency of the Marines, the last dreadful 
flushing by fire-throwers of the pillboxes whence Japanese had rained death for hours on 
young Americans.”441 The DPR latched onto the praise of Lucas’s story as a way to 
educate the other CCs in the field in order to help them emulate Lucas’s writing. The 
DPR underlined the sentence about “brief declarative sentences,” and stated that it 
“delineates one quality which all good news writing has.”442 They go on shed light into 
the writing strategy, the DPR hoped all CCs learned: “He doesn’t stop to throw in a 
“glorious,” “illustrious,” “peerless,” “indomitable” etc…every time he mentions the 
Marine Corps; he realized that if his story alone does not tell the readers how good the 
                                                 
441 Editorial in The Sun as quoted in “Tarawa,” Memorandum for Combat Correspondents, December 11, 
1943. USMC History Division, Subject File: Combat Correspondents. 
442 “Tarawa,” Memorandum for Combat Correspondents, December 11, 1943. USMC History Division, 
Subject File: Combat Correspondents. 
 190 
Marines are, no amount of 14-carat adjectives will help.”443 Lucas eventually attended 
Officer Candidates School and was promoted from an enlisted man to a second 
lieutenant. After the war, Lucas became a staff writer for Scripps-Howard and covered 
the Vietnam War as a civilian.  
The Joe Blow stories created by the Marine Combat Correspondents not only 
made it to the newspapers, but also to the families of the Marines they depicted. Armed 
with the addresses of Marines across the country, the Department of Public Relations also 
sent original copies of the stories as well as the photographs taken by the CCs in the field. 
This proved incredibly effective at endearing the Marines’ families to the Corps. In the 
December 28, 1943 issue of the Memorandum for all Combat Correspondents, the DPR 
reported that the “Central Procurement Division has received hundreds of expressions of 
gratitude from families of whom the division has sent copies of pictures and stories 
having to do with men of the families in the Corps.”444 In examples of the praise received 
from the families, the DPR quoted one letter, “It is with great pleasure and appreciation 
that we acknowledge receipt of your letter with the story about Bob, and the photograph. 
Courtesies like this are helpful in these troubled times and make us doubly proud of the 
service in which he has enlisted and is serving.”445 The thankfulness expressed by the 
families of Marines in the field also made it back to those Marines serving overseas, who 
saw how happy it made their families to get such news from the front. Marine CC First 
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Lieutenant Millard Kaufman wrote back to the DPR: “The excellent headquarters policy 
of mailing the original story on a Marine to his parents has come to the attention of this 
unit. An enthusiastic letter from Fern E. Doins of Peoria, Ill., to her son, about whom I 
wrote a story, mirrored her appreciation for the copy she received. Her son showed me 
the letter and was as happy about the gesture as his mother.”446 
Newspaper reporters were not the only members of the Combat Correspondents 
system, as photographers, combat artists, and radiomen also played a major role in 
bringing news of the Marine Corps back to the United States. Early on in the war, the 
Marine Corps took advantage of an opportunity that the other services refused 
participation. The Music Division of the Library of Congress began a project designed to 
record the songs of the enlisted men in combat overseas, and Denig agreed to aid them in 
collecting these recordings. Denig, however, admitted to dual purposes, as he told one of 
his CCs to record the songs, but also any other combat material, including the sounds of 
bombing and interviews with the men. With the “Presto” recording machine, the trained 
radioman CC recorded bombing runs in the Pacific as well as the noise that accompanied 
amphibious landings, and his recordings were disseminated on radio stations throughout 
the United States. He also recorded the voices and stories of many Marines and had them 
delivered to local radio stations, expanding the Corps’ tools for reaching Marines’ 
hometowns through different mediums.447 
Marine Corps Sergeant Dick Murphy, 24, from Chevy Chase, Maryland, was a 
graduate of Georgetown University and had experience writing with the Washington Star 
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and worked his way up from “copy boy” to reporter for the Washington Post before 
enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1942.448 Murphy had his first assignment at the Canal 
Zone in Panama, part of Denig’s plan to prepare the correspondents for deployment. In 
his first credited story back to the U.S., Murphy wrote about the ways in which the troops 
kept busy in the canal zone. “You’ve probably wondered (I know I did) what service men 
at an overseas post do with their spare time,” Murphy wrote. “Reading, of course, leads 
the list.”449 While this piece is not exactly a rousing story with the core tenets of Denig’s 
individual “human interest” involved, it found its way into the local papers back at home 
and became good practice for Murphy’s stories to come. By January 1943, Sergeant 
Murphy found ways to create interesting news from the Canal Zone. The first line of his 
January 15 article, published in The Tampa Tribune stated “Now I know how it feels to 
be a torpedo.” While in Panama, Murphy managed to get a ride aboard a U.S. Navy sub 
and was there to experience a maneuver called the “battle surface,” which made for 
fascinating reading back in the U.S.450 Murphy’s submarine article was reprinted in seven 
American newspapers. 
Once Murphy deployed to the Pacific in mid-1943 with the 2d Marine Division, 
he began sending home “Joe Blow” stories to reach the local newspapers. In September 
1943, Murphy penned an article titled “Marine in Pacific Meets His Recruiting Noncom; 
Now Outranks Recruiter,” in which he tells the story of local Terre Haute Marine Sgt. 
Carl L. Bopp, who ran into one of his local Indiana recruiters who had been “reduced 
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without prejudice” from Staff Sergeant down to Corporal in order to deploy to combat. 
The story not only mentioned Sgt. Bopp and his recruiter, but also worked in the 
information that Bopp was the “son of Dr. and Mrs. H.W. Bopp of Terre Haute,” and 
even mentioned that when the two Marines met each other, the recruiter immediately 
called out “Dr. Bopp’s son!”451 This type of article with so much information relevant to 
local families represented how Joe Blow stories were so successful. Much like an 
engagement announcement in the paper, this story could easily be clipped and hung on 
the fridge at home for all to see. It could be a source of pride for the family and brought 
the Corps’ image to a local level. 
 The types of stories written by Sgt. Murphy and other CCs also helped to deliver 
vital details about a local Marine’s injuries, often times providing more information than 
the brief War Department telegrams. The Edwardsville Intelligencer ran an article by Sgt. 
Murphy regarding one of their local Marines and his commendation for “conspicuous 
gallantry” at Tarawa. Murphy wrote “Marine Private First Class Glenn S. Shaffer, son of 
Mr. and Mrs. Guy Shaffer, RR. 4, Edwardsville, Ill., was recently complimented by his 
commander for...keeping open lines of communication on Tarawa.” “A member of a wire 
team, Pfc. Shaffer not only helped to establish the only wire communication between 
forward assault companies and his battalion, but also ‘risked his life many times by 
keeping that line in repair during the attack on Tarawa Atoll, November 21.’ Private First 
Class Shaffer, a former filling station attendant, didn’t have much comment to make on 
his own action.”452 This Joe Blow story not only offers the family of PFC Shaffer more 
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information about his injuries, but also it was an opportunity to brag about their son’s 
actions overseas. The story also continued to reinforce the Corps’ image as a battle-
hardened service. 
 Sgt. Murphy and other Marine CC’s stories also helped to directly associate the 
perceived successes of the Corps in the Pacific with towns across America. The 
tremendous effort on the home front in every city and town meant that recognition of 
each contribution to the war had meaning. In a story called “Mason City Marine Leads 
Final Mop-up On Tarawa Atoll,” Sgt. Murphy, who also landed with the Marines at 
Tarawa, led with the statement “It was a sergeant from Iowa who led the Marine unit 
which cleared Tarawa of its last Japs. He was Platoon Sgt. William C. Cross of Mason 
City. The non-commissioned officer the day after Betio Island was secured.”453 With this 
article picked up in Council Bluffs, Iowa, one of the largest cities in Iowa at the time, the 
people of Mason City as well as the friends and family of Sergeant William Cross 
received recognition for his and their part in the war effort at the front, all with the 
Marine Corps’ public image at center stage. 
 The Corps’ combat correspondents in the Pacific were both Marines and 
journalists and as such, they fought alongside fellow Marines, soldiers, and sailors at the 
front. On June 15, 1944, Sgt. Murphy boarded a Marine landing vehicle in order to join 
the first waves of Marines landing on the island of Saipan. After months of interviewing 
Marines for their stories of heroism and everyday occurrences on islands all over the 
Pacific, Murphy was slated to be with the infantry when it hit the beaches on that day. 
                                                 
453 Sgt. Richard J. Murphy, “Mason City Marine Leads Final Mop-up On Tarawa Atoll,” Council Bluffs 
Nonpareil, March 8, 1944. 
 195 
Unlike Tarawa and some of the other Marine amphibious invasions in the Pacific to that 
date, however, Saipan’s mountainous terrain offered the Japanese an ideal vantage point 
to fire down on the incoming landing craft. While the details of what happened to Sgt. 
Murphy’s LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) are unclear, the account passed down through 
his family reveals that another Marine was possibly ejected over the side. It is believed 
that Sgt. Murphy jumped over the side of the LVT in an attempt to save the other 
Marine’s life. Neither Marine was seen alive again.454 
What separated the Joe Blow stories written by Sgt. Murphy and the dozens of 
Marine Combat Correspondents was their focus on the individual Marine at war for the 
purpose of informing their friends and family at home in a way that shed a positive light 
on the Marine Corps, in spite of the deadly war that raged from the islands where those 
stories were written. Famous and talented war correspondents like Ernie Pyle wrote 
powerful and moving stories about individual soldiers, sailors, and Marines, yet his 
stories used the individual in order to tell a story with a much broader context. Consider 
the story of Captain Henry T. Waskow, who was killed at San Pietro on January 10, 1944 
in Italy. Pyle’s prose read more like a poem than a news item. The focus was death and 
the tragedy of war. “Never have I crossed the trail of any man as beloved as Capt. Henry 
T. Waskow of Belton, Texas,” Pyle wrote. “I was at the foot of the mule trail the night 
they brought Capt. Waskow’s body down. The moon was nearly full at the time, and you 
could see far up the trail, and even part way across the valley below. Soldiers made 
                                                 
454 Kristin Davis, “Remains of Marine Lost Off Saipan ID’d After 70 Years,” The Free Lance Star, May 
26, 2015. While the article cited here claims that Sgt. Murphy’s remains were found and identified, this 
claim stems from an independent review of historical documentation. On July 25, 2018, the Defense 
POW/MIA Accounting Agency officially accounted for Staff Sergeant Richard J. Murphy, Jr. It turned out 
that his remains had been recovered after the battle, but officials were unable to identify him at the time. 
 196 
shadow in the moonlight as they walked.”455 His story is devastating, just as war was 
devastating. When Pyle joined the Marines at Okinawa in 1945, he penned some of his 
darkest stories in the war, just before he, like Sgt. Murphy, was killed in action.  
 The year 1945 was pivotal for both the Marine Corps’ public image and for the 
war itself. By early 1945, the DPR had 63 public relations officers and 174 CCs in the 
Pacific. With operations in numerous island chains coming to a close, CCs flooded the 
DPR with Joe Blow stories and kept the Marine Corps in the minds of the public as the 
war in Europe also became the subject matter for the front pages of newspapers and 
magazines.456 The invasion of Iwo Jima in February 1945, however, marked one of the 
largest amphibious landing operations in history, and it was a Marine Corps operation 
that resulted in one of the most iconic images of the war, thanks to the work of CCs.  
Iwo Jima nearly became one of the biggest disasters for the Corps’ image in its 
history. The Battle for Iwo Jima was the only battle in the war in which the United States 
suffered the nearly the same number of casualties as the Japanese. The horrific results of 
the landing on Iwo became the subject of insults back in the United States. According to 
Historian Benis Frank, “certain Hearst newspapers—apparently beating the presidential 
drums for General Douglas MacArthur—came out with highly critical editorials of 
Marine Corps tactics.457 
Aging media mogul William Randolph Hearst ran daily editorials in his 
newspapers during World War II called “In the News.” These editorials encompassed a 
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“constant diatribe against Oriental barbarism—and an utter disdain for ‘the Jap’ in 
particular,” and often a running “commentary on American patriotism.”458 Among the 
highest praise doled out by Hearst in his editorials was his treatment of General Douglas 
MacArthur. Hearst’s papers helped to spread MacArthur’s beliefs about his superiority, 
especially when it came to the conduct of operations.  
On February 27, 1945, Hearst plastered his “In the News” editorial on the front 
page of his flagship paper, the San Francisco Examiner with the title “MacArthur is our 
best strategist.”459 In it, Hearst harshly critiqued the navy and Marine Corps’ Central 
Pacific campaign as he stated “there is awesome evidence in the situation that the 
attacking American forces are paying heavily for the island, perhaps too heavily.”460 
Hearst went on to state, “it is the same thing that happened at Tarawa and Saipan. If it 
continues the American forces are in danger of being worn out before they ever reach the 
really critical Japanese areas.”461 Instead, Hearst suggested, “General MacArthur is our 
best strategist…HE SAVES THE LIVES OF OUR OWN MEN…Why do we not use 
him more, and indeed, why do we not give him supreme command in the Pacific war, and 
utilize to the utmost his rare military genius of winning important battles without 
excessive loss of precious American lives?”462 Clearly, Hearst had an agenda, but the 
public heard loud and clear the idea that the Marines paid too high of a cost, and it was 
the by fault of their own leadership. 
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The next day, non-Hearst newspapers around the country reported not about 
Hearst’s words and his call for Macarthur’s leadership, but instead about the scene the 
developed at the Examiner the day before. Marines in San Francisco did not take well to 
Hearst’s editorial. In papers around the country on February 28, 1945, it was reported that 
Marine veterans of the Pacific War rioted and stormed the offices of the San Francisco 
Examiner, demanding a retraction or the chance to rebut Hearst’s argument. In the 
Pittsburgh Press, the headline declared “Marines Protest Hearst Editorial: Delegation 
Calls at San Francisco Paper.” It was stated that “the 12th Naval District reported today 
that the shore patrol was called last night to the San Francisco Examiner, a Hearst 
newspaper, to disperse 75 to 100 Marines who had gathered in protest against a front 
page editorial yesterday.”463 In the Hazleton, Pennsylvania Standard-Sentinel, it was 
reported that two Marines made it all the way to the editor’s office. There was no 
violence involved with the riots, but the Marines made their point.464 
Four days into the Iwo Jima campaign, however, a number of correspondents 
traveled with a Marine patrol to the top of Mt. Suribachi, the 556-foot volcano on the 
island, where the significance of the battle and of the war changed. On February 23, a 40-
man patrol climbed to the summit of Suribachi and raised a small flag at the top. 
Leatherneck photographer Sergeant Lou Lowery took pictures of the whole event. A few 
hours later, after a dispute over who would take the first flag home, Marines ordered 
another patrol to replace the first flag with another, larger flag. Marine CC Bill Genaust 
escorted AP photographer Joe Rosenthal (since he could not carry a weapon) to the top of 
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the mountain with the second patrol even as the Japanese continued to defend the cave 
system within the volcano. At the top, both Rosenthal and Genaust lined up near each 
other to catch some images (moving pictures in Genaust’s case) of the second flag-
raising. It was in that moment that Rosenthal captured what became the most reproduced 
photo of all time, and Genaust captured the film to confirm its authenticity. The 
renowned flag-raising photo won Rosenthal the Pulitzer Prize for photography and the 
image became synonymous with the Marine Corps and victory in the Pacific.465  
Identifying Iwo Jima as a positive turning point for the image of the Marine Corps 
would be an oversimplification. The Battle for Iwo Jima continued for another month 
after the flag-raising and claimed more than 28,000 American casualties, nearly 7,000 of 
which represented those killed in action, including Bill Genaust and six other CCs.466 
Despite the Corps’ relative success in bringing the stories of Marines to their hometowns, 
the themes of the Iwo Jima invasion were brutal fighting and high casualties. Marines 
who the Corps lauded as heroes from the early days of the war went to Iwo Jima and 
never returned. Medal of Honor recipient Sgt. John Basilone, who had become a 
household name because of his participation in War Loan Drives, was killed on the 
beach. Iwo Jima was an important test of the public’s will to continue the fight.  
While historians still debate the necessity of the Iwo Jima operation, American 
newspapers largely supported the Marines who fought there.467 It appears, though, that 
there may have existed an undercurrent of questioning about whether Iwo Jima was 
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worth the toll is exacted on young American men. Local newspaper editorials such as one 
published in the Parowan Times of Parowan, Utah argued to their readership that the 
capture of Iwo had significant value. Titled “The Cost of Iwo,” the editorial stated “It will 
be natural to ask whether the cost could have been less and whether the prize is worth the 
price…No doubt both mistakes and unexpected situations played their part. But they 
always do in a close battle. Iwo Jima was a key fortress in Japan’s whole system of inner 
defenses, just as Gibraltar and Malta have been in the Allied control of the 
Mediterranean.”468 With Iwo Jima, it seems that many Americans had to put aside the 
appalling numbers in order to support both the Marines who fought and died there, as 
well as the Corps’ and navy’s leadership who led those local men into withering fire. 
By this time in 1945, the Corps’ ambitious publicity strategies began to wear on 
the press and the military establishment. The general who led those Marines onto the 
beaches at Iwo Jima, Holland “Howlin’ Mad” Smith, doubled down on tying the Corps’ 
reputation to the bloody battle. The Los Angeles Times reported on March 20, 1945 that 
General Smith “spoke a final word today for those who died so ‘there will always be a 
Marine Corps.’”469 General Smith went on to say “If there’s any question in anybody’s 
mind about the Marine Corps after the war, this Battle of Iwo Jima will assure them 
there’ll always be a Marine Corps.”470 It was statements such as these that in the long run 
generated a great deal of animosity toward the Marine Corps. The perception that the 
Marine Corps tried so hard to gain favorable publicity at every step of the war allowed 
conspiracy theories to develop, especially surrounding the flag-raising itself. In his book, 
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Immortal Images, Iwo Jima veteran Tedd Thomey recalled that “the press gave him 
[Rosenthal] no peace…They claimed that his photo was fake. They accused him of 
organizing the raising of the second flag and posing the men who hoisted it into the air 
because he had missed the first flag raising.”471 It was because of this severe reaction to 
the Corps’ flag-raising publicity that Corps did its best to hide the fact that it had its own 
CCs on top of the mountain.472 
High ranking military officers of the other services also noticed the Corps’ 
publicity drives in the midst of record casualties. Prominent army officers publicly 
remarked on their perception of the Corps’ public relations activities. After a relatively 
unpublicized battle in Europe, General George Marshall commented, “Had it been a 
Marine Division every phase of a rather dramatic incident would have been spread 
throughout the United States.”473 Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas 
MacArthur also held a particular disdain for the Marine Corps’ public relations activities. 
Eisenhower’s naturally secretive nature and tight censorship policies throughout the war 
constantly hampered the Corps’ CCs in getting their stories back to the United States in a 
quick manner. MacArthur, despite his own self-aggrandizing publicity campaigns, was 
also annoyed at the Corps’ seemingly constant PR presence. At the amphibious landings 
of the Philippines (an army operation), the Corps’ CCs were on hand to cover the action 
of the single Marine air unit involved in the campaign. This led General Denig to 
comment that “the presence of public relations personnel with Marine aviation units in 
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the Philippines made it possible to provide the public information about Marine Corps 
activities in that sector which otherwise would have gone practically unannounced.”474 
The casualty lists at Iwo Jima quickly became overshadowed as the war 
progressed both in the Pacific and in Europe. The Battle for Okinawa, begun less than a 
month after the close of the Iwo Jima campaign, claimed 12,000 American lives, and the 
projections for the assumed invasion of mainland Japan rose into the tens of thousands.475 
With the war in Europe over, the public became even more aware of the casualties still 
emerging from the Pacific. Marine CCs continued to bring the public stories of the war. 
The Daily Courier of Connellsville, Pennsylvania published a column called “Notes from 
the Pacific,” which included nine short dispatches from Marine CCs. Most were 
lighthearted in nature and consistent with the typical CC prose. One such story 
highlighted the fact that “the roll call of the Third Tank Battalion, Third Marine Division, 
sounds like an excerpt from history’s Who’s Who, ranging from literati to the prize ring.” 
The story goes on to describe several Marines who have names like Pvt. Abraham 
Lincoln Chapman and Pvt. Romulus Remus Albu, Jr., all in the same unit.476 
The themes of some of the stories became more somber. In an article in the Miami 
Daily News-Record of Miami, Ohio, called “They Do Rest in Peace,” Marine CC Master 
Technical Sergeant Gene Ward described the scene of the military cemetery on Okinawa. 
“As I look out over this quiet burial place and down the broad vistas of the island hills to 
the sea, I wish that those who loved these dead could know this place, could know amid 
                                                 
474 Lindsay, This High Name, 63. 
475 Thomey, Immortal Images, 46. 
476 “Notes from the Pacific,” The Daily Courier, August 3, 1945. 
 203 
what tranquility their sons have found their final resting places.”477 For the public, the 
initial shock of Iwo Jima’s brutality was replaced with the realities of the continuing war, 
yet the image of the flag-raising persisted, representing victory over defeat and the return 
of a positive public image to the Corps.  
Conspicuously absent from the vast majority of Joe Blow stories in World War II 
were the African-American Marines who were also on the same islands so contested 
throughout the Pacific War. African-American Marines, while often relegated to the still 
vital duty of logistics, advanced alongside their white Marine counterparts on Japanese-
held islands under fire and many were killed or injured in the line of duty. Their absence 
in the newspapers, it appears, was not the work of the Marine Corps, but instead the 
workings of the segregated newspapers in the South at the time. This did not, however, 
prevent controversy regarding the Corps’ late introduction and alleged mistreatment of 
African-American Marines at times throughout the war. 
The introduction of African-Americans to the Marine Corps in 1942, which was 
the last service to allow their enlistment, challenged the Marine Corps’ public relations 
strategy. It is clear that CCs reported about African-American Marines, however caution 
was used when it came to these stories. In the Memorandum for Combat Correspondents 
on October 30, 1943, a notice in the “About Your Copy” section warned that “whenever 
a man named in your copy is a Negro, be sure to identify him as a Negro. This is 
especially necessary for copy distributed by the Southern Procurement Division, 
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inasmuch as Southern newspapers for whites do not publish Negro news or carry it on a 
separate page.”478 
 As training began at Montford Point, a segregated training center outside of 
Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, the treatment of the recruits and their experience there 
was well-documented by the press, especially African-American newspapers such as the 
Chicago Defender and Washington Afro-American. In July 1944, a scandal broke with 
the release of an article by the Afro-American on July 29, with the headline “18 Marines 
AWOL.”479 The article claimed that 18 Marines went AWOL from Montford Point with 
the objective to “reach the Navy Dept. higher-ups and newspapers to expose move to 
transfer 5,000 colored Marines from that camp to overseas duty and New Orleans, so that 
White Women Marine Reserves can occupy their current quarters.”480 The article went on 
to accuse the Marine Corps of failing to provide sufficient swimming training to African-
American Marines, even after “a number of colored Marines died on Saipan because they 
couldn’t swim.”481 
These serious allegations and the perceived danger of the ensuing public reaction 
brought about a response from the Commanding Officer of Montford Point, Colonel Sam 
A. Woods. In a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Woods argued that “from 
reading Negro newspapers, it appears that a more effective program be instituted for 
disseminating favorable publicity to the Negro press relative to Colored Marine 
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personnel.”482 Woods was concerned that even “a very slight distortion of the true 
situation can be made to appear very unfavorable by those intent on criticism.483 General 
John Marston, Commanding Officer at Camp Lejeune believed that it was not “advisable 
to counter such obviously untrue statements...by mere denials” and that “the 
establishment of an alert and active Negro public relations section at this Camp should be 
of value in disseminating favorable and untarnished publicity.”484  
It is clear that Marine leadership took even the mere accusation of misconduct at 
Montford Point seriously. The commandant, Lieutenant General Alexander Vandegrift, 
forwarded the letter to General Denig for his advice. In response, General Denig added 
his advice and understanding of the newspaper featured in the story. Denig’s belief was 
that the article “is the type of story that may be expected from the Afro-American. This 
publication is rabid in trying to stir up trouble that will incite negroes to assert their rights 
even if these are not being abused.”485 Denig’s ultimate recommendation was in 
agreement with General Marston in that a public relations program be started at the camp 
and run by “qualified Negro Marines to assist in the production of unbiased copy 
pertaining to Negro Marines.”486 It is unclear if a public relations section was formalized 
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at Montford Point, though a few positive stories about the African-American Marines 
training there emerged shortly after this controversy. 
While Denig’s response is certainly curt at best, it does not appear that the general 
sought to prevent CCs from covering news about African-Americans in combat. In fact, 
around the same time as this controversy, newspapers published CC Sergeant Charles R. 
Vandergrift’s story titled, “Negro Marine Unit Suffers First Casualties on Saipan.” In the 
article, Vandergrift goes into great detail about the heroics of the African-American 
Marines at Saipan, who suffered their first casualties there. As with similar stories 
covering white Marines, Vandergrift called out the names and hometowns of many of the 
African-Americans he interviewed there, including their occupation and any action they 
saw on the island.487 
The postwar period brought with it an end to the flexibility afforded to the CCs 
during World War II. With the creation of the Department of Defense in 1948, all public 
relations efforts were filtered through an even larger bureaucratic system. In no war after 
1945 would the Marines achieve the same publicity with the American public as they had 
throughout World War II. As CC Alvin Josephy confidently noted, there were a “peculiar 
set of circumstances working in World War II that were just wonderful for this.”488 The 
Marine Corps developed an institutional appreciation for public relations and the small 
size of the service, combined with the flexibility offered to Combat Correspondents, and 
the seemingly fly-by-night expertise of General Denig created an environment in which 
the Marine Corps developed a personal relationship with the American public. This was 
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made possible through the intelligent use of Joe Blow stories of human interest that were 
specific to the hometowns of the Marines they covered. 
In 1949, during an intense debate over the unification of America’s armed forces, 
Major John L. Zimmerman, director of the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, posed a 
query in response to the massive public outrage over attempts within the government to 
disband the Marine Corps, arguing that “the question arises inevitably as to why such a 
befuddled and anachronistic organization has gained such a hold up on the American 
imagination.”489 As the shadow of World War II continued to loom over these 
discussions, many continued to question Marine Corps’ success in the creation of 
grassroots support for their small service. Thirty years later, prominent military historians 
also recognized the irony of the Corps’ perceived elite status. Historian Dennis Showalter 
found that “the Corps is so commonly accepted as an “elite” that it is often awarded the 
adjective by the media even when being sharply criticized.”490  
The development of the Corps’ modern public image, however, began decades 
before these questions were asked. In the early twentieth century, the Marine Corps, in 
line with the corporate world, sought out former newspapermen and journalists to begin 
professional public relations activities. The Corps also created the Marine Corps Publicity 
Bureau in 1911, which was charged with increasing the public awareness of the 
institution’s purpose, mission, and history.491 The Corps’ success at publicity during 
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World War I was a matter of both act and accident, however, the knowledge gained from 
the activities of the Marine Corps Publicity Bureau during its first ten years would be 
transferred through some of its key players to those who oversaw the newly formed 
Division of Public Relations (DPR) in time for America’s participation in yet another 
World War in 1941. 
On March 15, 2011, in Tumon Bay, Guam, Iwo Jima veteran Oliver “Ollie” 
Cromwell, Jr. attended a symposium and veterans panel regarding the Battle for Iwo 
Jima. When asked about his service on Iwo Jima, Mr. Cromwell turned to his son Warren 
for a fresh copy of a personal news story regarding his action on Iwo Jima, a story 
recorded and written by a Marine Corps Combat Correspondent. Mr. Cromwell proudly 
gave everyone who asked a copy of his news clipping, which he received from his family 
while he was in the hospital recovering from wounds received in battle. The article was 
printed in his hometown newspaper in St. Louis, Missouri, and reflects the significance of 
the Joe Blow stories for the Marines and their communities.  
The Marine Corps Combat Correspondent system during World War II allowed 
the Marine Corps to continue and strengthen nearly half a century of public relations 
efforts aimed at informing the American public about their mission and keeping the 
Corps’ name in a good light. In attempting to answer the question posed by Major 
Zimmerman regarding why the Marine Corps has gained such a foothold in the psyche of 
the American public, the CCs of World War II represent one of the areas where the 
Marine Corps actively sought to create and maintain a positive relationship with the 
public. Due to their large size and permanent nature, the other military services did not 
always place the relationship in the same regard as the Marine Corps. After nearly 50 
 209 
years of teaching the American public about its service, the Marine Corps created a 
public image that could withstand even the greatest outside pressure, be it from within the 
government as it was in the Unification Debates of the late 1940s and 1950s, or from the 
outside, as it was during the backlash against the military shortly after the American 
withdrawal from Vietnam.  
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CHAPTER V – DEATH IN TECHNICOLOR: CENSORSHIP, RECRUITING, THE 
BATTLE OF TARAWA, AND THE DEBATE OVER THE MARINE CORPS’ PUBLIC 
IMAGE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Throughout World War II, the U.S. Marine Corps was criticized both at home and 
from within the military for its “blunt” offensive tactics in the Pacific. From enlisted men 
to officers, many in the other services felt that the Corps was not adept at the island 
assaults it had been assigned to perform, often suffering greater casualties than its critics 
believed necessary.492 While the nature of the Corps’ offensive tactics in the Pacific are 
still of intense debate today, the Marine Corps largely embraced that ethos because it 
helped to develop the Corps’ image as an elite fighting unit. However, as the Marine 
Combat Correspondents delivered timely news and witty articles of human interest to the 
press in the United States, the Corps’ Department of Public Relations constantly grappled 
with the fine line between Marines portrayed as either elite warriors or cannon fodder. 
Through an analysis of the film With the Marines at Tarawa, and the criticism regarding 
the film’s depiction of dead and dying Marines, the Corps’ dedication to its public image 
as a warrior service become clearer.  
The Battle of Tarawa and the film’s release occurred at a time when the Corps 
was facing changes of both government censorship and its recruiting process. These 
changes allowed the Marine Corps to gain favorable publicity from its success in these 
battles, yet at a cost to the recruiting of seventeen-year-olds, a self-imposed requirement 
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to keep up its “all volunteer” image. 
 The conduct of America’s censorship activities in World War II can be summed 
up by three primary motives: the feedback and public opinion of censorship in World 
War I, motivating the public to buy war bonds, and combating war weariness.493 
Censorship during the war itself can largely be categorized into two phases: 1941 to mid-
1943 and late-1943 to 1945. During the first phase, censorship, particularly of visual 
imagery, was strong handed. In his book, The Censored War, George H. Roeder, Jr. 
describes the newsreels and images of this period as puff pieces like travel 
documentaries, rather than hard-hitting wartime realities.494 By the end of the war, 
however, the U.S. government released even the most gruesome images of late-war 
graves registration activities as a way to keep the American public apprised of the cost of 
war.  
At the onset of war, the government did not approach censorship activities in a 
vacuum. Instead, public opinion experts such as Elmer Davis, the head of the Office of 
War Information (OWI) sought to ensure that the U.S. did not make the same mistakes it 
made during World War I, in which strong censorship of all activities in Europe 
prevented much of the American public from viewing the realities of arguably the most 
destructive war to that date. As a result, the Roosevelt Administration directed Davis and 
the OWI, as well as the military, to help the public understand and even cope with the 
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realities of war, particularly the death and destruction, while omitting only the most 
sensitive of operational military matters.495 
One of the subtler ways in which the U.S. influenced censorship activities during 
the war was instigating the public to buy war bonds. Lessons learned from the successes 
and failures of the first two War Bond Drives indicated that the more trauma and realistic 
depictions of war the public was exposed to, the more likely they were to buy war bonds. 
The OWI stated of its lessons learned, that “the strongest appeal in making people buy 
bonds [is] the casualty lists.”496 So ingrained was this idea, that in early 1944, there was 
even discussion at the level of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. to 
consider opening the purchase of war bonds to soldiers overseas. In a meeting about the 
War Bond Program on February 2, 1944, Morgenthau said “these people who have been 
up there and have seen the thing, saw people die all around them--they are buying the 
bonds; most likely eighty or ninety percent of their pay, whatever it is, is going into 
bonds. If we can do it, I think it would be awfully good. And it is novel. I think they 
would enjoy it. I mean, it would be kind of fun for them.”497 
Historian George Roeder adeptly considered the government’s censorship 
activities during World War II a “rationing of death.”498 It is easy to see how the idea of 
rationing fits well into the narrative of censorship. Very early in the war, the rationing 
was tight because the government not only needed time to poll public opinion, but the 
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slow pace of battles in the Pacific and the unsure position of the U.S.’s ability to fight 
effectively still weighed on American minds.499 By late 1942, with the victory at Midway 
secured and the U.S. fast carrier task forces harassing the Japanese in their sphere of 
influence, as well as American troops fighting their way across Africa, the government 
favored loosening the rationing of death. This way the public could see that the war was 
not to be taken for granted and they would sell more war bonds. War weariness played an 
important part in decisions around rationing censorship as the war pressed into 1944 for 
the United States. While the Roosevelt Administration, the OWI, and the Treasury all 
favored at one time or another the practice of lifting the censorship restrictions in late 
1943 and early 1944, the effects of the battle in Europe, with Americans now on 
European soil, as well as the multiple fronts in the Pacific forced them to consider the 
public’s exposure to war. 
For the Marine Corps, as in World War I, the layers of censorship bureaucracy 
played an important role in the coverage it received throughout the war. Even as the 
Corps focused on local news items and Joe Blow Stories to reach the public in a “local” 
way, the Corps also made sure its trained cameramen could produce footage good enough 
for Hollywood. Material from the front had to go through both navy and army censors in 
order to reach headlines, but for film footage, it also had to go all the way through the 
OWI as well.  
While mid-1943 was a period of change for censorship in the U.S., it was also a 
time of change for recruiting and mobilization, especially for the U.S. Marine Corps. Up 
until December 1942, the Marine Corps was fulfilling its quotas with volunteers at 
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staggering rates. In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, the Marine Corps was accepting 
nearly 6,500 volunteers a week, compared to a pre-war weekly high of just over 550.500  
Not only were volunteer rates exceptional to this point but also the Marine Corps avoided 
high rejection rates as they advertised to recruits the direct potential to see battle early in 
the war.  
A small example of the ways in which the Corps’ Division of Public Relations 
advertised to its target audience can be seen in the “Japanese Hunting Licenses” created 
and sent to potential recruits. One of those licenses from the Corps’ Central Recruiting 
District read: 
JAPANESE HUNTING LICENSE 
 FREE AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT - WITH PAY.  
Present this Certificate to the Officer in Charge, U.S. Marine Corps Recruiting 
Station, Room 356, U.S. Court House, Chicago, Illinois.  
Introducing ________________________________ 
Who is interested in learning details regarding enlistment in the U.S. MARINE 
CORPS. Please see that he is shown every courtesy and consideration.501  
The publicity effect of these “hunting licenses” was highly successful. In a 12 August 
1942 memo from General Denig, the Marine Corps’ Director of Public Relations, 
requested an order of 20,000 more “hunting licenses” for the Washington headquarters to 
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distribute to their mailing lists.502 The aim of the hunting licenses was to recruit the fittest 
and most “war-ready” recruits so that the Corps did not have to reject as large of a 
percentage as the other services. 
In the early years of World War II, the Marine Corps posted strong numbers of 
volunteers and enlistments, due in large part to the public image the Corps built in the 
first part of the twentieth century. Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb also 
played a prominent role in the Corps’ ability to grow as an organization from roughly 
35,000 before the war, to 233,000 by the end of 1943.503 In December 1942, however, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt fundamentally altered the Corps’ recruiting strategies 
with Executive Order 9279, which forced the service to solely allow enlistments through 
the Selective Service system. For the Marine Corps, EO 9279 was not just an 
organizational change, it was a change in the entire recruiting culture. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the Marine Corps focused on its status as a volunteer-only service, and 
in some ways, depended upon its ability to draw volunteers as a way to weed out men the 
Marines did not feel were fit to join. 
In order to circumvent the Selective Service requirements while still both 
following the law and accepting volunteers, the Marine Corps lowered the age of 
volunteer enlistment to seventeen. While these young men were allowed to volunteer at 
seventeen-years-old, they were not allowed to start their service until they were eighteen 
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when they would be directly enrolled into the Marine Corps Reserve. Perhaps the most 
important factor in the volunteer enlistment of seventeen-year-olds, was that they had to 
have a parent or guardian’s permission to volunteer. Convincing a young man to join the 
Marine Corps and fight for his country took a specific type of recruiting. Convincing a 
parent to allow their child to volunteer for the war was quite another.  
As the Marine Corps began to grapple with the prospect of recruiting seventeen-
year-olds, a major change in the way the U.S. dealt with the growing casualty numbers 
emerged to complicate the Corps’ transition. At the time, both military leaders and the 
Roosevelt Administration felt that the public was not ready for the casualty numbers that 
were to come. Popular images of casualties broadcast to many Americans in the theaters 
of the day showed smiling American GIs in ambulances and bloodied, but never bleeding 
soldiers and sailors. The fear of a misconception on the part of Americans about the 
casualties and realities of the battlefront led the Roosevelt Administration to seek a more 
lenient approach to censorship, especially as it pertained to casualties.504 It was during 
this period of the more lenient policy on casualties that the navy and Marine Corps 
invaded the Tarawa Atoll in November of 1943.  
On the island was Marine Corps combat cameraman Staff Sergeant Norman 
Hatch with his motion picture cameras ready to capture footage for a training film, 
though instead he created a piece of wartime and film history. Norman T. Hatch, known 
as Norm, was born in 1921 in Boston, Massachusetts. Hatch’s father, Irving Hatch, was 
an engineer in the motor industry and in 1927 was transferred to Chicago to help the 
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struggling Stutz Motor Company. While in Chicago, the Hatch family lived in a hotel that 
also happened to be occupied by infamous Chicago gangster Al Capone. Irving Hatch, a 
Pinkerton Detective in his younger days, had numerous dealings with Capone and his 
men as Stutz also built armored vehicles. Irving Hatch was unable to keep his job in the 
throes of the Depression and moved the family back to Gloucester, Massachusetts in 
1931. In high school, Norm Hatch became fascinated with the military and joined his 
school’s ROTC program. It was also in high school when Hatch became interested in 
photography and took classes to learn how to use a simple Kodak camera.505  
As the younger Hatch also struggled to find good work in the Depression 
economy, he looked into joining the military so that he could learn a trade and get a good 
job when he got out of the service. Having been around the ships in Gloucester for much 
of his teens, Hatch naturally tried to join the U.S. Navy. Hatch’s father also thought that 
the navy would be the safest service if war came and it offered the most opportunities to 
learn a trade.506 Unfortunately, the navy was filled to its small quotas with men in similar 
situations and Hatch was told he had to be patient and wait for his number to be called. 
After waiting for a full year to get into the navy, Hatch finally went down to the Marine 
Corps recruiting station in the same building instead. Upon asking to join, he was 
immediately offered the chance to raise his right hand. On July 7, 1939, Hatch was sworn 
into the Marine Corps and received orders to head to boot camp in South Carolina.507 
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 Hatch was unlike many of the other Marine Combat Correspondents in that he 
gained all of his training in writing, public relations, and film from the navy and Marine 
Corps and not from a related civilian field. Near the end of his time at Marine boot camp, 
Hatch saw an ad on the bulletin board for an English Teacher at the Marine Corps 
Institute in Washington, D.C. The same Marine Corps Institute started by former 
Commandant John A. Lejeune, and born out of his progressive ideals to create a more 
educated and specialist Marine Corps. Hatch figured he “had no problem with English in 
high school,” so he applied, and within weeks found that he was heading to Washington, 
D.C.508 While he held the title of English teacher, Hatch instead acted as a glorified copy-
editor for Marines around the world, correcting spelling and grammar for the large swath 
of Marines who were not native English speakers at the time. While the English teaching 
position did not turn out to be as interesting as Hatch had imagined, his time at the 
Marine Corps Institute gave him the necessary experience to move into other areas of the 
Marine Corps that dealt with writing and editing. Hatch applied to Leatherneck Magazine 
and became the Associate Editor there. His experience at Leatherneck offered an 
extensive understanding of Marine Corps history, lore, and culture, and all of the Corps’ 
activity both in the U.S. and abroad as he edited the “Sound Off” column, answering 
questions from Marines around the world.509 Leatherneck also offered to Hatch the 
opportunity to familiarize himself with government printing businesses and to get to 
know the military circles around Washington as he managed the printing of the Marine 
Corps’ official magazine.  
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In early 1941, Hatch left Leatherneck Magazine for a post with the navy’s Office 
of Public Relations (OPR). At this point in 1941, the navy’s OPR was not yet a publicity 
machine geared up for the war. Instead, like the Marine Corps’ languishing Publicity 
Bureau, the navy’s OPR was more of a government printing office and photographic 
distribution center than an organization directly geared toward a conversation with the 
public. An April 1941 article in the Washington Post summed up the navy’s approach to 
public relations in the context of the new commanding officer for the OPR. The sub 
headline read “Officer Is in Favor Of Giving the People A Maximum of Facts,” and went 
on to declare that “Heretofore public relations - all publicity dealing with the navy - has 
been a branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. A divorce of the two has been 
advocated because Naval Intelligence, an office handling such matters as espionage, 
naturally places the emphasis on secrecy.”510 Hatch’s job at the navy OPR was located at 
the navy headquarters, then called “Main Navy,” and involved nothing more than 
sharpening pencils and delivering navy press releases to the D.C. press corps, visiting 
newspapers, radio stations, and other studios. Once again, this provided Hatch the 
opportunity to get to know the area’s press agents and other important people in the news 
industry, but according to Hatch, the job did not well enough stimulate his growing 
interest in the military news apparatus, especially his continued interest in 
photography.511 
Norman Hatch’s path toward the field of motion pictures, like many of his other 
staff changes, came from an advertisement on the bulletin board at Main Navy. In 
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multiple oral histories, Hatch has said that he always paid close attention to the bulletin 
boards. Hatch desired to be a motion picture photographer, and a “bulletin came on the 
bulletin board...and it said that there would be training established at the “March of Time” 
for some navy and Marine personnel.”512 The March of Time was a short film and 
newsreel program established by TIME, Inc. in the 1930s. In Hatch’s words, what 
separated the March of Time from other newsreels was that they produced twenty-minute 
short documentaries, rather than the typical ten-minute fact-based newsreels released by 
most companies at the time.513 Each short film combined newsreel footage with 
interviews and dramatizations in order to provide context and realistic drama to the 
typical newsreels of the day. The March of Time films were presented between films at 
theaters all over the world.514 Hatch applied to the March of Time three separate times as 
a Private First Class and was denied every time. Fortunately for Hatch, a director at the 
March of Time, was at Main Navy one day and let Hatch know that the March of Time’s 
Producer, Louis de Rochemont was coming to town and that he could deliver some reels 
to him to get some face-to-face time. At the meeting, Hatch and de Rochemont talked for 
an hour and by the next day Hatch had orders to go to the March of Time in New York 
City.515  
                                                 
512 “Norman T. Hatch Oral History Interview, 2003.” From Nimitz Education and Research Center, 
National Museum of the Pacific War, Digital Archive. Audio. 
http://digitalarchive.pacificwarmuseum.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16769coll1/id/1592 (accessed July 7, 
2017).  
513 “Major Norman Hatch Oral History Interview, 2007-05.” Veterans History Project. 
https://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp-stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.60276/mv0001001.stream  
514 Jones, War Shots, 43. 
515 “Major Norman Hatch Oral History Interview, 2007-05.” Veterans History Project. 
https://memory.loc.gov/diglib/vhp-stories/loc.natlib.afc2001001.60276/mv0001001.stream  
 221 
Hatch began his training at the March of Time in October 1941 and began to learn 
the art form as well as he could through close observation of the professionals around 
him. Hatch largely performed menial tasks for the March of Time producers and directors 
such as setting up lights and other equipment, but he attributed his own skill with the 
camera to his time watching the professionals. Soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, de 
Rochefort directed Hatch to pack up some equipment and head straight down to 
Washington, D.C. as he anticipated a declaration of war. Hatch and the March of Time 
crew were able to get set up in the Capitol Building and witnessed Roosevelt’s famous 
“Day of Infamy” speech. 
While the Marine Corps was bolstered by half a century of publicity and attention 
to its image, the Corps was not ready to document the war when it finally came. Many 
Marines were particularly upset about the lack of coverage of the fighting at Wake Island 
on December 11, 1941. As previously discussed, the newly established Division of Public 
Relations (DPR), headed by Brigadier General Robert L. Denig sought to make sure that 
Wake Island became the center point of the Corps’ broadcasting plan during those early 
days. On January 6, 1942, President Roosevelt mentioned the Marines at Wake Island in 
his State of the Union speech. The Corps’ response to this perceived compliment was 
swift. In a January 19, 1942 letter from Brigadier General Denig to the commanding 
officer of Marine Corps Plans and Policies, Denig stated that “it is felt by the Division of 
Public Relations that a historic occasion of this nature will be of great interest to the 
personnel of the Corps and of assistance for the recruiting service.”516 Wake Island was 
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also featured heavily in the radio broadcasts paid for by the Marine Corps in the months 
after the start of the war and even the March of Time did a documentary on the battle.  
The Marine Corps leaned on Norm Hatch to help get the Corps’ photographic 
section up to par before he reported to back to Quantico. So desperate was the Marine 
Corps for motion picture photographic equipment that Hatch was ordered to scour New 
York City for used cameras and other 35-millimeter equipment that the Marine Corps 
could use.517 The photography industry had simply not expected the surge in demand 
when the war started, and most of the new cameras were bought up immediately by 
America’s news organizations as well as the far better funded army and navy. Some of 
the best cameras at the time were also German and as such were banned from 
importation. 
By October 1942, now Staff Sergeant Hatch had joined the 2d Marine Division 
Photographic Section in San Diego, California. He was joined there by another motion 
picture photographer, Staff Sergeant Johnny Ercole, who also attended the March of Time 
training program. Hatch and Ercole still needed to acquire higher quality cameras and 
film for their own work, so they both went to Hollywood to find new equipment. One of 
the places where they stopped was film manufacturer, Technicolor.  
Technicolor played an important role in film history as the first mass produced 
color film. The Technicolor process utilized three separate film strips of colors (red, blue, 
and yellow) in the filming process, which created color, whereas prior to this 
development, most color in film was added in post-production. Technicolor built on their 
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success of the three-strip color film with iconic color motion pictures such as The Wizard 
of Oz and Gone with the Wind. That particular type of film, however, was enormously 
expensive and heavy and would have been burdensome for Marine photographers, 
assuming they could have afforded it in the first place. Technicolor, however, had 
designed a new single-strip color film, much like Kodak Kodachrome, called the 
Technicolor Monopack, which created vibrant color footage in a portable and cost-
effective manner.518 The Technicolor staff gave Hatch and Ercole a tour of the factory 
and offered them 1,000 feet of Monopack film ready for field use.519  
Ultimately, Hatch and Ercole put out a call across all Los Angeles radio stations 
for 16-millimeter cameras to be donated to the Marine Corps for the war effort. The 
Marine Corps is often known as the service which can accomplish the most with the least. 
This is certainly an instance where the Marines did not have tremendous financial support 
like the army and navy, nor the celebrity motion picture directors such as Frank Capra, 
John Huston, and John Ford, to pull their weight around in Hollywood, yet they were able 
to scrape together the equipment necessary to document their combat experiences. 
In early 1943, Staff Sergeant Norm Hatch traveled with the 2d Marine Division to 
New Zealand to train and prepare with for the upcoming invasion. The photographic 
section of the 2d Marine Division was led by Louis “Louie” Hayward, a famous South 
African turned naturalized-American actor. Hayward was best known for his leading 
roles in Hollywood.520 After the Pearl Harbor attack, Hayward became a naturalized 
                                                 
518 Scott Higgins, Harnessing the Technicolor Rainbow: Color Design in the 1930s (Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 2007), 81. 
519 Jones, War Shots, 66-67. 
520 Jones, War Shots, 86. 
 224 
citizen of the U.S. and joined the Marine Corps.521 There were fifteen officers and men in 
the photographic section that landed at Tarawa and 2 of those photographers were killed 
during the battle.522 
In the Pacific War, Operation Galvanic, the capture of Tarawa in November 1943, 
was considered an early battle. While the Marines were battle-tested at Guadalcanal and 
other areas of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), the V Amphibious Corps landing at 
Tarawa with traditional Higgins landing craft and the newer amphibious tractors 
(amtracs) was still a young operation. As the U.S. Army and Navy acquired strongholds 
in the SWPA, a second operation was launched across the Central Pacific. The Central 
Pacific drive, carried out primarily by U.S. Navy fast carrier task forces, consisted of 
simultaneous airstrikes as far north as the Bonin Islands and as far west as the Caroline 
Islands in the Pacific to both soften up defenses in those areas and to divert attention 
away from the amphibious invasions that took place. With Midway Island secured by 
mid-1942, the U.S., with its industrial capacity growing by the day, set out a plan to 
move across the Pacific, a renewal of the original battle plans ORANGE and RAINBOW 
laid out in 1920s. As Japan showed the first signs of being on its heels, the U.S. sought to 
put its offensive power into play in multiple points across the Pacific in order to force the 
Japanese to stretch their defense lines as thin as possible. 
One of the first major amphibious invasions in the Central Pacific drive was at 
Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll. The size of Betio island lent much to the brutality of the 
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battle. Betio island, at 1.5 square kilometers in area is sometimes referred to as half the 
size of Central Park.523 At two miles long and in some places less than 700 yards wide, 
however, it is more akin to a modern-day airport runway and with only a few more 
terrain features. When World War II reached the picturesque Pacific sands of Tarawa, the 
tiny strip of sand and palm trees became a compact killing ground.  
Based on intercepts from broken Japanese naval codes, U.S. intelligence predicted 
there were roughly 2,500-3,000 Japanese troops on the island. This turned out to be fairly 
accurate, but what that intelligence and even pre-invasion aerial reconnaissance was 
unable to gather, however, were the lengths at which that Japanese dug into the island in 
order to protect themselves from the terrific American bombardment, both from the air 
and sea. Throughout the island, the Japanese built concrete bunkers that would withstand 
anything but multiple direct hits from naval shells or aerial bombs. These bunkers proved 
to be the most difficult obstacles on the island. The Japanese defensive strategy was that 
of a defense in depth. The Japanese knew that the 3,000-strong garrison at Betio could 
not hold off an entire American division. The defense was created, however, to slow the 
Americans down enough so that there would be time for the Japanese navy to respond 
with their own submarine and carrier strikes on the vulnerable American transports sitting 
off the island.524 For the Americans, there was little doubt prior to the invasion, that the 
only way to come away from Tarawa victorious would be to destroy the entire Japanese 
garrison on the island.  
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The 2d Marine Division, slated to take the island as part of the V Amphibious 
Corps, was comprised of roughly 18,000 Marines. For the invasion, the amphibious 
assault was planned to land first on the northern beaches of Tarawa, dubbed Red Beaches 
1, 2, and 3. Landing at these beaches would allow the Marines to take immediate control 
of Betio’s deep water pier and position them to cut across the middle of the island in 
order to divide the Japanese troops. Only the 2d and 8th Marines would take part in the 
initial assault, with the 6th Marines held in corps reserve. With the support troops also 
slated for follow-on landings, this meant that based on assault personnel alone, the 
Marines landed at Tarawa with roughly 2-1 advantage, a number that did not sit well with 
the 2d Marine Division’s commander, Major General Julian Smith.  
On 20 November, the 2d Marine Division assaulted the beaches of Betio Island. 
Amphibious planners knew ahead of time that the depth of the water would be an issue 
for the Marines. While aerial reconnaissance photos greatly aided in the creation of 
objectives on land for the Marines, they did not provide much information about the coral 
reefs and the depth of the water moving in. This led to one of the most important lessons 
the Marines learned, which was the importance of beach reconnaissance and underwater 
demolition teams to reconnoiter the invasion beaches. While the Marines would have the 
coral-hopping amtracs available to them, still more than half of the Marines would board 
Landing Craft Vehicle, Personnel (LCVPs) or traditional low-draft Higgins boats. These 
craft were well-suited to invasions onto sandy beaches, but when faced with the razor 
sharp coral reefs and a draft of less than 3 feet deep, they were rendered ineffective.525 
Another variable the Marines faced were the tidal conditions. At certain times of the year, 
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a neap tide condition would exist, where the tides became extremely unpredictable. Even 
Maj Gen Julian Smith was aware that the chances of the tide being deep enough for the 
LCVPs to cross the reef was roughly 50/50.526 Neap tide created a condition where high 
tide was much lower than most every other day of the year. Unfortunately for Smith and 
for the Marines, the neap tide was extremely low on 20 November.  
The first wave consisted of Marines in the amtracs, able to clear the coral reef and 
drive the Marines straight up to the island.527 While the amtracs proved effective in 
getting the troops ashore, their place as the first vehicles in the assault meant that the 
majority of those vehicles were knocked out prior to or just after reaching ashore. With 
the amtracs knocked out on the beach, they were not able to return to the ships to pick up 
more Marines and guide them shore. Once the majority of the amtracs (the Marines had 
100 for the assault) were out of commission, the follow-on waves only had the LCVPs 
available. The LCVPs could only get the Marines as far as the coral reef.  
Once they hit the reef, the Marines had to disembark into the coral and wade 
roughly 500 yards in the water to the shore. This, of course, proved dangerous for a 
number of reasons. The coral reef was extremely dangerous to cross for the Marines as 
they were weighted down by their gear. Any holes they encountered had the potential to 
severely injure a Marine’s leg in the best scenario, or cause the Marine to be submerged 
completely, which, with their heavy equipment might mean they could not get themselves 
out. The amtracs were also an obvious point of concentration for Japanese fire. Once past 
the coral reef, the slow-moving Marines were exposed to a hail of Japanese fire with no 
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effective cover. The fact that Marines had to wade ashore at Tarawa became one of the 
most reported tactical errors for the Marine Corps in the Pacific. Newspapers in the U.S. 
latched onto to this fact in order to show the Marine Corps had actually committed a 
blunder. While some historians have defended the Corps’ choice to go ashore during neap 
tide and with LCVPs, the fact remains that it was an event that defined the battle.528 
Not timid to get the shots they needed in battle, Staff Sergeant Norman Hatch and 
his assistant, Private First Class Kelly Kelliher managed to get into one of the first waves 
ashore on Betio while much of the Marine photographic section was still shooting color 
footage aboard the ships of the fleet. Hatch and Kelliher were in the command boat of the 
2d battalion, 8th Marines with its commanding officer, Major Henry P. “Jim” Crowe. The 
2d battalion, 8th Marines was assigned with the task of securing Red Beach 3, which was 
the closest beach just to the east of the long pier. The boat in which he was riding was 
one of the fateful LCVPs, which meant that Hatch, with all of his camera equipment, had 
to wade ashore.  
As photographers, particularly motion picture photographers, Hatch and Ercole 
carried a tremendous amount of gear. According to Hatch, together they had 200 pounds 
of gear. The men both had a 35-millimeter Eyemo camera, as well as “eight Bell & 
Howell 16-millimeter autoload motion picture cameras, which shot color film and were 
favored more by the Marine Corps than any other service branch; the 35-millimeter Wahl 
sound camera...a number of four-by-five Speed Graphics,” as well as chemicals, paper 
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and other supplies. The photographers also carried 10 cans of film, totaling 1,500 feet, 
and three-lens spider turrets. On top of their photographic gear, they both carried a pistol 
and ammunition.529  
This was a heavy load for the men, especially as they navigated their way ashore. 
The LCVP they were in had a failure of the loading ramp, so they both had to crawl over 
the side of the vehicle and essentially fall into the water. Once in water, both men had to 
stand-up completely straight as they walked in order to keep the film equipment dry. 
Fortunately, they were fairly protected by the pier from incoming fire and they used it for 
cover all the way to shore. Once ashore, Hatch and Kelliher sought to find cover and set 
up their cameras to begin capturing images of the other Marines pinned down on the 
beach by gunfire. The two photographers caught up with Major Crowe and his command 
post foxholes and they continued to film the Marines and the naval and air gunfire raining 
down on the Japanese. 
The initial beach assault on Tarawa was a tremendous struggle for the Marines. 
The amtracs of the first wave were able to get a number of battalions ashore, but the 
Marines were pinned down on the beach. Many companies experienced between 25% to 
50% casualties. Major General Julian Smith committed another battalion to the battle in 
an attempt to continue the momentum on the shore before noon as he knew that the key 
to any amphibious invasion is to hold and then push through the beach. The size of the 
island and proximity of the bulk of Japanese forces, just by the nature of the island made 
it very difficult for the Marines to move forward. Marines remembered the waves hitting 
their feet as they fought for their lives and a hold on the beach. The U.S.’s hope was that 
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by the end of D-Day, Marines would have cut across the center of the island and defeated 
the majority of Japanese resistance. However, at the close of D-Day, the Marines had 
made it not quite halfway across the island, and not yet to the airfield’s runway, which 
was one of their main objectives. 
Unbeknownst to Hatch, he was one of the only motion picture photographers on 
the island that first day. Every other photographer was either capturing color film from 
the ship, failed to find a spot on a landing craft, or, as in the case of one Marine motion 
picture photographer and his civilian counterpart, their landing craft was capsized or 
destroyed. Alongside, Hatch, however, was Robert Sherrod, a civilian correspondent with 
Time. Sherrod was also accompanying Major Crowe and his battalion. Sherrod’s news 
pieces and eventual book on Tarawa became seminal histories of the battle and civilian 
coverage of the war. Sherrod’s stories about Tarawa often end up sounding much 
different than Hatch’s retelling of events. For Hatch, the battle was a canvas on which to 
project a story that could be made into a film such as the March of Time newsreels. In 
later interviews, Hatch admitted that viewing the battle through the lens of his camera 
offered him an escape from the realities of what was going on around him.530 Hatch was 
also trained as a combat Marine before he ever got into the motion pictures he was 
creating. While Sherrod the civilian correspondent had a nearly identical experience to 
Hatch in terms of his journey to shore and his location on the battlefield, his more 
realistic telling of the battle was that of fear, chaos, and death. Sherrod highlighted the 
death he saw around him, particularly the sudden and random nature of it all. 
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 On the second day of the battle, Hatch and Kelliher continued to film the Marines 
fighting across the island. Japanese snipers were all over the island and they had even 
taken up in some of the half-sunken landing craft out to sea, putting the snipers at the 
Marines’ backs. The objectives for the day largely comprised the concrete Japanese 
bunkers strewn across the island. None of the American firepower levied on these 
blockhouses had the intended effect. The Japanese were still able to hide out and continue 
to pick off the Marines who approached. Using dynamite and flamethrowers, the Marines 
cleared out the command posts one-by-one. Hatch captured much of this type of fighting 
on film, including one of the most important shots, a group of Japanese soldiers escaping 
a bunker with the Marines who caught them in the same shot. While this proved to be the 
only moment on film of both sides in combat in World War II, it would be the images he 
caught after the battle was over that would garner America’s attention. 
 The Battle for Tarawa continued for another day, totaling 76 hours of combat for 
the Marines. The Marine Corps lists its casualties for the invasion at roughly 1,000 dead 
and 2,200 wounded, with a total of 3,300 casualties. Nearly all of the Japanese on the 
island were killed or too wounded to fight or commit suicide. Most of the prisoners 
captured on the island were Korean laborers. The Americans captured several other 
islands in the atoll with far less cost in human life, including Makin and Apamama. The 
airfield at Tarawa was immediately put into use as a forward operating base for navy and 
U.S. Army Air Forces aircraft to strike the next line of Japanese defenses. 
Tarawa was a defining battle for the Marine Corps. The nickname “Bloody 
Tarawa” was created as news of the casualties began to reach the U.S.531 General 
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Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and critic of the navy’s 
drive across the Central Pacific, predictably expressed his unease about the Corps’ assault 
on the tiny atoll, writing that “these frontal attacks by the Navy, as at Tarawa, are a tragic 
and unnecessary massacre of American lives.”532 In the newspapers back in the U.S., the 
initial headlines of the invasion took a strikingly heroic tone regarding the “bold” capture 
of the Japanese held islands. Based on headlines such as “U.S. Air Forces Wreck Jap 
Bases at Tarawa,” it was perhaps easy to believe that American forces would not face 
tremendous opposition.533 
News of the battle’s toll, however, began to ramp up as Americans celebrated 
Thanksgiving. By November 27, 1943, the headlines began to focus more heavily on the 
casualties. In an article titled “Marines’ Toughest Battle,” war correspondent Richard 
Johnston of the Chicago Tribune wrote that “No victory in American military history was 
attained at a higher price.”534 In another article on that day, the New York Times 
published Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox’s warning that the public should expect 
severe casualty reports in the coming days and weeks. Knox stated that “the American 
losses undoubtedly were considerably less than the estimated Japanese casualties of 
approximately 4,000.”535 At roughly 3,300, however, American casualties were not far 
behind the Japanese.  
 For the Marine Corps, the public’s perception of the Battle of Tarawa was a 
defining moment, both for its image as a hard fighting service on the “tip of the spear,” 
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but also at a moment when maintaining its volunteer image was crucial for recruiting. 
The Battle at Tarawa, and particularly the news of terrible casualties at Tarawa, came at a 
time when the Roosevelt Administration felt it needed to shock the nation into 
understanding the cost of war. Even after the North African and Italian campaigns tallied 
over 10,000 casualties, the Tarawa invasion came at the moment when the government 
eased up on censorship and allowed not only the casualty statistics, but also the images of 
the battle it released.536  
 The news of the battle as it was distributed in the states certainly built up a 
visceral sense of the gore, even without the images. In a Chicago Tribune article, 
correspondent Robert Trumbull reported: 
This island was won over the dead bodies of United States Marines. Betio fell because the Marines 
kept coming. As those in front of them died, other Marines took their places. Finally, a force of 
men was able to get on the beach. This battle was the bloodiest mess ever seen. Today, 24 hours 
after the last organized Japanese resistance ended, riddled corpses form a ghastly fringe along the 
narrow white beaches where men of the 2d Marine Division died for every foot of the sand. It is 
impossible to look in any direction from any point on this island, which is less than one square 
mile in area, without seeing bodies of Marines and Japanese.
537
 
This was, in fact, a natural progression of the government’s push to acclimate the public 
to the horrors of war, and “bring the cost of this war in human lives directly to the 
people.”538 
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While some historians see the press’ focus on the toll at Tarawa as “bad press,” 
the Division of Public Relations lauded the work that was released to the public by its 
Marine Combat Correspondents.539 A December 11, 1943 issue of the Memorandum for 
Combat Correspondents lauded, “In the Tarawa action our combat footage functioned for 
the first time as it is supposed to function.”540 The Marines at the DPR knew that the 
battle of Tarawa, including the death, destruction, and gore told the story for them and 
was well within parameters of the Corps’ public image. 
Rather than bad press, the Marines of the DPR, who were tasked with managing 
the Corps’ sacred image, likely saw the battle at Tarawa as the true beginning of the 
Marine Corps’ participation in the war as far as its public image was concerned. The 
drawn-out battle for Guadalcanal, which ended with the Japanese escaping the island, 
was not the statement for the Corps’ image that Tarawa became by early 1944. In the 
press, the Corps’ struggle at Tarawa was soon compared to iconic American battles. In 
TIME, Robert Sherrod placed Tarawa into the annals of American history. “Last week 
some two to three thousand U.S. Marines, most of them now dead or wounded, gave the 
nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the 
Alamo, Little Big Horn, and Belleau Wood. The name was Tarawa.”541 
Norm Hatch, now 22-years old, survived the battle and his footage was 
immediately flown stateside. Fortunately for him, he had handwritten his name on all of 
his film reels, which allowed him direct credit for the footage that was coming out at 
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home. Small portions of his footage were released to the public in December for use as 
shorts in the newsreels. Officers at the DPR knew that Hatch’s footage was excellent, 
especially as there was so much good color footage to accompany the black and white 
combat scenes.542 Hatch remembered that he was recalled back to the U.S. quickly after 
the battle. While he figured he was in trouble, he realized when he returned that he had 
actually become somewhat of a celebrity. A local public relations officer drove him 
around San Francisco and showed Hatch his name on all of the marquees around town, a 
rare occurrence for military photographers.543 When Hatch returned to Washington, he 
was brought to a personal meeting with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major 
General Alexander Vandegrift and sent down to Quantico to teach Marine photographers 
preparing for the next invasion. 
The footage shot by Hatch and the Marine photographers at Tarawa gained 
notoriety across the country for its realistic presentation of the horrors of war. President 
Roosevelt, while in favor of showing pictures of the realities of war, reportedly went back 
and forth on the decision to release the most gruesome images of the film. In a letter from 
Sherrod to TIME Associate Editor David Hulburd on December 28, 1943, Sherrod 
recalled a conversation with President Roosevelt that lasted for twenty minutes after the 
President completed a press conference that afternoon. As Sherrod recalled, “The 
President said: ‘What do you think of these pictures at Tarawa - I think we ought to 
release them.’ He added: ‘They are pretty gory-they show a lot of dead.’ I made the pat 
answer: ‘War is pretty gory, Mr. President,’ and said I thought they certainly should be 
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released.”544 It is unclear whether there were further conversations between Roosevelt 
and either the Joint Chiefs or the War Information Committee on the release of the film. 
While much of the combat footage was released in snippets to the newsreels, there were 
still a great number of gory scenes to be published before the film was released. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff invited Major Frank Capra, one of the greatest directors 
of the time, to help Hatch and the Marine Corps create a short documentary film out of 
the footage from Tarawa.545 Hatch’s youth and laid-back personality caught Capra’s 
attention and as part of the Fourth War Loan Drive in February 1944, he first produced a 
short called I was There Tarawa. In it, Hatch stands casually at the film processing table 
of the Army-Navy Screen Magazine cutting room while receiving praise for his work and 
bravery. Hatch recalls that between him and Kelliher they shot 5,000 feet of film, with 
Hatch claiming only 2,000 feet, a remarkably small amount of film for so much of it to be 
immediately ready for release.546 Hatch then moves over toward the projector and begins 
to narrate a newsreel-esque presentation of his footage.547 The 11-minute film only 
showed Hatch’s black and white footage, but included Marine dead and dying on the 
beaches, though no close-ups and none in color. 
Director Frank Capra and the Motion Picture Industry wing of the War Activities 
Committee spent $115,000 to edit, narrate, and compose the final product.548 With the 
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Marines at Tarawa was released on March 2, 1944, and was shown in theaters across the 
country as an intermission short between feature films. On March 1, 1944, the 
Hattiesburg American ran a review of the film titled “Tarawa Movie Will Erase Your 
Apathy,” in which the Associated Press (AP) reporter, Jack O’Brian, noted that the film 
was nearly rejected for release because the images were too gory for public consumption. 
“Even with the most horrible scenes deleted, it is by far and away the most powerful war 
documentary this reviewer has seen to date.”549 
The final cut of the film With the Marines at Tarawa mixed together both color 
motion picture footage from photographers aboard the ships and Hatch’s black and white 
combat footage from the front lines. An analysis of the footage and narration provides an 
interesting perspective into the ways in which both the Marine Corps and Hollywood 
perceived the Battle of Tarawa and how they wanted the public to view the battle, 
especially with such raw footage included. The film begins with color scenes of Marines 
boarding ships and the convoy’s voyage to Tarawa. Early on, the narrator dictates the 
strategic importance of Tarawa as a Japanese airfield at the “outer fringe of their Pacific 
defenses.”550 Footage of men at religious services show both younger and older men, 
which creates for the viewer a snapshot of the American public, rather than just “young 
boys off to war.” As the fleet arrived off Tarawa, shots of the American bombardment are 
shown in color. In one of these shots, the water is a crystalline aqua. This shot and others 
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that show the tremendous beauty of the islands bring the viewer a visceral sense of place, 
especially compared to much of the black and white footage from Europe. 
Unlike the reality of the battle, the narrator voices no sense of tension in planning 
or execution of the invasion. In the film, everything rolled off like clockwork. The 
narrator casually states that teamwork and preparation made this a perfect amphibious 
assault. This is an interesting claim, especially because the news reports that came from 
the battle heavily featured the fate of the Marines who had to wade ashore. The film 
shows both LCVPs and amtracs going ashore, playing down the availability of the latter, 
which was limited for the battle. The Marines are next shown infamously wading ashore 
in Technicolor. The photographer is on a ship far off in the distance, yet the shot again 
provides the contrast of beauty (water, beach, and palm trees), and impending death. The 
narrator then describes a “pretty good toehold on the beach,” but even the visuals betray 
that statement with nothing but a sea of heads poking up from hastily made foxholes. 
Both wounded and dead Japanese and Americans are shown early on in the film.551 
Once ashore, the film clearly switches from the vibrant colors of the motion 
picture photographers out to sea and turns back to Hatch’s black and white footage. The 
combat action in the film is immediately chaotic and aggressive, probably showing how 
the combat was on these islands better than any other film at the time. Men shooting at 
unseen objects and flamethrowers going off in the same scene, smoke and fire 
everywhere. One of the scenes that sets the film apart from any other in the war takes 
place in the eighth minute. Hatch captured one of the rarest forms of combat footage: 
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both U.S. and Japanese troops in the same shot. Many thought that it was a staged effort, 
though the Marines in the shot were clearly caught off guard by the Japanese running out 
and were only able to pull their weapons up seemingly too late. The Marine on the left 
fires his weapon, only to realize that it was futile given the amount of Japanese (roughly 
15) running from the bunker. He immediately lowers his weapon and tries to fish 
grenades from his bandoleer. The scene appears to be anything but staged. 
When compared to seeing our military in action today, the Marines in the film, 
some without helmets and their uniforms open, often seem as if they are on R&R. They 
seem, in some ways, uncoordinated. This, of course, is merely the chaos of battle 
showing through. They were clearly cautious and tentative as they snuck up on 
supposedly cleared bunkers. As a parent, these moments, aside from the dead Marines 
shown later, certainly came across as some of tensest. The parents watching the film 
might have thought that their son was the one with the pistol looking into the bunker 
while everyone else waited in the safety behind. There are other moments as well where 
the Marines’ veneer of invincibility briefly cracks. On top of a hill (the viewer has no 
conception of what is behind it, except the faceless enemy), Marines are shown using one 
of the deadliest weapons in their arsenal: flamethrowers. A Marine fires his flamethrower 
and (perhaps predictably) it nearly jumps out of his hand, looking more like a cartoon 
firehose than a deadly fire-breathing weapon. This brief moment gives the viewer the 
feeling that the Marine is perhaps young and inexperienced, not what a parent wants to 
see of their child in a film.552 
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About halfway through, the film shows the Japanese dead from the major action 
just before. The narrator coolly states that the Japanese are “savage fighters and their 
lives mean nothing to them.”553 Color footage on the island begins again soon after this. 
The coral dust and the heat are palpable. The narrator states that “by now we know the 
Japs are licked, and they must know it too,” however the battle lasted for two more days. 
The film is out of order according to Norm Hatch’s memory of the fighting that day. This 
would most likely be in order to get more of the color film into the footage. 
As film deals with the dead and dying Marines, the narrator addresses the graves 
registration activities, and specifically chaplains roaming the beaches and picking up one 
of the two dog tags on each of the dead Marines. “So there’ll be no mistake later on.”554 
Unfortunately, what happened to the dead of Tarawa became one of the more significant 
graves registration blunders of the war. While these chaplains did their duty by the book, 
shortly after these Marines were buried on Tarawa, their grave markers were moved in 
order to beautify the cemetery. Subsequently, a major runway was built on top of those 
graves and they were lost for nearly 70 years, until the Defense POW/MIA Accounting 
Agency was able to re-locate them and identify many of the missing Marines. 
How the film deals with the casualties, not just dead but also wounded, was 
significant as well. The narrator discusses the wounded, assuring the audience that 
throughout the process, all of the wounded are attended to by navy doctors and corpsmen. 
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When the first dead Marines are shown strewn across the beaches, no faces are shown. 
The film is bleached out, so blood is difficult to see. Rifles are sticking up to mark their 
bodies among the miscellaneous debris alongside them. The narrator then states that “this 
is the price we pay for the war we didn’t want,” as the camera pans up to show seemingly 
endless dead Marines along the beach. The most gruesome shot of the film is a brief close 
up of a dead Marine, clearly rigid from rigor mortis and either burned or bloated from the 
sun and heat. The top of his head is red and there is clearly blood running down the side 
of his arm. His face is not clear with the blood and disfigurement, rendering him 
unrecognizable to those watching. What follows was one of the most reproduced images 
of the battle: dead Marines floating against the shore, many face-up and also bloated from 
rigor mortis. No faces are shown here, but the display of the dead as if they were no 
different than the flotsam around them is certainly a dire picture. 
A burial at sea is shown next. Perhaps the ritual and pomp among the Marines and 
sailors during the ceremony is enough for some families, but for many, a family member 
buried at sea is a just another missing soldier who is no longer considered missing by the 
military. The narrator lists the casualty numbers and states that “Tokyo once boasted it 
would cost 100,000 soldiers to take the island. We lost less than 1,000, while the 
Japanese lost over 4,000.” As the film closes, the Marines raise the flag, the narrator 
states in first person that “we were mighty proud.”555 The final footage of the film shows 
the Marines who fought the battle marching all together in unison as if they were 
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marching on to the next battle, and the film closes with the Marine Corps Eagle, Globe, 
and Anchor, with the words Semper Fidelis. 
The public reception of the movie in the newspapers was roughly what the Marine 
Corps and the Roosevelt Administration expected. The film was advertised heavily in 
hundreds of cities across the country as an accompanying feature to the major motion 
pictures of the day. The reviews and previews of With the Marines at Tarawa made sure 
the public knew what to expect from the film. There were few publicly critical newspaper 
articles regarding the footage and its effect on viewers. However, a March 13, 1944 
article in the La Grande Observer of La Grande, Oregon offered a cynical tone in its 
preview of the film citing that it was “A picture that cost a human life” for a reel.556 A 
reason for the positive public reception might be that some theaters edited or cut out the 
most gruesome scenes of the film, choosing to act as local censors. In a full-page 
advertisement of the film in the Hattiesburg American, the Royal Theater published a 
“note” regarding the film, which stated “Even though the most gruesome parts of this 
film have been eliminated, still no one can see this picture and ever again complain of the 
hardships of ‘The Home Front.’ Taxes, rationing, scarcity, high prices...all fade into 
insignificance after you have witnessed the invasion of Tarawa.”557 
At the Corps’ Division of Public Relations, however, the response by both the 
public and the Corps’ own recruiters caused an intense debate that lasted through May 
1944. There were clearly two separate and competing beliefs about the effect of showing 
dead and dying Marines to the public. The pressure of recruiting 17-year-olds into the 
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Marine Corps in order to maintain its “volunteer” status left Marine recruiters across the 
country, but especially on the West Coast, having to deal with upset parents and lower 
recruiting numbers as a result of the film. The officials of the DPR, however, felt strongly 
that the film enhanced the Corps’ image, especially to 17-year-olds and was therefore a 
broad success. 
On March 16, 1944, Colonel Ralph West (USMC), the officer in charge of 
recruiting for district of San Francisco, sent a scathing letter to the head of the Western 
Procurement District which stated “the undersigned complained against the publication in 
the press of photographs featuring dead, dying, and wounded Marines, and against the 
public exhibition in commercial motion picture houses of factual films such as ‘The 
Marines at Tarawa,’ especially in technicolor, showing numerous scenes of dead, dying, 
and wounded Marines engaged in combat, the technicolor adding to the gruesomeness of 
the scenes and the spilling of blood.”558 West claimed that it was “reliably reported to 
him,” that the film causes “women to faint and men to vomit.”559 West argued that “this 
type of publicity is harmful to the Marine Corps recruiting program in this District 
because it causes parents to refuse consent to the enlistment of their 17-year-old sons in 
the Marine Corps on the grounds that Marine Corps service is too dangerous.”560 As 
proof of the negative impact on the Corps’ recruiting process, West attached the 
statements of several Marine Corps recruiters who experienced the perceived blow-back 
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daily. West reinforced the validity of their statements by listing the educational and 
career backgrounds of all 19 recruiters. 
All of the recruiters cited serious concerns regarding the effect of With the 
Marines at Tarawa as well any other films that might be in the works. Staff Sergeant 
Charles W. Gann argued that “such scenes appealed only to the morbidly curious. Parents 
of boys serving overseas were left with a depressed feeling and many expressed their 
disapproval towards viewing such films.”561 Staff Sergeant Sanford M. Berenson noted 
that publicity such as this film give “the impression that the Corps is the ‘Suicide branch 
of the Armed Forces.’”562 Multiple recruiters argued that the Marine Corps was the only 
branch showing these types of images. While this was not true, the perception of the 
Corps as the branch that most often showed its dead was a damning one for these 
recruiters. Staff Sergeant A.W. Stremmel offered the most vivid description of the 
public’s reaction to the images in the film. “Women and young girls were crying and 
expressing their opinions to their escorts that the Marine Corps would be the last branch 
of the armed services of the United States that would allow any of their relatives to enter 
if they had anything to do with it.” “The picture was morbid and nauseating. From a news 
standpoint it contained only the belated message that everyone knows, the fact that the 
Marines captured Tarawa. The fact that the display of bodies of dead Marines is intended 
to spur every individual on to a great war effort is defeated.”563 
                                                 
561 Charles W. Gann to OIC District Headquarters Induction and Recruiting Station (DHIRS), San 
Francisco, March 21, 1944. Marine Corps Methods and Plans - Public Relations, Box 1468, Entry A1 18-B, 
1939-1950, RG 127. NACP. 
562 Sanford Berenson to OIC DHIRS, March 21, 1944. Marine Corps Methods and Plans - Public Relations, 
Box 1468, Entry A1 18-B, 1939-1950, RG 127. NACP. 
563 A.W. Stremmel to OIC DHIRS, March 21, 1944. Marine Corps Methods and Plans - Public Relations, 
Box 1468, Entry A1 18-B, 1939-1950, RG 127. NACP. 
 245 
 In response to Colonel West’s damning letter, the Division of Public Relations 
immediately sent out a memorandum to all recruiting sergeants across the country 
requesting them to respond with a letter as to whether the films and images of dead 
Marines “act as a deterrent or as an incentive for enlistment of 17-year-olds.”564 It was 
clear that Colonel West’s experiences took the officials at the DPR by surprise, and in 
order to qualitatively analyze the problem, the DPR essentially polled recruiters across 
the entire country. It is not clear if the responses presented in the collection represent 
every single response to the request, however, the report does include positive, negative, 
and mixed results from the recruiters.565 Many of the responses were also from the 
Western Recruiting District since the original report stemmed from the West Coast. In 
their replies, the unnamed recruiting sergeants offered a glimpse into the Corps’ 
recruiting strategies, especially as it came to the younger 17-year-olds. 
 The response from the Seattle District succinctly represented the DPR’s primary 
belief about the effect of these images on the American public. In their response to the 
DPR, the District of Seattle reported that “the personnel of this office unanimously agree 
that combat pictures depicting the hazards of battle and casualties are an incentive to 17-
year-olds, as most of the applicants, we find, are urged by the spirit of adventure rather 
than by any other opportunity the corps might offer.”566 The “spirit” of the Marine Corps 
is the Corps’ public image and the DPR wanted the public to believe that the Marine 
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Corps would go into the toughest fights and win the day, no matter the cost. The recruits 
that responded positively to that public image were exactly the type of men (and by this 
point, women also) that the Marine Corps wanted to incentivize. 
 The responses in the negative all took a similar line of argument as those 
submitted by the recruiters of the San Francisco area. The District of Butte responded that 
“Mothers and fathers who saw that picture are going to feel, reasonably enough perhaps, 
that the day of their son’s enlistment should be postponed as long as possible. Sisters, 
knowing their enlistment means the transfer of a male Marine to combat duty, may share 
that opinion.”567 The Marines of the District of Butte offered that perhaps in future films 
there be “increased stressing the intensive Marine Corps training as a protective measure 
in combat. This might counteract valid Tarawa scenes and any other legitimately 
newsworthy films in which Marines are rendered ‘hors de combat’.”568  
 Memoranda from Public Relations Officers (PROs) around the country largely 
rejected the findings of Colonel West and his recruiters. The conclusions the DPR drew 
from their surveys was that, while some 17-year-olds were not able to join because their 
parents were upset by the film, “it is not felt that the showing of the picture was ill-
advised.”569 PRO Captain Merlin Sterling argued that “All media of public information 
have long since established the Marines as hard-hitting assault troops. No far-reaching 
damage could have been done to recruiting as the man who selects the Marine Corps 
generally wants combat action and the ‘fighting Marine’ reputation is probably the chief 
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attraction in most enlistments. The Tarawa film supports that traditional conception of the 
Marines admirably.”570 
 The film With the Marines at Tarawa and the battle itself played important roles 
in the development of the Marine Corps’ public image. While the Marines suffered 
terrible losses at Tarawa, the public perception of the battle fit directly in line with the 
Corps’ public relations goals and values. The powerful frontal assault of the tiny atoll 
conducted almost wholly by Marines, while drawing the post-battle ire of army officers, 
was an ideal story to tell the public, both during the war and long after. Tarawa 
immediately became one of the most iconic battles of the war and far from disappointed, 
the Marine Corps embraced Tarawa into its mythology. For the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade was called Task Force Tarawa. This was certainly 
no mistake or impromptu move on the part of the Marine Corps as those Marines surely 
embraced the correlation of their war with that of World War II. The navy has also 
commemorated Tarawa with a ship of that name continuously from 1945 to the present, 
with the amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-1). 
 The film With the Marines at Tarawa went on to win an Academy Award for Best 
Short Subject Documentary in 1944. While Hatch was not named in the credits for the 
Oscar, his work with the Marine Corps proved to be a defining moment. Hatch went on to 
film more seminal Marine Corps events, including the Battle of Iwo Jima and air attacks 
on Japan. Had the Marines fought for the island of Tarawa in any earlier than late 1943, it 
is possible the film would never have received the credit it did due to the realistic images 
of war it portrayed. While it was certainly an impressive piece of combat film, showing 
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both sides in one shot, it was its depiction of the horrors of war that made it an important 
work to the Roosevelt Administration and the Marine Corps. While the Marine Corps had 
an intense internal debate over its impact on the recruiting of 17-year-olds after Selective 
Service was imposed, the DPR’s stance on the film remained that the film was not only 
important in order to place Tarawa into the mythos of the Marine Corps, but also to 
incentivize potential recruits who wanted to be at the “tip of the spear.” 
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CONCLUSION 
The military services of the United States are instruments of American diplomacy, but 
they are also reflections of American society. The case of public relations and the U.S. 
Marine Corps between 1898 and 1945 provides a lens through which historians can view 
how one of those services interacted with the American public and the successes and 
repercussions of this unique approach to civil-military relations. The Marine Corps faced 
unparalleled obstacles in its pursuit of a secure place in the U.S. military. This peculiar 
position, however, placed Marines in a condition of constant defense for their own 
existence, thus creating a powerful drive for survival. The disadvantages the Corps had to 
overcome, including its small size, arguably redundant mission, and relative obscurity at 
the turn of the twentieth century, led the Marines to take their case to the public. In an 
unprecedented campaign of open dialogue with the American people, the Marine Corps 
overcame its limitations and emerged as heroes—a true elite fighting force in the public 
imagination. 
 While the Marine Corps as an institution did not begin the twentieth century with 
an explicit knowledge of the power of public relations, its ability to deploy to the 
locations at which the nation needed them most, and the Corps’ positive impression upon 
war correspondents from Cuba to China displayed the effectiveness of good publicity. 
From the turn of the twentieth century, the Marine Corps built and maintained its image 
in the public eye. Beginning with the Spanish-American War, the Marine Corps’ 
participation in “small wars,” not only sent Marines to the corners of the earth but also 
gained a constant state of publicity from which the public could identify the Marines as 
either the protectors of Democracy or tools of American expansion to new frontiers. In 
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either sense, the word Marine increasingly came before the public in the first decade of 
the twentieth century. The public remained entranced with the actions of Marines in 
places like the Caribbean and the Pacific, areas of the world considered America’s new 
frontiers.  
Beginning as early as 1903, government agencies began to recognize the 
effectiveness of public relations precedents set in the private sector in the years before. 
As the use of public relations began to take hold within the federal government, the U.S. 
military began to employ public relations principles in order to bolster recruitment and 
appropriations. The Marine Corps’ development and use of a Publicity Bureau was 
essential in its ability to capitalize on an emerging tool for institutions to organize and 
control its relationship with the public. With the foresight of Marines including Thomas 
G. Sterrett and others, the Recruiting and Publicity Bureau introduced its crowning 
achievement, The Recruiters’ Bulletin. Through the Bulletin, Marines at the Publicity 
Bureau in New York could provide advice to the recruiting stations across the country. 
With the experience of former newspapermen and those versed in public relations, 
Marine recruiters gained the ability to take the case of the Marine Corps to local 
newspaper editors with the Corps’ groundbreaking use of press releases in daily 
newspapers.  
The First World War brought with it the ability for the Marine Corps to allocate a 
more assets toward recruiting and advertising along with the national mobilization effort. 
While the Recruiters’ Bulletin and the Publicity Bureau in New York continued to work 
at full capacity in order to gain publicity, the Corps’ leaders, including Commandant 
George Barnett successfully lobbied for Marines to travel with the first troops to Europe 
 251 
in order to fulfill the advertising promise of being the “first the fight.” The First to Fight 
campaign itself proved to be an incredibly powerful publicity slogan as it not only drew 
in recruits, but also reinforced the Corps’ image as a fighting unit. Much to the chagrin of 
leaders in the army, the Marines managed to maintain a constant spotlight upon their 
actions through clever advertising campaigns and the constant focus on keeping the 
Corps’ name in front of the public. 
 Even though Marines represented a very small percentage of the troops fighting 
in France, their very name allowed news of their actions to pass through the strict 
guidelines of wartime censorship. With the stories of Floyd Gibbons, as well as media 
fascination that occurred over now traditional icons, including the term “Devil Dogs,” the 
Marine Corps managed to emerge from the war with far more credit to their name than 
was proportional to their part in the entire war. Regardless of this fact, the Corps 
maintained a focus on these exploits, thus creating and solidifying myth and legend with 
in the WWI record of the Marines.  
 The First World War had done much for the publicity of the Marines and it was 
then the duty of the Corps’ leadership to preserve public image momentum into the 
conservative 1920s and legitimize the public image the Corps developed. When Major 
General John Archer Lejeune succeeded Major General George Barnett as commandant 
in 1920, he immediately began to reorganize the Marine Corps from headquarters down. 
Lejeune, the Marine, was a student of the Naval Academy and the U.S. Army War 
College, all of which offered him strong credibility in both the military and political 
realms. Having commanded an army division in the First World War, there was not much 
Lejeune had not accomplished, allowing him tremendous flexibility in reforming the 
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Corps during his eight years as commandant. Lejeune introduced sweeping reforms, 
including a new system of promotion and the establishment of the Marine Corps Schools, 
a predecessor of the Marine Corps Command and General Staff College and the Marine 
Corps Institute, which helped enlisted Marines develop their careers both in and out of 
the Corps. His reforms institutionalized professionalism in the Marine Corps and the 
establishment of a Marine Corps Historical Center helped to solidify the Corps’ focus on 
the preservation and publication of its history for the future. Lejeune continued the 
legacies of the Recruiters’ Bulletin by maintaining a focus on the Corps’ image and a 
drive for public relations. Even small reforms, such as the establishment of a mandatory 
Marine Corps Birthday celebration every year, helped to mythologize the Corps’ 
traditions.  
 Conservatism and budget cuts in the 1920s forced General Lejeune to reduce both 
personnel and funding to the recruiting section of the Marine Corps, yet the progressive 
commandant volunteered Marines for various different highly publicized events. Lejeune 
never forgot the importance of keeping the Marine Corps in the public eye and oversaw 
some of the Marine Corps’ most fascinating adventures. The Corps was called out twice 
in the 1920s to guard the U.S. mail system from armed robbers. It is clear now that by 
order of the Secretary of the Navy, no information was to be released concerning the 
guarding of U.S. mail by Marines, yet their story “leaked” and became a national 
sensation.571 Lejeune also established a precedent for the Corps’ partnership with 
                                                 
571 Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps to All Officers of the Recruiting Service, November 9, 1921, Folder: 
“Publicity,” Box 304, Entry 18, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Correspondence, 1913-1938, 
Record Group 127, National Archives and Records Administration I, Washington, D.C.  
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Hollywood, a partnership that proved vitally important to the Corps’ public image even 
through the Second World War. 
If the First World War acted as the Corps’ public relations renaissance, the 
Second World War was a canvas on which the Corps’ leadership could solidify the 
development over the previous forty years on the Corps’ public image. While Brigadier 
General Robert L. Denig claimed to arrive at the job as head of the Division of Public 
Relations with no experience, his ability to draw on the Corps’ past and prepare for the 
Corps’ participation in the war to come was uncanny. Instead of relying on the outdated 
methods then employed by all the services, in which protecting and reacting to the news 
was the norm, Denig sought out experts in the fields of journalism, photography, radio, 
and motion pictures in order to disseminate and control the Corps’ news.  
The cadre created by Denig, called the Marine Corps Combat Correspondents, 
became the most significant factor in the war that helped the Corps stand out above the 
other services. As the Corps’ Combat Correspondents travelled all over the other world to 
follow the Corps’ achievements and the Marines on the ground, their “Joe Blow” stories 
filtered back to the United States to the hometowns of the families whose sons, brothers, 
and fathers waited desperately for news. By focusing on the individual Marines’ human 
experience in wartime, the Corps escaped the ubiquitous military and political interest 
stories often produced by the other services. This not only provided a service for the 
families and the Marines themselves, but it also helped to make the Marine’s wartime 
experience one in the same with the American experience in general. Without the Corps’ 
Joe Blow stories in the press, and its meticulous attention to getting the name of the 
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Marines into the public, events such as the flag-raising on Iwo Jima may not have 
reached as wide an audience as it did.  
 While the Marine Corps wanted to get its name in front of the public in the 
Second World War, just as it did in the First World War, Marine public relations leaders 
still believed that there was a type of recruit that was best suited for the Corps. Through 
an examination of the Battle of Tarawa and the Corps’ release of the film With the 
Marines at Tarawa it is clear that the Corps’ establishment of an elite image necessitated 
a type of recruit that fulfilled its own definitions of manliness and fitness. With the 
loosening of censorship on images from the battle fronts, the Marine Corps faced a 
challenge in getting those recruits as parental permission for new seventeen-year-old 
volunteers collided head on with the disturbing news and images that came from the 
Battle at Tarawa.  
 While even the Corps’ own recruiters sought to cease the displaying of these 
images, which showed dead and dying Marines on Pacific beaches, General Denig and 
the Department of Public Relations came to a different conclusion, one that had far-
reaching significance for the Corps’ public image. As some recruiters dealt with angry 
families and a reduction in volunteer numbers because of the scenes in With the Marines 
at Tarawa, Denig and other recruiters found that while those pictures worried the mothers 
and fathers of potential recruits, the type of Marine recruits that still showed up at the 
recruiting stations were exactly type of men the Corps sought. The type of men who saw 
the images of the dead and dying and wanted to join the fight, rather than run away from 
it. 
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 The Marines that volunteered for the Corps in the aftermath of Tarawa, one of the 
Corps’ bloodiest conflicts, truly embodied the image the Marine Corps had developed for 
nearly half a century. This was the image of a Marine around which the Corps developed 
its entire identity. This was the image developed from the news articles that touted its 
interventions around the world as the purveyors of American democracy throughout the 
early twentieth century. This was the image that the slogan, “First to Fight,” helped the 
Corps to achieve lower rejection rates during the First World War and, perhaps, led to a 
higher quality of combat efficiency in Europe. This was the image that Commandant 
John A. Lejeune helped to legitimize and integrate into American culture during the 
interwar period. This was the image that the Combat Correspondents disseminated to 
hometowns across the country during the Second World War.
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